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I.

II.

NAPOLEONIC MEDALS

The above are enlarged reproductions of originals in the author's possession; the actual diameter is 13 mil. These small medals were generally struck in gold, silver, and bronze, and were used for throwing broadcast among the people or soldiers.

I. — Struck during the Consulate, in 1803, just before the rupture of the peace with England. The legend, Armé pour la paix, *armed for peace*, is suggestive.

II. — The last medal bearing the effigy of Napoleon struck under the Empire; to commemorate the *Champ de Mai*, eighteen days before Waterloo.

Napoleon

A SHORT BIOGRAPHY

By

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PREFACE

THIS book is intended to present to the reader in the most concise form possible, but yet with historical accuracy, an outline of the history of Napoleon that will convey an adequate first impression of his genius and policy. Without some knowledge of this extraordinary man and of his period it is impossible to understand the politics, constitution, and general circumstances of modern Europe. But the literature of the Napoleonic period is so vast, probably approaching forty thousand books, that the reader who feels disposed to get some acquaintance with it is frequently unable to find a practicable way through the maze. It may be said without disparagement to their writers that any one of the three or four best general histories of Napoleon, taken alone, is inadequate to convey a sufficient impression of the man and his times. But to Napoleonic literature as a whole there is no key; a complete bibliography is so vast an undertaking that even the labours of Baron Lumbroso and Herr

Kircheisen appear to offer little promise of completion. The latter's select bibliography is the best available guide; but, however valuable for the student, some two hundred pages of bare bibliographical entries cannot be of great service to those not possessing some previously acquired knowledge. It is part of the purpose of the present work to enable the ordinary reader or the would-be student safely to take a few first steps in Napoleonic literature, avoiding the innumerable books of little or no authority, and getting some sort of notion beforehand of what those here recommended are likely to give him.[1]

As to the narrative itself the desire to attain conciseness combined with true proportion presents difficulties and disadvantages, results in unavoidable gaps. Thus no attempt can be made to narrate the numerous military operations of Napoleon on the same scale. Certain campaigns and battles, — Wagram, Austerlitz, Waterloo, for instance, — have been treated more fully as being of special importance politically or strategically; others have been passed over with a bare mention, though not without due consideration for the clearness

[1] As to the selection of books see also the remarks in the note to Chapter I.

and continuity of the narrative. Where details and anecdotes have been brought in it has invariably been for the purpose of illustrating broad issues.

To furnish a correct outline of Napoleonic history and to point the way along which it may be profitably pursued, that, and nothing more, is what this book aims at effecting.

This new edition is revised to date in the bibliographies, and is corrected in a few typographical and other slips. Its appearance coincides with that of my *French Revolution,* of which it forms the continuation. Will the reader kindly note, however, that this is not a short history, as that is, but a short biography? The one book continues the other, but in a different key.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., April, 1909.

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NAPOLEON

CHAPTER I

NAPOLEON BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Birth and Childhood — Education — Appearance and Character — The Revolution.

IN the history of Napoleon Bonaparte we plunge into the characteristic at the very outset, — the date of his birth. He was born either in 1768 or 1769; probably, but not certainly, in the latter year. As late as in 1796, when he married, the date of his birth was given as February 1768; later it was fixed at the 15th of August 1769. This is not a matter of vital importance, yet it is not without interest, for two reasons. In the first place, it is typical of Napoleon's methods that he should have placed the celebration of his birthday at the same date as that of the Assumption, which is one associated with rejoicing and merry-making in all Latin countries. Another interesting point in this connection is that in 1768 the island of Corsica, the home of the Bonapartes, was Genoese; a year later

it was French. If Napoleon was born in 1768, he was born a Genoese, if in 1769, a Frenchman.

However this may be, and the point has been the subject of some controversy, it is certain that all the circumstances of his birth and youth left him nearly devoid of what might be described as national traditions or feeling, though in his boyhood he was intensely Corsican. The Bonapartes were a noble but poor family of Italian extraction, settled at Ajaccio, where Charles Bonaparte, — Napoleon's father, — exercised legal functions under the Genoese government. He took part in the civil wars that preceded Napoleon's birth, in which Paoli became prominent. The Corsican disorders need not be related here. It will suffice to say that Charles Bonaparte transferred his allegiance to France in 1769, when the sovereignty of the island was abandoned by the Genoese. Yet by race neither he nor his son was a Frenchman. The Genoese were a maritime people. Their home was the Mediterranean. Their standards had been carried in triumph at various periods from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosphorus and Constantinople. This is worthy of note, for the boy brought up in the Genoese atmosphere and

traditions who became Emperor of the French had for many years his eyes and his policy constantly fixed on the Mediterranean. At every stage of his career we find that great inland sea, around which our civilization took its earliest shape, playing an all-important part. Napoleon first crossed it in the year 1779 when his father succeeded in securing his appointment to a free cadetship at the military school of Brienne.

Young Bonaparte's school days were not very remarkable. His ignorance of the French language, his lack of fine clothes and fine manners, his innate pride and aloofness, kept him solitary. He did not shine in arts and literature, but showed conspicuous ability and quickness in mathematics and geometry. In one other respect he impressed several of his teachers, and that was with his strong and domineering temperament. In 1784 he was transferred from Brienne to the military academy at Paris, and no sooner was he there than he revealed his force of character even more strongly by drawing up a memorandum exposing the numerous shortcomings of the establishment as a military training school, and setting out a scheme for its reformation. This did not tend to make the fifteen-year-old Corsican popular with those

placed over him; how little could they then foresee that he was fated to carry out this and many other even more important reforms within a very few years! He spent only twelve months in Paris, and then received his commission as a sublieutenant of artillery. Three years later the French Revolution broke out, and in ten years more the Corsican sublieutenant of artillery was the ruler of France. What were the causes that brought about this wonderful rise of fortune? Chiefly two: the extraordinary character of the man; the extraordinary character of the circumstances into which he was thrown. Had not those two great factors coincided with such precision, it is quite safe to assume that European history would be without what is perhaps its most wonderful page. It is therefore important, before we go further, to consider the personality of Napoleon, after which a brief view of the origin of the French Revolution must be taken; this will lead us to the events in which the Revolution and the man who was destined to be its heir were both concerned.

Napoleon Bonaparte was a short, dark, swarthy man, of typically southern appearance. In his early years, until 1805, he was extremely thin; it was not until his face filled out that

his features could be pronounced handsome, though his nose was salient and mouth well formed. His hands and feet, like those of his brothers and sisters, were beautifully modelled. His head was large, full, and intellectual, but what produced the greatest impression on all who met him was the brilliancy and imperiousness of his steel-blue eyes; they revealed the volcanic energy of the soul beneath. He was given to violent bursts of temper, the occasional outbreaks of a nearly superhuman mental energy and of a temperament easily swayed to passion by personal and selfish considerations. He was perhaps the greatest egotist the world has ever seen, with the result that he often applied his indomitable will and magnificent qualities to very low aims. Judged hastily and by certain traits alone, he might be thought to be little more than contemptible, — thus, in the matter of veracity. He viewed lying from a strictly utilitarian point of view, and always said just what was convenient, so that his history written from his own statements would be little better than fiction. He played cards as he conducted warfare, obtaining every advantage he could, legitimate or otherwise. Yet he cannot be called a small man, only a man with small aspects, and if he won by his cheating at cards,

he always returned the stakes after the game was over. When found out in his perversions of truth he was prepared to own up. On one occasion Metternich stoutly declined to believe some information published in the *Moniteur*, and at last Napoleon laughed and confessed: "Sono bugie per i Parigini, *they are lies for the Parisians!*" Alongside of this trait was a wonderful largeness of perception; and many, in fact, have said that it was Napoleon's breadth of view that constituted his genius. It was not so much that as the perfect combination of breadth of view with attention to the most minute detail. His powerful imagination made him see events in their fullest possible extension; as he said himself, he was always living two years ahead. At the same time his instinct for detail was the nightmare of every colonel in the army, of every functionary in the Empire; the memoirs of the period are full of anecdotes illustrating this. Philippe de Ségur relates that he was sent on a tour of inspection in which he visited several fortresses, many camps and forts, and numberless earthworks and batteries. On his reporting to the Emperor, he was cross-examined at great length, but went through the ordeal with flying colours until at last asked whether at a particular spot on a

small cross-road not far from Antwerp two field-pieces were still in position!

The brain of Napoleon was like a machine, so perfect, so accurate in its working; but the spirit that impelled it was that of a soldier and a gambler. Logical perception of chances was instantaneous with him, and promptly turned into action with perfect audacity and relentless activity. It was among his soldiers that he was happiest, and few anecdotes told of him are more characteristic than that related in the memoirs of a Polish officer who served in the campaign of Russia. Napoleon had just joined headquarters after three years of peace, and was in the midst of the numerous columns converging on the points at which the Russian frontier was to be crossed. In the middle of the night the officers of the staff were awakened by an unusual noise. Napoleon was sleepless, and was tramping up and down his bedroom singing at the top of his voice the revolutionary marching song, *Le chant du départ!* He was happy once more, he was playing the biggest stake of his life, with the biggest army he had ever assembled; it was the satisfaction of the roulette player sitting down at his accustomed chair with a large pile of gold in front of him. But there are

yet other aspects of the character of this the most extraordinary man of modern times that must not be omitted in attempting to portray him.

Making exception of the rhetoric he so frequently used in addressing his soldiers and occasionally in his diplomatic relations, his correspondence constitutes a wonderful intellectual achievement. In the thirty-two volumes published officially one might nearly say that there is not a superfluous word, not an embellishment. Conciseness, energy, decision, perception, stand out with overpowering force from every page; and it may quite properly be said that the correspondence of Napoleon is a great literary monument. It is safe to predict that it will be read when the names of Chateaubriand, of Delavigne, and of Lamartine are well-nigh forgotten.

His bombast has been alluded to. However distasteful to Anglo-Saxon ears, it often enough produced its due results: inspired his soldiers, terrified his enemies. In nothing was Napoleon more an Italian than in his strong dramatic sense, and his public life, from the moment he got his foot on the first rung of the ladder of ambition, was one long pose. He did his best to create, and to send down to posterity, the

Napoleonic legend; and even at the present day, when more reasonable views are beginning to prevail, there are many, even among staid historians, who are prepared to accept him at his own valuation. Before closing this brief sketch of his personality, it may be as well to add that a view that seems becoming popular in some quarters at the present day, — the view that Napoleon was an epileptic, — reposes on very slight evidence. It is possible, just as many other hypotheses are, but on the other hand it is certain, if this theory is accepted, that he was a very slight sufferer, and that no epileptic ever showed greater clearness of intellect. Historically speaking, to say that Napoleon was epileptic is probably untrue, and is certainly irrelevant and misleading.

Here, then, in the year 1789, was a young sublieutenant of artillery from whom great things might be expected. Yet had not his path crossed that of a great political cataclysm, it is certain that he would never have found the opportunities that enabled him to rise to the level of his genius.

The misgovernment and ineptitude of the Bourbons had at last been visited with retribution. Although France was fast increasing in wealth, more than half her people knew the

pangs of famine, many had died of hunger. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, d'Alembert, had stirred the reason of the thinking class. France had within her all the makings of a great modern nation, as was conclusively demonstrated by Napoleon ten years later; yet she was degraded by such barbarities as the mutilation and execution of the Chevalier de La Barre, or the attempt to prevent the burial of Voltaire's body; she was brought to bankruptcy by the criminal folly of the court and its ministers. Retribution followed, the Revolution broke out, and reaction swung far in the direction of popular absurdities and horrors. From 1789 to 1794 the complete scale of democratic passions was exhausted. The most excellent reforming zeal, the most exalted sentiments of patriotism and disinterestedness, caught in a rising tide, hurried into a whirl of political disintegration, finally disappeared or made way for mob rule, violence, terrorism, suspicion, and anarchy. While in the cities the Revolution gradually fell into the hands of gangs of political fanatics or unprincipled ruffians, its best elements found refuge in the armies of the assailed Republic. Birth was no longer essential for becoming an officer, and great soldiers like Ney, Masséna,

or Murat, found their path no longer stopped at the rank of sergeant; court favour no longer made generals, and a Bonaparte might expect to rise above all his fellows. His first opportunity came in 1793, at the siege of Toulon, but before coming to that it will be as well briefly to indicate what had occurred previously and since Bonaparte had entered the army.

CHRONOLOGY

1261.	Earliest Bonaparte at Florence.
1529.	Bonapartes go to Corsica.
15 Aug., 1769.	Napoleon Bonaparte born.
April, 1779.	He goes to school at Brienne.
Oct., 1784.	Proceeds to military academy, Paris.
Aug., 1785.	Sublieutenant of artillery.
14 July, 1789.	Capture of the Bastille. — French Revolution.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL HISTORIES. — Among the numerous general histories of Napoleon the following are best to consult: LANFREY, *Histoire de Napoléon*, Paris, 1875, 5 vols. (unfinished and hostile), also English translation; ROSE, *Life of Napoleon I.*, London, 1902, 2 vols. (English point of view); FOURNIER, *Napoleon I.*, Leipzig, 1886, 3 vols., also English translation, New York, 1903 (Con-

tinental point of view and good bibliography). For illustrations, but not matter, see DAYOT, *Napoléon raconté par l'image*, Paris, 1894; TARBELL, *Short Life of Napoleon*, New York, 1895; SLOANE, *Napoleon*, New York, 1896 (but contains many fancy pictures); for coins and medals see DELAROCHE, *Trésor de numismatique*, Paris, 1832; for bibliography see KIRCHEISEN, *Bibliographie Napoleon's*, Leipzig, 1902.

MEMOIRS of the Napoleonic period are numerous and generally not very trustworthy; they convey, however, a local colour that no history does, and no real impression of the epoch can be gained without reading into them. As a first instalment MADAME JUNOT, MARBOT, and SIR ROBERT WILSON might be recommended; the reader wishing to go further could then choose among the following: BOURRIENNE, THIÉBAULT, LE NORMAND, PASQUIER, MÉNEVAL, SÉGUR, B. JACKSON, BAUSSET, CAVAIGNAC (*Mémoires d'une inconnue*), RÉMUSAT, and DURAND; TALLEYRAND is disappointing, METTERNICH voluminous and a little difficult. Other memoirs will be mentioned for particular subjects at the end of later chapters.

It must be understood that these notes are only designed to cover a limited field; they are intended to serve as an *introduction* to Napoleonic literature, nothing more. This will explain why no reference is here made to such works as, for instance, the *Correspondence* of NAPOLEON, the *Memoirs* of King JOSEPH, or the works of ROEDERER.

For the preceding chapter the following may be consulted: On the youth of Napoleon: CHUQUET, *La jeunesse de Napoléon*, Paris, 1899; JUNG, *Bonaparte et son temps*, Paris, 1883, 3 vols.; BOURRIENNE, *Mémoires*, Paris, 1830, 10 vols. On his father, mother, and family: MASSON, *Napoléon et sa famille*, Paris, 1897 (also *Napoléon inconnu*);

NASICA, *Mémoires sur l'enfance . . . de Napoléon*, Paris, 1852; LARREY, *Madame Mère*, Paris, 1892, 2 vols. For the character and appearance of Napoleon a reference to nearly all the memoirs of the period would be necessary; the most brilliant portrait by any modern writer, though overdrawn, is that of TAINE in *Les origines de la France Contemporaine;* the thirteenth chapter, Vol. III., of BOURRIENNE'S *Memoirs* (see above) should always be consulted on this point.

SOREL'S *L'Europe et la révolution française*, Paris, 1904, eight volumes, is the best accredited modern work on the subject which it brings down to the Congress of Vienna. The first volume of Mme. de BOIGNE'S *Memoirs*, MORVAN'S *Soldat Impérial*, and FISHER'S *Bonapartism*, are of value in their sphere.

CHAPTER II

TOULON AND VENDÉMIAIRE

Bonaparte and Corsica — Siege of Toulon — the Terror — Vendémiaire — Marriage of Napoleon and Joséphine Beauharnais — Army of Italy — Tactics and Strategy in 1796.

FROM 1789 until 1793, during, that is, the first four years of the Revolution, Bonaparte was striving to improve his prospects in connection with Corsican affairs. He paid several visits to the island, joined the French democratic party, but could not succeed either in securing the victory of that party at Ajaccio, or in bringing to a favourable end a small military expedition he led into Sardinia. In the course of these intrigues and proceedings we catch an interesting glimpse of him noted by his school friend Bourrienne during a short stay in Paris.

The young Corsican officer, whose watch was in pawn and whose dinners were generally provided by his friends, saw among other sights the march of a mob of five hundred men to the Tuileries, and Louis XVI. complying with their

orders by appearing at a window wearing a red Phrygian cap. Bonaparte was deeply moved at this spectacle, and declared with indignation that with a couple of guns he could have dispersed all this scum of the *faubourgs* and taught them a lesson they would never have forgotten.

The doings of Bonaparte at this period have no large bearing on history and are in part somewhat obscure. But after the final failure of the French party in Corsica he returned to his occupation as an officer of artillery, serving now in the rank of captain (1793). In August of the same year the French Republic, assailed on every side, received a severe blow by the inhabitants of Toulon proclaiming the King and calling to their help an Anglo-Spanish fleet.

The government immediately sent troops to attempt the recapture of the fortress, and Bonaparte found himself in command of the small force of artillery collected. His skill and judgment quickly won recognition, and he was soon promoted to the functions of a lieutenant-colonel. His energy made feasible the only plan that promised success. It consisted in capturing one of the English positions, the fort *de l'Eguillette*, whence the bay and shipping could be commanded. Bonaparte pressed

forward the work, but the British fire was severe and the guns of his battery were silenced. He then had recourse to his knowledge of human nature and of the French soldier. A large sign was posted: *This is the battery of the men without fear*, and a call was made for volunteers. This was well responded to, some severe fighting ensued, finally the British position was breached and stormed. As Bonaparte had foreseen, this success of the French entailed the immediate evacuation of Toulon by the Anglo-Spanish forces. Thus Bonaparte won his first reputation, and before many months passed his services were recognised by promotion to the rank of brigadier-general.

It was at the period we have now reached that the Revolution attained its extreme of violence. The government of France had been seized by the Jacobin Club and Robespierre. An enthusiastic conformity to their doctrines appeared the only means of escaping the guillotine. Bonaparte, like nearly every other officer of the French army, made show of zeal in support of the Terrorists, and was during some months on close terms with Robespierre *Jeune*. But in Thermidor (July) 1794, the Jacobin tyranny was broken, and in the reac-

tion that followed Bonaparte was for a few weeks placed under arrest. After his release, having thrown up his command in the southern army, he went to Paris where he probably hoped to find some opportunity of advancement in the turmoil of politics. That opportunity was slow in coming, but he refused the command of a brigade of infantry in the army of the West rather than leave the capital. At last, in the autumn of 1795, events took place that marked his first step forward in the political world. Since the fall of Robespierre in 1794 a strong movement of reaction had taken place in the capital, partly royalist, wholly conservative. Most of the Sections of Paris were hostile to the Convention, which aimed at retaining power under a newly framed constitution; and as each Section had its battalion of national guards, the movement soon took an insurrectional and menacing aspect. The executive power of the Republic was to be vested in a committee of five, — the *Directoire*, — among the members of which was Barras, who, as a representative of the government, had known Bonaparte at Toulon and had been struck by his talents.

In the last days of September 1795, the movement of the Sections became more pro-

nounced, the symptoms of an approaching storm more clear, and the Convention charged Barras with its defence and with the command of all the troops in Paris. But Barras was a civilian and needed military assistance. He therefore called to his aid several generals then in the capital; among them was Bonaparte, who accepted, though not without hesitation; his personality, his decision and promptitude completely turned the scale.

At this point we may pause for one moment to recall an anecdote of those days that is eminently characteristic of the man. Thiébault, a young officer, reported at headquarters, and found the newly appointed general seated at a table in conversation. He appeared small, of poor physique, with long, lanky hair and a shabby uniform. He was asking questions of the most elementary character of officers of far greater experience and seniority in military administration. There was an inclination among some of those present to smile at the ignorance displayed by the newcomer, but Thiébault admired his complete absence of false pride, the searching character of his inquiries, and the rapidity with which he appeared to assimilate the information he acquired. The officers placed under his com-

mand were certainly not inclined to think lightly of him for long. On the 13th of Vendémiaire the revolt came to a head, and the Sections prepared to march against the Assembly. Bonaparte seized all the available artillery, owing to the promptitude of a major of cavalry, Murat by name. The few thousand troops available were concentrated about the Tuileries, and as soon as the national guards began their movement, Bonaparte opened with grape along the streets leading to his central position. There was considerable bloodshed, but the insurrection collapsed immediately, as must all insurrections treated in that prompt and uncompromising way.

Bonaparte's second successful demonstration of his knowledge of the theory and practice of artillery received large recognition, for he was shortly afterwards appointed to the command of the army of the Interior. He was now a rising man in the State, and for this reason succeeded in winning the hand of a lady of rank and beauty to whom he had been paying his attentions for some months. Joséphine Tascher de La Pagerie was a beautiful créole who had married the Vicomte de Beauharnais, an officer in the French service, by whom she had two children, Eugène and Hortense.

Beauharnais fought for the Republic, was unsuccessful, and went to the guillotine one of the last victims of the Reign of Terror. His widow became one of the beauties of the new fashionable society that centred about the dissipated Barras and his wife. Whether she loved Bonaparte is very doubtful, but it is clear that she felt his magnetic power, and when it was decided that he was to have the command of one of the armies on the frontier, she married him. The marriage took place on the 11th of March 1796, and on the 21st Bonaparte started for Nice to assume command of the army of Italy. It appears not improbable that Joséphine's influence with the Barras had been largely instrumental in securing this important appointment.

We now have come to the beginning of Napoleon's career as a commander-in-chief, and since his history must be essentially military, since he remains without question the greatest soldier concerning whom we have accurate information, it will be well to examine at this point, before we follow him into Italy, what was actually represented by a movement of troops or a battle in his time.

To speak of an advance or retreat of a right or left wing, or of a movement resulting in so

many thousands being killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, conveys but the vaguest notion of the evolutions actually carried out; when considering the history of the greatest of captains it will not be out of place to take a preliminary view of the tactics and strategy of his day, and to attempt to convey some more precise impression of the actual occurrences of the battle-field.

When the French Revolution broke out, the art of war was as much trammelled by narrow regulations as was that of letters. The methods and traditions were those of Frederick the Great, but dogmatism had supplanted genius. Rigidity of discipline and tactical formalism were the foundation of the system. The soldier was a brutalized individual, skilled in multitudinous attitudes and formations, fighting like a machine under the inspiration of constant floggings. Two opposing lines of infantry, each formed on a depth of two or three ranks, would advance nearer and nearer to each other in the most perfect alignment, every musket even, every toe turned to the same angle. When within firing distance the one whose discipline was the more rigid would generally manage to survive the two or three mechanical volleys that would be ex-

changed at a range of fifty to one hundred and twenty yards. With regiments thus drilled the great aim of every commander was to attain tactical perfection, and the conduct of a battle-field became slow and artificial. War was turned into a scientific game with arbitrary rules.

France revolutionized war as she had every political and social observance. With promotion thrown open to every soldier; with the doctrine of *Liberty*, *Equality*, *Fraternity*, proclaimed; with many of the old officers leaving the country, it became impossible to maintain discipline, and in many of the early battles of the Republic the French army suffered in consequence. The Convention declared that corporal punishment should not be inflicted on free men; the sentiment was to its honour, but the army was soon reduced to chaotic conditions. From these conditions arose a new army, bolder and greater than the old. It was inspired by ardent patriotism, that finest of all the military virtues, and made up in dash, intelligence, and courage what it lacked in science. From these circumstances a new system of tactics was evolved, of which the most characteristic innovation may be understood by the following convenient illustration.

A body of men marching along a road will naturally form a column, — say four abreast. Suppose such a column arrives near a village occupied by the enemy, and attempts to take it, — what is the simplest, least scientific manner in which this might be accomplished? In the first place the most raw of officers and inexperienced of troops would quickly learn to double up so as to convert a front of four into a front of eight; then a quick dash, the bayonet, the pressure of the rear ranks on the first, would do the rest. This was, in its roughest form, the usual French system of attack during the wars of the Republic and Empire. The same column deployed, or opened up right and left, would give an extended front for firing when on the defensive. When attacking, the distance the column would have to cover exposed to musketry fire will be realized when it is stated that the extreme range of the musket then in use was two hundred yards. Effective volleys were generally fired at from one hundred and twenty down to sixty yards. When a French brigade attacked the usual disposition was for about one quarter of the infantry to be dispersed as skirmishers to draw and divert the enemy's fire. Behind these skirmishers, columns would be formed,

brought up as far forward as the ground would permit, and at the proper moment launched at the enemy's line at the charge. The formation of these columns varied according to circumstances, but a front of sixteen and depth of seventy men, equivalent to two battalions of reduced strength, may be taken as representing a rough average. The French infantry excelled in offensive evolutions, in quickly seizing a hill, house, or hedge, and their celerity of movement and intelligence proved more than a match for the methods of the armies opposed to them. Before many years had passed every country of Europe, save Great Britain alone, abandoned the old tactics and copied the new. Similar changes took place in the handling of artillery and especially of cavalry, which were now used with far greater boldness, especially for completing the destruction of the enemy after a successful engagement; perfect alignment became a secondary consideration.

Strategy changed on the same lines as tactics. Slow, methodical movements were checked by rapid marching; the capture of a fortress became an object of less importance than the destruction of an army. Bonaparte fought his first campaign when the new

theories of war were just beginning to emerge from chaos, when a number of self-made and excellent officers had won their way to the heads of regiments and brigades; he grasped with a firm hand the instrument Fate had placed in his hands and wielded it from the very first instant with the skill of a master.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept.,	1789, to Feb., 1791.	Bonaparte in Corsica.
Aug.,	1791, to May, 1792.	
May,	1792.	Bonaparte fails to secure success of French party at Ajaccio.
21 Sept.,	"	Proclamation of the French Republic.
21 Jan.,	1793.	Execution of Louis XVI.
Feb.,	"	Bonaparte fails in an expedition to Sardinia.
28 Aug.,	"	Toulon occupied by Anglo-Spanish forces.
Nov.,	"	Bonaparte lieutenant-colonel.
17 Dec.,	"	Toulon captured by French.
April,	1794.	Bonaparte general, commanding artillery of army of Italy.
July,	"	Fall of Robespierre, — end of Reign of Terror.
Aug.,	"	Bonaparte under arrest.
4 Oct.,	1795.	13th of Vendémiaire, revolt of the Sections suppressed by Bonaparte.

11 March, 1796. Bonaparte marries Joséphine Beauharnais.

21 " " Leaves Paris to take command of army of Italy.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See note at page 11.

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CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY

1796–1797

Montenotte — Armistice of Cherasco — Crossing of the Po — Lodi — *Le petit caporal* — Entrance into Milan — Castiglione and Lonato — Bassano — Arcola — Rivoli — Fall of Mantua.

FROM the time Bonaparte took command of the army of Italy he appeared a changed man. He received even his oldest friends, such as Decrés, with a reserve that was intended to mark the distance between them and his avowed aspiration to superiority. With the generals over whom he was placed such an attitude was perhaps necessary, for veterans like Masséna, Augereau, and Sérurier, were inclined to be restive on finding themselves under the command of the little Corsican whom they styled derisively *le général Vendémiaire.* This feeling soon disappeared, for Bonaparte, unlike most great captains, showed himself the master of his army and an accomplished strategist from the first moment.

The French army of Italy numbered some thirty-seven thousand men; it was stationed along the coast of the Mediterranean in the neighbourhood of Nice and in the passes of the lower Alps. Across the mountains were two armies: the Sardinian of about twenty thousand men watching the passes and protecting the roads running northeast towards Turin; the Austrian of about thirty-five thousand men occupying Genoa on its left and thence stretching across the Ligurian Alps to join hands with the Sardinians towards Dego and Montenotte. The Austro-Sardinians, under Beaulieu and Colli, were thus stretched out on a line of sixty miles through mountainous country; not only this, but their lines of communications were divergent, that of the Austrians on Alessandria, that of the Sardinians on Turin. Bonaparte framed his plan of operations in accordance with these facts. He concentrated his divisions, first made show of marching along the coast on Genoa, then turned off across the mountains and struck with his whole force at the point where the Austrian right joined the Sardinian left. The isolated divisions opposed to the French were beaten in a series of engagements at Montenotte, Dego, and Ceva; at Mondovi the Sardinians were defeated, Bonaparte pressed

Campaign of Italy

them hard on the road to Turin, and on the 28th of April, after a fortnight's campaign, the King of Sardinia was compelled to accept terms. An armistice was signed at Cherasco highly favourable to the French Republic and leaving Bonaparte free to operate against Beaulieu.

The second part of the French general's operations turned on a similar strategic consideration as the first, that of compelling his enemy to cover his lines of communications; and as this is an essential feature of the strategy of nearly all ages and countries it may be as well to make clear its precise significance before proceeding further. The reader who has not studied military history is apt to think of an army as a piece on a chessboard that may be moved freely in every direction. But this is not so; an army is a society having special needs that have to be met daily, and it can only be moved in such directions as will enable these needs to be satisfied. Food may be found for a small body in the country operated in; but cities, even of the largest size, cannot supply at a moment's notice large quantities of gunpowder, shot, shell, muskets, boots, and the thousand and one things an army requires. How many small towns could work out even such a trifling problem as the reshoeing of the

horses of a brigade of cavalry? Every army consequently has a line of communications running back to its base, along which pours a continuous stream of supplies essential to its continued action in the field; and this line of communications is generally agreed to represent an army's weakest point. For if it is cut by the enemy the army becomes powerless as soon as it has expended the supplies actually on hand. Some of the most remarkable operations of war have turned on a clear comprehension of this fundamental principle; we shall see it constantly brought into play in the campaigns of Napoleon.

While Bonaparte was driving the Sardinians towards Turin, Beaulieu had concentrated his army to cover the road to Alessandria. After the signature of the armistice of Cherasco he retreated to the north bank of the Po and prepared to oppose the crossing of the river and to defend Lombardy and Milan. Yet Bonaparte achieved the conquest of that rich province and its capital without firing a gun and by methods highly characteristic of his genius.

A road runs northeast from Alessandria to Milan, crossing the Po at Valenza, in Sardinian territory. It was stipulated in the armistice of Cherasco that every facility should be afforded

the French army for crossing the river at that point. Information of this quickly reached Beaulieu's headquarters, and he took up a strong position on the northern bank, whence he commanded the passage. He was confirmed in this disposition by the fact that the French as they advanced collected all the boats that could be found up stream from Valenza. But Bonaparte was only feinting. While one of his divisions demonstrated in front of Valenza and formed a screen along the Po, the great mass of the French army pushed along the southern bank to Piacenza, fifty miles east, and there crossed over safe from attack (May 7).

This great strategic march placed the French army within a few miles of the Austrian line of communications, which ran from Milan, through Lodi, back to Mantua. No sooner had Beaulieu discovered that only a small part of the French were before him, and that he was being outflanked, than he hurriedly retreated, and abandoning Milan reached Lodi a few hours before Bonaparte. From Lodi he continued his retreat to Mantua, leaving a strong rear guard to keep the French back.

On the 10th of May was fought the battle of Lodi, of which the interest is more personal than military. At this point the road to

Mantua crosses the Adda by a long bridge. At the further end of this bridge the Austrians had established a considerable force of infantry and artillery to cover the retreat. Bonaparte determined to carry the position by storm and a column of grenadiers was formed and sent to the attack. Mowed down by the Austrian guns and musketry, the column recoiled and retreated. Then Bonaparte, followed by Augereau, Lannes, and other officers, ran in among the men, restored order, reformed the column, and pushing to the front led the grenadiers once more across the bridge. The Austrian fire was tremendous but Bonaparte's onset was irresistible, and he came out of the melee untouched. Later in life he declared it was on that day that the belief firmly took hold of him that he was destined to accomplish great deeds. That same evening a deputation of sergeants of grenadiers waited on him in his tent, and respectfully declared that he had been unanimously elected a corporal in their corps; and for many years afterwards Napoleon was fondly called *le petit caporal* by his soldiers. It was partly in this respect that he was a great leader, that he knew how to play on the feelings of his men. On his inspections he would pass along the ranks unac-

companied and speak directly to the soldiers, who were always at liberty to make known their wants. On one such occasion, during the Empire, a grizzled veteran reminded him that one night in the Italian campaign he had shared a loaf of bread with his general: instantly Napoleon granted him the promotion, or pension, or medal he coveted, and made his heart glad. In his proclamations, that are frequently such difficult reading to the Anglo-Saxon, he played with perfect precision on the sentiments of the men who were to win his victories. In his first proclamation to the army of Italy he told the soldiers that they were without pay, without clothes, without glory, and that these were all to be found in the rich plains of Lombardy, into which he was about to lead them. He redeemed his word, for on the 15th of May the army made its entry into Milan. The sight of the republican soldiers produced a curious effect on the Milanese, so long accustomed to the brilliant uniforms and irreproachable drill of the Austrians. The French infantry was dressed in rags, and marched with a long, slouching step; many of the subordinate officers, even captains, were without boots. The generals were far from the rigid good breeding and presence of the Austrians. But the drums

rolled out the *Ça ira*, the bands played the *Marseillaise*, and from the draggled, weary columns there came a breath of fierce, swaggering spirit and patriotism that went far to explain their success. And at their head was a plainly dressed, boyish figure whose deep-set eyes and pale, impassive face proclaimed aloud to those that gazed on him that the spirit and strength of the revolutionary army was directed by pure calculation and intellect; all Europe was soon to learn what the combination of the two could accomplish.

After having rested and refitted his army at the expense of Milan, where a provisional republican government was established, Bonaparte marched to the Mincio where Beaulieu had taken up his position. A passage was forced on the 30th of May, the Austrians retreated into the Tyrol, and the French settled down to besiege the great fortress of Mantua, which Beaulieu had strongly garrisoned and provisioned. Bonaparte now looked for favourable positions whence he could oppose the efforts of any relieving army sent by Austria, and took possession of the Venetian fortresses of Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera. These, together with Mantua, form the most famous strategical position of modern history, the



The Quadrilateral

Quadrilateral, commanding the north side of the valley of the Po together with the passes of the Adige.

Between June 1796 and January 1797, Austria made four attempts to relieve Mantua, all of which were defeated. In August the first effort was made by Wurmser with forty-five thousand men, Bonaparte being at that time slightly inferior in numbers. The Austrians advanced from the Tyrol in two bodies, one under Quosdanowich to the west of the lake of Garda, the other under Wurmser down the valley of the Adige. Bonaparte, proceeding on an entirely opposite principle, concentrated his whole army between the two Austrian divisions, even withdrawing the blockading corps from Mantua, and by rapid marching succeeded in defeating Quosdanowich and Wurmser one after the other. There was a week's fighting and marching about the southern end of the lake of Garda, among the principal engagements being those at Castiglione and Lonato, and finally the Austrians were defeated and retired to the Tyrol after suffering heavy losses.

A month later (September 1796) Wurmser was ready to attempt the relief of Mantua once more, but from a different point. Leav-

ing Davidowich with fifteen thousand men to guard the passes of the Adige, he proposed marching from Trent to Bassano with twenty-five thousand men, and thence to circle around, approaching Mantua from Legnago. On the same day that Wurmser marched from Trent, Bonaparte started north from Verona with about thirty thousand men, intent on assuming the offensive. He drove Davidowich north towards Trent, and on discovering that the principal Austrian force was not in his front, but had marched to the east, he followed it without hesitation through the valley of the Brenta, joined and defeated it at Bassano, pursued it through Vicenza and Legnago, and finally drove its remnants into Mantua on the 12th of September. Wurmser had lost nearly half his numbers in killed, wounded, and prisoners. This was one of the boldest and most effective marches ever performed by Napoleon; the troops had covered one hundred and fourteen miles in eight days. A speed of fourteen miles a day may not appear much to the reader not versed in military matters, who does not appreciate the difficulty of moving long columns of heavily laden men over narrow roads inevitably blocked at frequent intervals; but the study of military his-

tory will show that for periods of more than three days' continuous marching in an enemy's country, a rate of fourteen miles a day is very nearly an extreme. The American reader may note with particular interest that this is precisely the rate at which Stonewall Jackson's famous marches during his Shenandoah Valley campaign work out. But, of course, this does not negative the fact that a small body of troops might in one day cover thirty or forty miles.

Wurmser's second failure did not break down Austrian resolve. A new army was collected and placed under the command of Alvintzy. Towards the end of October the position was as follows: Alvintzy with thirty thousand men was on the Piave threatening an advance on Vicenza; Davidowich with twenty thousand more was at Roveredo; the main French army was at Verona and numbered about thirty thousand. Bonaparte now decided to reverse the operation he had carried out against Wurmser, to defeat Alvintzy on the Piave, then strike back through the valley of the Brenta at the flank and rear of Davidowich; but this time his plan failed. After some desultory fighting Alvintzy crossed the Piave and forced Bonaparte to retreat to

Verona. On the 12th of November the two armies met a few miles east of Verona, at Caldiero, and the French were severely defeated. Bonaparte's position was now highly critical, for Davidowich had descended the Adige and was only held in check by a division occupying the strong position of Rivoli. Only a few miles separated the two Austrian armies, and it appeared as though their junction could not be prevented. But now that the loss of an hour, or a single prompt decision, might mean all the difference between success and failure, the acute perception and superb audacity of Bonaparte made him more than a match for the slow and cautious generals opposed to him. On the night of the 14th the French army crossed the Adige at Verona and turned eastward; at Ronco the river was recrossed, and thence Bonaparte marched northwards to debouch on the flank and rear of Alvintzy. The success of the whole operation turned on the occupation of the bridge and village of Arcola, which the Austrians defended with great courage during the whole of the 15th and 16th. Bonaparte tried to repeat at this point the charge over the bridge of Lodi, but saw nearly all his personal staff killed and wounded, and was himself

swept by an Austrian counter-stroke into a swamp where he nearly perished. The fighting at Arcola was of a desperate character, but finally, on the 17th, the French were successful in forcing a passage, and Alvintzy, finding the enemy in force on his line of communications, decided to retreat.

The last Austrian attempt to relieve Mantua was made two months later (January 1797) and under the same commander. Alvintzy now concentrated his main force, about thirty thousand men, at Roveredo and marched down the valley towards Verona; at the same time two smaller columns threatened the lower Adige from Vicenza and Padua. Bonaparte met Alvintzy at Rivoli (January 14) and by superior strategy inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austrians, who in two days lost thirteen thousand men. Thence he marched rapidly back to the lower Adige just in time to prevent the entry of Provera with nine thousand men into Mantua and to force him to capitulate. These utterly disastrous operations of the relieving army sealed the fate of the fortress, and two weeks later Wurmser surrendered with some twenty thousand men (February 2, 1797).

CHRONOLOGY

12 April, 1796.	Bonaparte's first victory, Montenotte.
13 " "	Millesimo.
22 " "	Mondovi.
28 " "	Armistice of Cherasco.
7 May, "	Po crossed at Piacenza.
10 " "	Lodi.
15 " "	French entry into Milan.
30 " "	Passage of Mincio. Siege of Mantua begins.
31 July, "	Lonato.
5 Aug., "	Castiglione.
4–12 Sept., "	Bonaparte's pursuit of Wurmser, — Verona, Bassano, Mantua.
12 Nov., "	Alvintzy successful at Caldiero.
15–17 " "	Arcola.
14 Jan., 1797.	Rivoli.
16 " "	Provera capitulates at La Favorita.
2 Feb., "	Fall of Mantua.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11. Add for military history: YORK VON WARTENBURG, *Napoleon als Feldherr*, Berlin, 1886, 2 vols. (also French and English translations).

For preceding chapter: G. FABRY, *Histoire de l'armée d'Italie (1796–97)*, Paris, 1900, 2 vols.; BOUVIER, *Bonaparte en Italie*, Paris, 1899 (only to the occupation of Milan). For other than military matters see note to next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT

Armistice of Leoben — Fall of Venice — Peace of Campo Formio — Methods of the French Armies, and of Bonaparte, his relations with the *Directoire* — The Eastern question — Expedition to Egypt — Capture of Malta — Battle of the Nile — Campaigns in Egypt and Syria — Return to France.

TWO phases of Bonaparte's campaign of Italy have now been reviewed; the first, essentially offensive, during which the French swept the Austrians back from the Alps to the Quadrilateral; the second, essentially defensive, during which they reduced the fortress of Mantua and foiled every effort to relieve it. The third and last phase was to be offensive once more. A new Austrian army had been formed numbering about fifty thousand men, and had been placed under the command of the young Archduke Charles who had just begun his brilliant military career. Bonaparte was slightly stronger in numbers, and manœuvring with wonderful strategic skill first through the Upper Venetian provinces, then through the Julian Alps, he constantly out-generalled his opponent, won a

number of small engagements, and forced him steadily backwards. So relentlessly did he urge on his columns that on the 7th of April he had reached the little town of Leoben on the northern slope of the Alps, less than one hundred miles from Vienna. Then at last Austria acknowledged defeat; an armistice between the two armies was agreed to, and the basis for negotiating a peace.

Just at the moment when the negotiations of Leoben were freeing the French army from all anxiety in the north, the inhabitants of the Venetian mainland, long dissatisfied with military rule and rapacity, rose against the invaders. At Verona and elsewhere massacres took place. Nothing could have happened more opportunely for Bonaparte. The excuse was a convenient one for colouring the spoliation of the ancient republic of Venice, the neutrality of which neither France nor Austria had respected, the spoils of which both had coveted. The Doge and Senate were too weak to offer any resistance, and on the 11th of May the city was occupied by French troops. The long history of Venice had come to an inglorious, nearly unnoticed close.

Bonaparte spent that summer at the castle of Montebello near Milan, conducting the

peace negotiations with the Austrian commissioners. With the attractive but extravagant Joséphine by his side he held an informal court, to which many were attracted by the grace and beauty of Madame Bonaparte, but most by a curiosity to see the extraordinary soldier who in a few short months had carved himself a place alongside of the greatest captains of all ages.

On the 17th of October peace was signed at Campo Formio. Its chief provisions were those that gave France the Rhine as frontier, that stipulated for the recognition by Austria of the newly formed Ligurian and Cisalpine republics (Genoa, Lombardy, Modena, and Bologna) and that transferred to Austria as a compensation for Lombardy, Venice and her Adriatic provinces.

In the account given of the campaign of Italy the military operations have hitherto received nearly exclusive attention. There are a few other matters, however, that deserve passing notice. The French army, unpaid, weak in commissariat, loosely disciplined, followed by a horde of needy and not over-scrupulous adventurers, made the people of Italy pay dearly for the introduction among them of the glorious principles of the Revolution. Even

Bonaparte, who from the point of view of military efficiency disliked and did his best to prevent license, made the Italian cities disburse largely in return for the measure of liberty he brought them. Enormous contributions of war were imposed, and these took the form, in part, of a seizure of the treasures of Italian art for the benefit of the French national museums. Bonaparte pushed his odd and inexpensive collecting mania to great lengths, denuded northern Italy of nearly every masterpiece, and was accordingly elected a member of the *Institut de France.* How complacently he viewed this queerly won scientific distinction may be judged by the fact that, for several years after, he frequently wore the official dress of his new colleagues, and generally began his proclamations after the following fashion: *Le citoyen Bonaparte, Membre de l'Institut, Commandant-en-chef*, etc. Notwithstanding the corruption that attended the contracts for the provisioning of the French army, it seems pretty clear that the fingers of the general-in-chief remained clean. Large profits accrued to him legitimately in connection with prize money, but that was all.

The genius of Bonaparte had been felt not by his army alone. The magnetic influence

of his superiority had touched the *Directoire*. But for the present there was no obvious jealousy or estrangement between that body and its masterful general; each felt a need for the support of the other. When in the summer of 1797 there was fear of a new reactionary movement in Paris, Bonaparte gave his uncompromising support to the government, offered to march to Paris with the army, and sent General Augereau to carry out the *Directoire's* mandates for suppressing its opponents. The purging process then carried out in the ranks of the Royalists and Conservatives is known as the revolution of Fructidor. What is perhaps most important to note in this connection is the fact that the victorious army had now become the mainstay of the Republic. The Revolution had swallowed up all that was best fitted to govern in the civil population of France, all the elements of strength and character were now to be sought for in the army alone; and the soldiers, led by generals like Jourdan, Bernadotte, Augereau, Murat, Victor, Ney and others, comrades who had carried the musket and risen from their ranks, were democrats to the last man.

Towards the close of 1797, France being now at peace. General Bonaparte proceeded to Paris

where he met with a triumphant reception. In this connection it may be well to notice an important aspect of his remarkable personality: he not only knew how to win a battle, but also how to make the most of it. At that period newspapers were few and made little effort to obtain news at first hand. There were no special correspondents at General Bonaparte's battles, but he took care in person that they should be duly recorded. His bulletins, written in a rhetorical style suited to the public and military taste of his day, rarely mentioned the general-in-chief, gave the credit of every achievement to the soldiers, but never failed when expedient to distort and falsify facts, all to the greater glory and profit of Napoleon Bonaparte. His numbers were always understated, those of his opponents exaggerated; even defeats such as that of Caldiero were officially travestied into victories. Thus a perfectly deceptive legend began to come into existence from the first weeks of the campaign of Italy, and thus it was studiously continued, even in the last painful days of the prisoner of Saint Helena, even in the last clauses of his will. At the *Directoire's* official reception of the general on his return to Paris in 1797, this talent of his for impressing the public mind was

visibly manifested; for he carried in his hand to present to the government a parchment scroll, which was the treaty of Campo Formio, and behind him was displayed a large tricolour flag covered with gilt lettering recording the sixty victories of the army he had commanded, the capture of one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, of one hundred and seventy colours, of fifteen hundred cannon.

The wild enthusiasm displayed by the spectators of this dramatic scene did not lead Bonaparte, as it might have a weaker or more short-sighted man, to bid too openly for popular support. He declined to show himself in public, and even when he went to the theatre generally occupied the darkest corner of his box. With him this was all a matter of calculation; he saw no real political opening for the present, or, as he put it, the pear was not yet ripe, and he did not want the Parisian public to take him up like some new toy and then quickly tire of him.

At first Bonaparte's idea appears to have been that he might be brought into the *Directoire*, but the fact that he was only twenty-eight, and that the legal age for belonging to the executive body was forty, served as a good excuse for keeping him out. The question was,

how was he, now that the Continent was at peace, to keep himself before the public and earn new laurels? The only hope of solving this question lay in the circumstances of the maritime war still proceeding with England. The Directoire was as anxious as the young general that he should find some military employment, and he soon left Paris with a small staff personally to inspect the French ports and camps facing the British coast along the Channel. This inspection proved unsatisfactory, and Bonaparte decided that there was nothing in this direction to tempt him. But, as a result of the last war between France and England, there was an attractive theory firmly fixed in the public mind, a theory on which military action might be based, a theory still of considerable moment in world politics. In the war which was closed by the treaty of Versailles in 1783, France had won the honours and Great Britain had met with many reverses. French fleets had swept the Channel, English commerce had been harried, the American colonies had become the United States, France had made territorial gains; yet within a few months of the peace it was found that British prosperity was greater than ever, increasing by leaps and bounds, whereas France was heading straight towards bankruptcy.

What was the explanation of this curious result? It would be out of place here to discuss the economic aspects of this question; to state the opinion then generally accepted in France is all that is necessary. That opinion was that the prosperity of Great Britain was chiefly due to her possession of and commerce with India; therefore to deal an effective blow at Great Britain it was necessary to strike at India. Bonaparte through all his life accepted this as sound doctrine; the only question with him was: How was India to be reached?

There were at that day, as there are now, three lines of approach from Europe to India, one by sea, one by land, the other of a mixed character. The sea route was that leading from the Atlantic round the extremity of Africa into the Indian Ocean; the preponderance of England in naval strength placed this line of approach virtually under her control, and although the possession of the Cape of Good Hope did eventually become a matter of dispute, operations on this line were never seriously contemplated by France. The land route was one that should lead from Russia or Asiatic Turkey through Persia and Afghanistan or Beluchistan to the valley of the Indus; in the year 1798 it

was far removed from any political combination that the French government was in a position to attempt, though ten years later it entered the field of practical politics. The third line of approach, the most rapid and convenient, was that running through the Mediterranean to Egypt and thence either overland or by the Red Sea. Bonaparte was a son of the Mediterranean, his imagination had often evoked visions of Oriental conquest. He now eagerly took up the idea of dealing a powerful blow at Great Britain on her line of approach to India. His immediate aim was to establish the power of France in Egypt; his ulterior one not well defined. He probably viewed as possible the eventual marching of an army from Egypt to the confines of India.

The *Directoire*, pleased at the thought of ridding France of the presence of one in whom they detected a formidable rival, equipped a large fleet and placed a fine army of thirty thousand men under Bonaparte's orders. With these he sailed from Toulon in May 1798. A British fleet under Nelson had been sent into the Mediterranean to watch this great French armament, destined, as many supposed, for the invasion of England; but for the moment Bonaparte and his admiral, Brueys, avoided

meeting the enemy. They reached Malta on the 10th of June and the Grand Master of the ancient Order of St. John was summoned to surrender his fortress to the army of the Republic. This he did; and the French, having garrisoned Malta, sailed once more towards the east, shaping a course for Crete. After sighting this island, Admiral Brueys turned south-east and on the 1st of July arrived in sight of Alexandria. Bonaparte now learned that Nelson with the British fleet had been there only two days previously, but had sailed away again to the north-east. He gave orders for immediate disembarkation, took possession of Alexandria, and started the next day on the advance to Cairo, the capital of Egypt. In the meanwhile Brueys moored his thirteen line-of-battle ships and frigates as close to the shore as he thought possible and awaited events at the anchorage of Aboukir.

The British fleet under Nelson had left the straits of Messina a few days after Bonaparte sailed from Malta. Nelson shaped his course direct for Egypt, crossed that of his opponents so close as nearly to sight them, left them to northwards in the direction of Crete, and arrived off Alexandria first. He then cruised in various directions for information, and fi-

nally appeared off Aboukir again on the 1st of August. On sighting the French fleet at anchor the British admiral immediately took his ships into action, succeeded in getting part of his fleet between the enemy and the shore, and battering the motionless French ships from both sides, consecutively sank or captured nearly every one of them. The French fought with great courage and obstinacy, and Admiral Brueys was lost with the flagship *L'Orient*, whose magazine exploded. The daring and skilful manœuvre that had turned the French line and placed two British ships opposite each French one had decided the result of this great naval battle.

Bonaparte and his army were now cut off from the world, and that in a country where the stores necessary for a European army could not be procured. Had Brueys' fleet not anchored at Aboukir, but sailed back to Malta, to Corfu, or even to Toulon, the position would have been threatening for England; as it was, Bonaparte and his thirty thousand men were in great jeopardy. He proceeded, however, with his extraordinary enterprise with an imperturbable self-reliance that inspired all those with whom he came into contact.

Egypt was at that time a dependent province

of the Turkish Empire ruled by a Bey and a dominant caste of military colonists who formed a splendid body of feudal cavalry known as the Mameluks. They proved, however, no match for the French army, and were crushed by the steady firing of the republican infantry at the battle of the Pyramids on the 21st of July. This victory gave Bonaparte possession of Egypt which he now administered and converted into a source of supply in even more relentless fashion than he had treated Italy. During the autumn and early winter months he was actively engaged in matters of administration and prepared to turn Egypt into a firm base from which the next move might be securely made. What that next move might have been is perhaps indicated by the fact that he dispatched a letter to an Indian prince then at war with Great Britain, Tippoo Sahib, urging him to new efforts and promising him assistance.

But India and even Constantinople were far off, and it is best to view as tentative this step of Bonaparte's, and to treat as only vague purposes the sayings attributed to him at this period in which he referred to the possibilities of founding a new Oriental empire, or of returning to France by way of Constantinople.

What it is important not to forget is that once in Egypt every one of Bonaparte's movements was perfectly sound from a military point of view. Not one of them was based on any considerations in the least approaching the romantic.

In January 1799, he had to resume active warfare. The Sultan decided to drive the French invaders out of his dominions, and for that purpose prepared two expeditions: one was to proceed by sea, the other by land through Asia Minor. Bonaparte determined not to await this double attack, but to take the offensive and deal with his opponents one at a time. Accordingly in January he marched across the desert from Egypt into Syria and after many hardships reached Jaffa, a small port already occupied by a Turkish advance guard. There was some severe fighting, the town was stormed and captured, and the French accepted the surrender of some two thousand prisoners. But the question at once arose: what was to be done with these men? The army was short of food, and an arduous march through barren country lay before it. If the prisoners consumed rations, it would mean privation, perhaps even starvation for the army; if they were released they would probably

rejoin the Turks, or at all events take to the hills and marauding. It was a difficult problem, and was resolved in the safest but least merciful way: the Turks were taken out and shot down. This terrible incident has long been one of those most criticised in Bonaparte's career, yet modern military writers do not hesitate to justify it on the ground that a general can never sacrifice the vital interests of his army to those of humanity. This may be true, but it might also be pertinently asked: was not the unprovoked attack of France on Malta and on Egypt at least as great a subject for reproach? Is it not far more important to award blame for the waging of an unjust war, than for what is only a military incident, of debatable necessity, occurring in the course of such a war?

From Jaffa Bonaparte marched northwards to encounter the main Turkish force, and at Acre received a severe check. The Turks, assisted by Captain Sidney Smith of the British navy, defended the town with the utmost resolution, and after a siege of two months the French were beaten off. It was during this siege that a well-known incident occurred: Sidney Smith sent into the French camp a challenge inviting Bonaparte to meet him in

single combat, to which he received the pertinent reply that the French general would accept if the British would produce a Marlborough to meet him! During these two months the French overran northern Palestine and fought numerous engagements against the Turks, one of which, that of Mount Tabor, was a brilliant and decisive victory. On the 20th of May the retreat began, and the army, after heavy losses and intense suffering, owing to lack of food and water and an outbreak of plague, reached Cairo a month later. Within a few weeks it was called on to make new exertions, for the Turkish fleet made its appearance off Aboukir and there disembarked some ten thousand troops. Bonaparte collected every available man, marched against the Turks, found them badly posted with their backs to the sea, routed, and in great part destroyed them. This was the battle of Aboukir (July 26). Shortly afterwards he gave secret orders to have a small frigate got ready in the port of Alexandria, and on the 23d of August 1799, accompanied by Berthier, Murat, and a few others, he left the army and sailed for France. After a long journey and several narrow escapes from British cruisers, he arrived in the bay of Fréjus on the 9th of October.

Had he commanded events and dates at the hand of Fate he could not have chosen better; for the pear was now exactly ripe. One month later he was the master of France.

CHRONOLOGY

2 Feb.,	1797.	Fall of Mantua.
19 "	"	Treaty of peace with Pope at Tolentino.
18 April,	"	Leoben, — peace preliminaries between France and Austria.
May–July,	"	Bonaparte at Montebello.
4 Sept.,	"	18th Fructidor, — royalist movement put down by Augereau.
17 Oct.,	"	Treaty of Campo Formio between France and Austria.
Nov.,	"	Bonaparte proceeds to Paris.
19 May,	1798.	Expedition to Egypt sails.
10 June,	"	Arrives at Malta.
2 July,	"	Alexandria taken.
21 "	"	The Pyramids.
1 Aug.,	"	Battle of the Nile.
6 March,	1799.	Jaffa stormed.
March–May,	"	Siege of Acre.
15 April,	"	Mount Tabor.
25 July,	"	Aboukir.
22 Aug.,	"	Bonaparte leaves Egypt.
9 Oct.,	"	Lands at Fréjus.

NOTE

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Napoleon's attitude towards the question of Italian nationality is dealt with as a whole in a later chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE 18TH OF BRUMAIRE

French Policy and Disasters — Sieyès — Novi and Zurich — Landing of Bonaparte — His Attitude — Episode with Joséphine — Conspiracy — Bonaparte appointed to command Troops in Paris — Fall of the *Directoire.*

THE peace signed at Campo Formio did not prove of long duration, for at the very time that Bonaparte was sailing for Egypt the *Directoire* had proved its incapacity by reversing his Italian policy and giving provocation to the Powers. During the course of the Italian campaign Bonaparte had shown an accommodating spirit in his relations with the two southern Italian States, the Papacy and the kingdom of Naples. He did not wish to weaken himself by carrying on military operations in such an ex-centric direction, nor would he associate himself too closely with the extreme anti-religious policy of the *Directoire.* But while the Egyptian expedition was preparing, and after its departure, the French government successively quarrelled with and occupied

both Rome and Naples, and there promoted the establishment of republics. The jealousy of Austria and Russia was at once kindled, and these two Powers took up arms. In the spring of 1799, the French were several times defeated in northern Italy by Souvaroff, while the Austrians threatened the Rhine and an Anglo-Russian army prepared to operate from Holland. This military failure was not all, however; for the *Directoire* was as feeble and unsuccessful at home as abroad. In 1798 France became bankrupt. In the spring of 1799 the Jacobin party, representing what was left of the Terrorist element, was successful in the elections and secured nearly one half of the seats in the Council of Five Hundred (lower House). The government had neither money, nor administrative system, nor moral strength; France was overrun by lawlessness, taxes were unpaid, gold was hoarded, and the only thing that prevented the Republic from sinking was the general fear of a Bourbon restoration. Nearly all men wanted to keep something of the Revolution, but so many political panaceas had already been exploded that there appeared little hope of agreement or salvation. At this crisis, in the early part of 1799, an important group of moderate men, anxious to save the

Republic by means of some administrative or constitutional reform, turned to that eminent statesman Sieyès, then French ambassador at Berlin. Sieyès had been a prominent debater from the earliest days of the Revolution, and had gained the reputation of being the greatest constitutional authority of France. By a prudent course he had weathered the storms of Jacobinism, and now a convenient expurgation of the *Directoire* gave him a seat in that body, while the best men in the legislative and administrative field rallied to his support and looked to him to effect a constitutional reform that should give stability to the State. Sieyès thought that to effect a change in the government the support of the army was essential. Bonaparte was in Egypt, and the British cruisers intercepted all communications. Under these circumstances, Sieyès decided that General Joubert's should be the arm to deal the necessary blow. But in the summer of 1799 the military fortunes of France had sunk so low that it was thought indispensable that Joubert should first retrieve something of the lost prestige. He was accordingly given all the troops that could be collected and sent into Italy to rally the dispirited remnants of the French army in that country and to bring the

Austro-Russians to battle; from his anticipated victory he was to return to Paris and help Sieyès reform the State. At Novi, on the 15th of August, one week before Bonaparte set sail from Alexandria, the two armies met; Souvaroff was once more successful, Joubert was not only defeated but killed. This blow placed Sieyès for the moment in a desperate position; and not only Sieyès but France, for the German and Italian frontiers were now both uncovered. Only one French army, that of Masséna in Switzerland, still held the field. For a few weeks after Novi the Republic appeared doomed, and then, in the last days of September, Masséna won a series of splendid successes in the neighbourhood of Zurich. A thrill of hope ran through France once more, and just at that moment Bonaparte landed. It was an extraordinary coincidence of prevision, audacity, and chance; he had just caught the turn of the tide that carries on to fortune.

The feeling that Bonaparte was the only man who could save the State was so universal that no sooner was his frigate at anchor than she was boarded by a mob of excited people who took not the slightest heed of quarantine regulations. The general and his companions landed and proceeded on their journey to Paris, every

stop, every change of horses being the occasion of enthusiastic demonstrations in honour of the conqueror of Italy, of the victor of Aboukir. But Bonaparte knew enough of the necessities of the times, of the temper of France, not to pose as the ambitious general. Moreau, Joubert, Masséna, Jourdan, Hoche, had shown themselves fine soldiers, but Bonaparte alone had closed a series of victories by forcing a peace. It was peace France now wanted; and it was the general who had presented the treaty of Campo Formio to the *Directoire* who was now declaring to those who eagerly pressed about him, that the government of France was driving her to ruin, but that he intended that peace should be obtained and that all classes of Frenchmen should enjoy its benefits. As a result of his Italian campaign, he declared, France had been left prosperous, victorious, and honoured; he now found her bankrupt, defeated, and disgraced. He allowed it to be understood that either with or without the *Directoire* he was prepared to save the country.

Bonaparte's return to Paris was marked by an important incident in his relations with Joséphine. Probably no great man was ever less influenced in a political sense by women, and for that reason there will be little said on

that subject in this book; yet the incident we are now coming to must receive notice because it partly leads up to and explains events of the greatest importance that took place ten years later. Joséphine Bonaparte was beautiful and a woman of her period, frivolous, charming, extravagant, tender-hearted, and perfectly lax in her morality. Bonaparte had loved her intensely, fervently, as the letters he wrote to her in the course of the Italian campaign sufficiently disclose. But when in Egypt, intercepted correspondence and the tittle-tattle of kind friends had revealed to him that he had ample cause for divorce. Joséphine hurried from Paris to meet her returning husband on the Lyons road, so as to place her version of affairs before him ere he should reach Paris. But the family feud between the Bonapartes and the Beauharnais was already in full force. Napoleon's brothers, Joseph and Lucien, who had now become important political personages in Paris, had determined to overthrow Joséphine so that their influence might predominate with their brother. They also hastened to meet him and succeeded in doing so, whereas Joséphine failed. For several days after his return to his little house in the *rue Chantereine*, of which the name had been changed to *rue de la Victoire*, Bonaparte

refused to see his wife. Finally her lamentations and entreaties, with those of her two children, Eugène and Hortense, together with the feeling that an action for divorce would be impolitic at such a crisis, prevailed with Napoleon, and a reconciliation took place.

The really important question was: how and by what means could a change of government giving power to Bonaparte be effected? There were several ready formed parties anxious to win his support, but on his first arrival he practically declined all overtures, even those of his own brothers, declaring firmly that he belonged to no party, that he was in favour of no party, but that he was for all good Frenchmen to whatever party they belonged. In fact, he would follow no man, but wanted all men to follow him. The *Directoire* was too divided and impotent to take notice of the open challenge involved in the conduct of the Corsican general. He was in a sense a deserter from his army; he had come from a plague-stricken port and had violated the quarantine regulations; he openly impugned the conduct and threatened the existence of the government, yet the *Directoire* dared not order his arrest for his moral strength was far greater than theirs. Public

opinion saw in him the only man in France of sufficient ability and of sufficient strength of character to draw the country from the quagmire in which it was sinking.

Probably Bonaparte's first intention was to make use of Barras with whom he had so effectively co-operated in crushing the rising of Vendémiaire 1795. Barras was still a member of the *Directoire*, but was now too discredited with the best section of public opinion to be of any political utility. Between Sieyès and Bonaparte there was at first much coolness, but it was clear to many that in their co-operation was the only hope of effecting something useful. A party in which Talleyrand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cambacérés, Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte were active, succeeded in bringing the two men together. From that moment the scheme for effecting a revolution proceeded fast. The precise form that should be given to the new constitution was for the present left undetermined. What the conspirators were agreed on was that the executive power of the Republic must be strengthened and that a committee of three should hold it: Bonaparte, Sieyès, and a colleague who followed his lead, Roger Ducos. Few were let into the secret, but

there was a vast tacit conspiracy supporting Bonaparte and Sieyès that placed at their beck and call a large number of men in the legislative bodies, especially in the Council of Ancients. Few of them knew exactly what was intended, but most of them were prepared to take up any lead shown them. The cue was soon given.

Bonaparte had since his return received many applications to review various bodies of troops quartered in the capital, but had deferred answering. On the night of the 17th of Brumaire (November 8, 1799) he accepted all these invitations and fixed the following morning for the inspection, asking each commanding officer to march his troops to the garden of the Tuileries. He also wrote personal letters inviting every officer of note in Paris to call at his house in the *rue de la Victoire* at an early hour of the morning. During the course of the night the secretaries of the Council of Ancients, whose support had been secured by the Bonaparte-Sieyès faction, wrote and dispatched messages convening the members to a morning session on the 18th of Brumaire; in a few cases where opposition might be expected, these messages were either not sent or failed to reach their destination.

Early in the morning a large assemblage of officers in full uniform gathered in the *rue de la Victoire;* at the sight of their numbers all realized that the long-expected hour had come, though how the change in government was to be effected, none knew. All, however, save General Bernadotte whose sympathies were with the Jacobin party, followed Bonaparte, who led them in a body to the Tuileries where the Council of Ancients was already in session. That assembly, on the motion of one of the conspirators and in perfect accord with the terms of the existing constitution, declared Paris to be in a condition threatening to the security of the State, decreed that both the upper and lower House should suspend their sessions and adjourn to St. Cloud on the 19th, and that General Bonaparte should assume command of all the troops quartered in and near Paris. The general was now introduced, and harangued the legislators, declaring that he would support them and save the Republic. He then proceeded to the gardens where the troops were assembled and passed them in review, being at all points greeted with tremendous enthusiasm.

While a packed meeting of the Council of

Ancients was thus placing the power of the sword in Bonaparte's hands, the *Directoire* was rapidly disintegrating. As had been preconcerted Sieyès and Roger Ducos made their appearance before the Council of Ancients and declared that they resigned their functions. Barras hesitated, but on pressure of some private nature being put on him by Talleyrand, he decided to make a virtue of necessity and signed his resignation. This left only two out of the five Directors in office, Moulins and Gohier; their influence was slight and did not affect the crisis.

But there was a third body in the State, one in which the Jacobins were strong and from which trouble might not unreasonably be anticipated, the Council of Five Hundred. In the enthusiasm created by the return of Bonaparte from Egypt that assembly had elected his brother Lucien president, and Lucien was now to play an almost decisive part. The Five Hundred were to assemble at noon that day in the ordinary course of business. No sooner had they done so than Lucien, declining to listen to any motion, declared the session adjourned till the following day at St. Cloud, according to the terms of the perfectly constitutional decree issued by the Ancients. To

this ruling the members perforce submitted, and thus every item of the day's programme had passed off without a hitch. All Paris appeared to rejoice at the events that had occurred, and, unique fact in the history of revolutions, the government stocks rose in the course of the day from $11\frac{1}{4}$ to $12\frac{3}{4}$.

But the revolution was only half accomplished, and the 19th of Brumaire proved as stormy as the 18th had been peaceful.

CHRONOLOGY

	1798.	Bankruptcy of the *Directoire*.
	"	Invasion of Rome and Naples.
	"	Russia and Austria resume war.
25 March,	1799.	Jourdan defeated at Stockach.
15 Aug.,	"	Joubert defeated and killed at Novi.
22 "	"	Bonaparte leaves Egypt.
25 Sept.,	"	Masséna's victory at Zurich.
9 Oct.,	"	Bonaparte lands at Fréjus.
9 Nov.,	"	18th Brumaire.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

For Brumaire there is nothing of the same rank as VANDAL'S *Avénement de Bonaparte*, Paris, 1902, perhaps the finest work yet written on Napoleonic history.

CHAPTER VI

THE 19TH OF BRUMAIRE AND MARENGO

Scenes at St. Cloud — Formation of the new Government — External Affairs — The Army of Reserve — Plans of Campaign — Passage of the Alps — Marengo — Triumph of Bonaparte.

IN the early hours of the 19th of Brumaire troops were marching out from Paris to St. Cloud, some five miles distant, to take charge of the palace where the legislative bodies were to meet. This palace, destroyed by the German bombardment in 1870, was on a hillside close by the river Seine, and its buildings, courts, and terraces were completely encircled by massive iron grilles. Following the troops came a constant stream of carriages and pedestrians, of legislators and spectators, so that by eleven or twelve o'clock the little village of St. Cloud was crowded with a representative audience come to witness the politico-dramatic performance announced to take place. Many pressed up to the grilles, watching the privileged few within and exchang-

ing comments with the sentries pacing beyond. These sentries really represented the essential factor in the situation, and therefore it will be well to note a few particulars concerning the troops. Of the thirty-five hundred men present most were devoted to Bonaparte. The cavalry consisted of several squadrons of dragoons commanded by Colonel Sebastiani; he was a Corsican and had placed himself unreservedly at his compatriot's disposal. The infantry consisted nearly entirely of several battalions that had followed Bonaparte in the campaign of Italy. They not only felt a personal devotion for their old general, but a detestation for what they called a government of lawyers from which they had never received proper treatment. The soldiers displayed their dilapidated uniforms to the spectators and complained that for six months the *Directoire* had left them starving and without pay. In one company a single pipe of tobacco was gravely passed from man to man, so that each might puff in turn and enjoy his proper share of this somewhat Spartan luxury. There could be no doubt as to what answer these soldiers would give if the question between Bonaparte and the government was placed clearly before them. But there was another body of some four hun-

dred men whose sentiments appeared more doubtful; these were the guards of the Councils. These men, picked to defend the Councils against Parisian disorder, were stout republicans, well paid and not disaffected; it was uncertain how they would act, though their superior officers had been won over by the Sieyès-Bonaparte faction.

It had been arranged that the Council of Ancients should meet in a hall in the body of the Palace, the Council of Five Hundred in a covered orangery outside. It was from the Jacobins in the latter body that resistance was feared, for they had during the previous afternoon and evening been actively debating means of resistance to what they denounced as an attempt to overturn the Republic in favour of a dictature. Jourdan and Bernadotte, who each had some following in the army, were not disinclined to support the extremists, but nothing more was settled than that the Five Hundred would oppose a strenuous resistance to any constitutional amendment.

Was constitutional amendment, however, the course that Bonaparte and Sieyès intended to adopt? No one could tell. The fact was that the conspirators, who had planned every detail of the first day with such minute care, had left

the second to take care of itself; there was absolutely no plan of action.

When Bonaparte and his supporters arrived at St. Cloud on the morning of the 19th, they found preparations for the meeting of the two assemblies incomplete. It was past noon before the orangery was ready for use, and by that time impatience and nervousness had set in. At last Lucien Bonaparte took his seat in the presidential chair and the proceedings of the lower House opened. Many motions and resolutions were handed in, but one only met with the general approval of Jacobins, Bonapartists, and all sections: this was that the members should individually renew their oath to maintain the constitution. This was eminently characteristic of the assembly, a resort to talking when it was essential to act. At two o'clock the solemn farce began, at four it was still proceeding.

In the meanwhile the Ancients had also got to business; but unfortunately none of the members appeared to know precisely what course to take. Finally, getting no lead from Bonaparte or Sieyès, a proposal was put forward that the three vacancies in the *Directoire* should be filled up. Till this moment Bonaparte had been little seen. From a room in the

palace he had watched events, confidently awaiting their development in a favourable direction; but the more he waited, the less satisfactory did the appearance of affairs become, and now, trusting to his soldier's instinct, he determined to proceed to the point of danger. Accompanied by his chief of staff, Berthier, and by his secretary, Bourrienne, he presented himself at the entrance of the Council of Ancients and, unbidden, entered the hall, making his way to the foot of the president's tribune. He then hastily and nervously delivered a speech, the worst of his life. Unused to the atmosphere of a deliberative assembly, unprepared with any definite propositions, he excitedly stumbled from blunder to blunder. The Ancients were not disinclined to support him, but when he explained that the Republic was in danger from a great conspiracy, there were immediate demands that he should specify what his accusations meant. He grew embarrassed and talked louder; the legislators pressed questions on him and became heated; finally Bonaparte began telling of what he had and what he could accomplish by the might of the sword. By this time Berthier and Bourrienne were pulling at his coat tails, and in the midst of much excitement they

finally half dragged, half persuaded him away. This was a bad beginning, but worse was to follow.

Bonaparte was now roused, and, not waiting to cool, proceeded from the Ancients to the Five Hundred in the orangery below. There was a crowd at the door through which he slipped nearly unrecognized and began elbowing his way down a gangway blocked with members towards the presidential tribune. A moment later a voice shouted, "Down with the Dictator! Down with the Tyrant!" and a rush was made for the spot where the little Corsican was still struggling to make his way. An indescribable uproar followed. The cry of "Outlaw him!" that five years before had sounded the knell of Robespierre, now rose loudest of all; and, surrounded as he was by the furious deputies, Bonaparte appeared lost. But Murat with other officers and a few grenadiers were forcing their way through to save their general. In a moment more he was dragged safely away, half suffocated, his coat torn, his face scratched and bleeding. He retired to his room for a short while, then descended to the courtyard and mounted his horse; he was more at home in the saddle glancing down a row of bayonets than in the midst of legislative assemblies.

The incursion of Bonaparte into the Council of Five Hundred resulted in the putting forward of a formal motion of outlawry, and it was well for him that his brother happened to be president of the assembly. Lucien showed as much resource and coolness in this crisis as Napoleon had impetuosity and rashness. He first declined to accept the motion, then finding he could not resist it, claimed his right to speak, and leaving the presidential chair, ascended the tribune. Notwithstanding the Jacobin efforts to howl him down he held his ground for some time, and succeeded in whispering a message to a friend to the effect that the conspirators must act at once or all would be lost. This message resulted in the appearance of half a dozen grenadiers in the hall, who proceeded to the tribune, surrounded Lucien, and escorted him out into the courtyard. No sooner was he in the open than he called for a horse, and jumping into the saddle pushed up to the ranks of the guards of the Council. He addressed them in ringing tones, declaring that a faction of assassins had dominated the assembly; that his life and that of his brother were no longer safe; that he, the president, represented the assembly, and called on them to restore order; and that if

his brother intended or ever attempted anything against republican institutions he would stab him with his own hands. At the conclusion there was much loud shouting of *Vive Bonaparte!* The guard of the Councils appeared shaken, the soldiers of the line had long been stamping with impatience. At this moment some one, perhaps Murat, gave an order, and a drum began to roll out the charge; Murat promptly made for the door of the Council chamber, followed by Leclerc and the infantry. This move was decisive. At the sight of the troops the legislators hurried to leave the hall, most of them by the windows, and Murat, ordering bayonets to be fixed, cleared the room. The revolution was accomplished.

In the late hours of that evening small groups of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients representing the victorious faction met in the now deserted halls of the palace of St. Cloud, and gave an appearance of legality to the decrees sent for their approval by Bonaparte and Sieyès. On the following morning proclamations appeared announcing a new government under three Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger Ducos, and declaring a policy of the reunion of all parties and of peace.

It is curious to reflect, when viewing Bonaparte's career as a whole, that it was on a policy of peace that he attained power. Yet it was so; that was undoubtedly the great desire of the French people in 1799, and it was the perfectly well-founded opinion of the country that if any man could give it peace, internal and external, it was Bonaparte.

Yet the military situation of France was so weak in regard to the three great Powers with which she was at war that few believed in the possibility of foreign peace save through victory. Bonaparte, however, was no sooner in office than he made pacific propositions to the allies, and so far succeeded that he detached the Czar Paul from the alliance. Great Britain declined all overtures, being then in hopes of soon reducing the French garrisons in Malta and Egypt; but this she did in terms that showed peace to be possible in the near future. With Austria, however, it was clear that a campaign must be fought. That campaign will now be related and a consideration of the internal policy of Bonaparte after Brumaire must be for the moment postponed.

In the spring of 1800 the military position was as follows. The remnant of the French army of Italy was covering Genoa under the

command of Masséna; a much superior Austrian army under Melas eventually drove it into that city and threatened an invasion in the direction of Toulon and Marseilles. In southern Germany Kray with one hundred and fifty thousand men menaced the Rhine. Moreau with an army nearly equal stood on the defensive at Basle. As against these two Austrian armies the French had a great advantage of position owing to their holding the projecting bastion of Switzerland; in strategic language they had a double base from which to manœuvre, either to the north or to the south. The meaning of this will appear from the plans formed by Bonaparte. His first proposal was this: that all the available reserves should be marched into Switzerland to strengthen Moreau; that that general should transfer his army from Basle to Schaffhausen whence he could march, so as to place himself on the Austrian lines of communications; that Bonaparte should accompany the army to supervise the operations. Moreau rejected this scheme; he preferred a plain frontal advance to the more daring and destructive one proposed, and he objected to Bonaparte's virtual assumption of supreme command. Precisely at this juncture came the news that Melas had driven Masséna



The Swiss base, 1800

into Genoa, and Bonaparte promptly determined to alter his plans. Instead of basing himself on Switzerland to attack Kray's lines of communications, he would turn south and deal a similar blow at Melas. His preparations for this were eminently characteristic of his genius. His first move was to deceive the enemy as to his strength and intentions. The newspapers accordingly announced the formation of a camp at Dijon, where a formidable army of reserve was to be assembled. The First Consul, as he was now officially known, went down to inspect the troops and so, of course, did the spies of all the Powers. They found nothing more than a few weak battalions made up of boys and cripples and presenting a most ragged appearance. In a few weeks Bonaparte's army of reserve was the laughing stock of the courts of Europe; but not for long. The camp at Dijon was only a blind. With Berthier at the Ministry of War the most strenuous efforts were being made to squeeze out of the nearly exhausted resources of France one more effective army. There were other camps besides that of Dijon, where strong battalions were being got into shape. In April it was reported that reinforcements were to be marched to Nice where Suchet with a small

force was facing Melas. In May it became known that Bonaparte was leaving Paris for a tour of inspection that was to last just two weeks.

By an article of the new constitution it was provided that the First Consul should not exercise any military command. Such a clause was not likely to hold good with a man like Bonaparte at the head of the State. Yet the situation was precarious. The government was very new, and a military failure might spell ruin. In this difficult position, anxious to direct operations, to keep up the military deception, to make Paris believe his absence momentary, — Bonaparte took the following steps. He appointed Berthier general-in-chief of the army of reserve, but arranged personally to supervise the operations of that general; he gave out that he was only leaving the capital for a fortnight, and that his diplomatic receptions would not be interrupted. He left Paris on the 6th of May, and from that moment his plan ripened with startling rapidity. From the centre and east of France long columns had been for many days converging on Geneva and southern Switzerland. On the 14th the first column of a large army began ascending the pass of the Great

St. Bernard; a week later the army of reserve, strengthened by a corps taken from Moreau, had struggled through the snow and ice of the Alps by various passes between the Mont Cenis and the St. Gotthard, and was rapidly marching down into Piedmont and Lombardy, straight towards Melas' lines of communications.

The operations of the next three weeks may be summed up in a few words. It was some days before Melas realized that a French army of considerable size had descended from the Alpine passes into Italy; by this time his line of retreat towards the Quadrilateral was cut. He then appears to have done all that was possible under such circumstances. He concentrated his columns with a view to marching on the enemy, pressing on the siege of Genoa in the meanwhile. On the 4th of June Masséna and his starved garrison surrendered after a memorable defence. In the week that followed Melas marched towards Alessandria, and on the 14th there was fought near that fortress the battle of Marengo that decided the result of the campaign.

Bonaparte having occupied Milan and pushed Murat with the cavalry as far as Piacenza, crossed the Po, advanced to Stradella, and

thence spread out his corps right and left so as to intercept the Austrian retreat at every point. Strategically he had already won a nearly decisive advantage; for being between the Austrian army and its base he had but to succeed in holding the defensive to win. Yet his anxiety to extend north and south led him into error, left him too weak centrally, and nearly resulted in disaster. The French main column marching south-west from Stradella came into contact with the Austrians marching north-east on the 13th, but failed to recognise the fact that the enemy was in force; Melas probably had some thirty-five thousand men present, Bonaparte not more than twenty thousand. On the following morning the Austrians advanced resolutely, deploying right and left of the main road. Bonaparte hastily sent orders to his outlying columns to march to his support, and withstood the attack as best he could.

Heavy fighting followed, gradually turning in favour of the Austrians. By three o'clock in the afternoon the French had been driven some five or six miles, their left was completely routed, their right was in great confusion and in the centre alone was there still some semblance of effective resistance. To Melas the

battle now appeared won; leaving the pursuit to his chief of staff he turned back to Alessandria, where he wrote dispatches to his government describing his victory over the French.

On the departure of Melas the mass of the Austrian infantry was ordered to continue its advance along the road to Stradella in one heavy column, battalion after battalion. This over-confident and faulty disposition proved fatal. At four o'clock General Desaix, who had marched since the morning on the sound of the firing, brought up his division to the aid of the First Consul. A battery was placed across the road and suddenly unmasked; the head of the Austrian column was broken; several of Desaix' fresh battalions were rushed forward with the bayonet, and at the same moment Kellermann charged down in flank with five or six hundred dragoons. In a few moments the dense Austrian ranks were in confusion and at the mercy of the horsemen. There was no time and no space in which to deploy. Bonaparte pushed his advantage home. The straggling French were rallied and brought back to the attack; the fresh troops of Desaix carried everything before them, and avenged the fate of their general who fell early in the fight. In half an hour's time the victory

of the Austrians had been turned into a disastrous rout in which they lost thousands of prisoners and all the positions they had captured earlier in the day.

On the following morning Melas offered to negotiate. A convention was agreed to whereby the Austrian army was permitted to continue its retreat, in return for which Lombardy and all the western parts of Italy were ceded to the French.

It is not altogether correct to think of Marengo as a lucky victory. In one sense it was so; but even had Melas won the field, Bonaparte had already secured so great a strategic advantage that he would probably have won the campaign. Had he retreated to the intrenched position of Stradella and been rejoined there by the corps of Desaix and Sérurier, it does not appear likely that Melas could have succeeded in dislodging him. Failing in that he was cut off from his base and would have had to pay the consequences.

Bonaparte's return from Marengo to Paris was the greatest, the truest triumph of his life. The enthusiasm everywhere evoked was based on the idea that the struggle he had waged so successfully was necessary to the existence of France and was the herald of an honourable

peace. So it proved. A few months later Moreau defeated the Archduke John with great loss at Hohenlinden, and Austria gave up the struggle. Peace was signed at Lunéville on the 9th of February 1801, and left France and Austria in about the same position as the treaty of Campo Formio four years before.

CHRONOLOGY

10 Nov., 1799.	19th Brumaire.
15 Dec., "	New Constitution proclaimed.
6 May, 1800.	Bonaparte leaves Paris for army.
14–20 " "	Crossing of the Alps.
4 June, "	Masséna surrenders Genoa.
14 " "	Marengo.
3 Dec., "	Hohenlinden.
9 Feb., 1801.	Peace of Lunéville.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See note page 11.

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CHAPTER VII

LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The Consular Constitution — Bonaparte secures a Dictatorship — Plebiscites — Legal Reform — Influence and Work of Bonaparte — The Napoleonic Bureaucracy — Religious Questions — Death of Washington — The Press — Royalist Overtures.

IT will be better briefly to depart from a chronological order and to consider as a whole the institutions that owed their origin to Napoleon; they came into existence for the most part shortly after his accession to power, and may be conveniently thought of as originating in the period 1800–1805. There are three chief questions to be considered in this respect: first, constitutional; second, legal and administrative; third, religious.

The new constitution of France, evolved from the revolution of Brumaire, had as its fundamental fact the personality of Bonaparte. For the sentiment that had made Brumaire possible, the sentiment represented by Sieyès and the moderate politicians, was that the executive power must be strengthened or the Re-

public would perish. But theories are not the business of a strong executive officer; character, personality, and facts must be the predominant note, — and this was what France found in Bonaparte. The very first meeting of the new government showed clearly what had happened. On the day following the overturning of the Council of Five Hundred, the three provisional Consuls assembled at the Luxembourg. Sieyès on entering the room asked the question: "Who is to preside?" But Bonaparte had already sat down at the head of the table, and Roger Ducos replied: "Do you not see that the general presides?" The question was never raised again.

The new constitution was prepared by the provisional Consuls working with a large committee representing the faction of the Ancients and Five Hundred that had supported the new government. It was principally made up of men who, whatever they had been in the early republican days, were now in favour of moderation and a strong executive; with many, if not with most, the fact that the new government might have occasion to utilize and to remunerate their talents had the greatest weight. The committee and Consuls now set to work to frame a new constitution. Their first care

was to create four great bodies: first, the Council of State whose functions were to advise the executive in the preparation of legislation; second, the Tribunate, which was to discuss all laws, but without voting on them; third, the Legislative Body, which, by a converse process, was to vote on all laws but without discussing them; fourth, the Senate, whose principal duty was to decide on constitutional questions raised by the Tribunate. This may be characterized in a few words, as the diffusion of the political forces of the country, and as the provision of a large number of salaried positions in which the men of the Revolution might be conveniently deposited. The really useful body of the four was the Council of State in which were placed all the workers with practical knowledge of questions of finance, law, or administration.

But, however great the lassitude of France, it was impossible to put forward any constitution that did not make some show of being based on democratic principles. It was therefore provided that there should be elections; but these were of a very indirect and illusory character. Their result was merely to place before the executive a list, arrived at by several progressive steps, from which members of the Senate were appointed; the senators in turn

named the members of the Tribunate and Legislative Body. In practice this gave the head of the State a fairly effective control over all these bodies.

The most thorny subject of discussion in the framing of the constitution was left for the last: what was to be the nature and extent of the executive power?

On this subject Sieyès had some ready-made theories to propose; but they were of an unpractical nature and were rapidly demolished by Bonaparte. This marked the point at which his influence gained a complete predominance and that of Sieyès began to sink. During the lengthy discussions that had taken place Bonaparte had shown that his was the master mind, and Sieyès soon after dropped out of the government, receiving handsome compensation in emoluments and honours. It was finally decided that there should be a first, second, and third Consul, appointed for ten years; that these officials should have a general control over foreign affairs, the army, navy, and police; that Bonaparte should be First Consul, and should appoint the other two. Last of all came the question: what should be the powers of the consuls as between one another? Here really lay the knot of the new constitution, and most

declined the attempt to untie it. One solution would give France a modified *Directoire*, the other a master. At this point, when all hesitated, Bonaparte's prompt intervention proved decisive, and all bowed to his imperious will. He dictated a clause whereby no act of the executive was to be undertaken without the First Consul consulting his colleagues, but they were given no vote, all decisions resting solely with him. This clause made Bonaparte in effect a dictator, and among those who realized the fact were doubtless more than one who believed that this was, after all, the best thing for France and for themselves.

Bonaparte appointed as his colleagues Cambacérés, an eminent jurist, who as a member of the Convention had voted for the death of Louis XVI., and Lebrun, a conservative of great financial knowledge, respected for his integrity and moderation. Among the first ministers were men of all shades of opinion, notable among whom were Talleyrand-Périgord, ex-abbé and member of the Convention, a subtle intriguer and experienced diplomatist; Gaudin, a functionary in the department of finance, whose ability in that sphere was of the greatest; Fouché the ex-Terrorist, famous for the massacres of Lyons, always ready to sup-

port whatever government might be in power, a master craftsman in every device and deceit of secret police work.

As soon as the new constitution was formulated it was submitted to the popular acceptance by a plebiscite or referendum, the result of which was satisfactory to the government. The plebiscite has played a large part in French politics since that date, and it is as well to state that it is in a strict sense not a true test of the political opinion of a country when the question at issue is one involving a change of government. In such a case it is usual to frame the question submitted to the people in such a form that a negative vote implies a desire for turning out the government *de facto*. It is self evident that the citizens must always be few whose disapproval of such a government will carry them to the point of recording a vote which, if successful, could only mean revolution or civil war.

So much for the constitution evolved from the revolution of Brumaire. Let us now consider the great legal and administrative work undertaken by the newly made First Consul.

Napoleon has been called the new, or the modern Justinian; he was, in fact, a great codifier of the law. Like his Roman predecessor

he intrusted to his ablest jurist the care of reducing the chaos of French laws to order. The upheaval and confusion caused by the Revolution facilitated the task of Cambacérés and his assistants. The *ordonnances* of Louis XIV., the subsequent laws of the Monarchy, the mass of legislative enactments of the Republic, were recast in one piece and fitted into a somewhat theoretical framework derived from the principles of the Roman law. Bonaparte's technical knowledge did not fit him to take a very active part in these labours, yet the credit for the framing of the *Code Napoléon* is properly his, for it was his unceasing stimulation that got the work done. He would occasionally keep his Councillors of State working all through the night till dawn, he would decide the points on which the jurists disagreed, and even the most narrow specialist rarely left the council board without feeling that the marvellous pressure and power of elucidation of the great intellect that had presided had deepened his own knowledge of his particular subject. The Council of State was eminently a body for work, and its master drove it as hard as he did himself.

The civil code, afterwards called *Code Napoléon*, was published in 1804; it was followed

by commercial and criminal codes, but it does not come within the scope of this book to attempt a description of their provisions. It will suffice to say that the legal system of Napoleon forms at the present day the basis of much of the legislation of the world; its influence is strong from Prussia to Sicily, from St. Petersburg to Madrid, and even in such distant parts of the globe as Java, South Africa, and Louisiana. If it is possible to give an impression of the *Code Napoléon* in a few words, one might describe it as representing the mass of the laws and customs of old France, purged by the Revolution and poured by the genius of Napoleon into a Latin mould, paternal, authoritive, clear, but inelastic.

The Code was akin in spirit to the administrative fabric that was erected alongside of it. The State was converted into one great bureaucratic machine; every phase of the life of each citizen was classified, supervised, and directed. What the French people want, declared Bonaparte, is equality, not liberty; and his system was accordingly framed to provide all with equal justice, equal privileges, equal opportunity of advancement. But if the State was prepared to grant justice and preferment, it also took care to secure the services of all the intellect of

the country and to repress all attempts at individual action. Even education and religion were brigaded and administered in military fashion. *Membres de l'Institut*, illustrious savants or artists, — Cuvier, Laplace, or David, — were officials salaried, uniformed, and supervised by the State.

France had been divided into departments by the Republic; each of these divisions had as chief administrator a prefect, depending on the Minister of the Interior. The principal duties of this functionary were to administer matters of revenue and police. Under him came the mayors of townships, and lower still came subordinate officials, all under the control of the government, down to the game-keepers or sellers of tobacco and salt. The administrative or bureaucratic machine was powerfully supported by an extensive system of secret police. The ramifications of this department were so extensive that Fouché is reported actually to have secured reports from Joséphine herself as to the daily doings of the household of the First Consul.

With such a system there was a chance for every citizen, provided only he would accept the political situation and support the government; but it was entirely a *downwards* system,

proceeding from the governor, not from the governed, and in no wise resembling free institutions. Feudalism and privileges had been swept away by the Revolution, but personal government had been reinstated by Bonaparte, —and personal government of a far more efficient and stable form than that of the Bourbons, because wonderfully adapted to the practical requirements of a European nation in the nineteenth century. Bonaparte had created what was the most powerful and effective instrument for governing a country and for centralizing and directing its strength yet seen in Europe; none could fail to see the good points of his system. The opponents of France after suffering from the effects of the machine Napoleon had constructed, copied it; and now bureaucratic government with a greater or less admixture of democratic tendencies or appearances, with an executive directing power strong in some countries, weak in others, is the one form to be met with in every part of the continent of Europe. But what else could be expected from Napoleon? The revolution of Brumaire was not the work of a man whose first thought was the good of his country, and the two great currents of sentiment that brought it about were nothing better than

self-preservation on the part of the Sieyès faction and ambition on that of Bonaparte.

The religious question yet remains to be dealt with. In this as in all things Bonaparte took a purely practical point of view. He considered Christianity, with Mohammedanism and all other religions, respectable and useful. For many years he had apparently no religious belief, but during boyhood and towards the close of his life he observed the forms of the Catholic faith. Whatever his inmost belief, as a statesman his attitude towards Rome may be said to have been purely political. During the campaign of Italy, in 1796–97, the *Directoire* had repeatedly pressed him to action against Rome, but he had shown enough reluctance in carrying out these orders to make clear to the astute Papal diplomatists that the young Republican general might one day be their friend. No sooner was he in power than he issued orders for removing the trammels placed on the Catholic worship. The ringing of the church bells throughout France a few days after the 18th of Brumaire created a religious ferment that astonished the government and the country, but that did no harm to the First Consul's popularity. He recognised even more clearly than before the deep attachment of the people

to their religion and determined to go further. Notwithstanding the murmurs of the army, in which atheism had been promoted to the rank of a creed, negotiations were opened with Rome, and in 1801 a treaty was signed re-establishing Catholicism in a privileged position. By the Concordat, as this treaty is known, Bonaparte obtained control of the nomination and salaries of all high ecclesiastical dignitaries, thus securing over them a hold nearly equal to that which he had over his civil and military functionaries. A solemn service held to celebrate this event at Notre Dame led to unseemly scenes in which some of the generals, among them Lannes and Augereau, gave full vent to their disapprobation of the course taken by the First Consul. The feelings of the staunch republicans were further ruffled by the introduction of prayers for the head of the State.

Bonaparte was clear-sighted in his religious policy, and took this great step forward with calm decision. Like every other act of the consulate, it turned partly on considerations relating to the strengthening of his personal authority. In the early days, however, when his supporters were still republican soldiers or republican politicians and not yet Bonapartists,

it was impossible for him to profess any but republican opinions and intentions. A few weeks after his accession to power a very solemn farce was played on the occasion of the death of George Washington (December 14, 1799). A funeral ceremony was held in honour of the American patriot, and the speeches delivered on that occasion more than inferred that France could now gaze on a Washington of her own. Yet when we are inclined to view with amused indignation the obvious fraud and hollowness of such professions, ought we not to marvel equally at the fact that the politicians of America have generally shown more respect for the methods and aims of Bonaparte than they have for the lofty statesmanship and patriotism of Washington.

Acting on the principle he had constantly invoked since his return from Egypt, Bonaparte once in power, stopped the excessive political persecution that had so long been thought necessary. Many political prisoners were speedily released, and France was thrown open to thousands of exiles. While with one hand he thus acted with great apparent liberality, with the other he skilfully seized and muzzled the press, which he retained completely in his power during the next fourteen years. To

what extent this control was carried may be judged by the fact that the *Moniteur* never at any time made the slightest reference to the greatest naval battle of modern times, one in which France was not successful, that of Trafalgar!

The new government was a success from the first, and after Marengo its popularity was immense. Every month the position of France seemed to improve visibly, and Bonaparte soon thought he might advance a step towards the throne. The Comte de Provence, elder of the surviving brothers of Louis XVI., approached him with a view to a Bourbon restoration. This overture Bonaparte politely declined, and shortly afterwards a pamphlet appeared entitled: "*Parallel between Cromwell, Cæsar, Monk, and Bonaparte*," in which the imperial ambitions of the First Consul were clearly revealed. The impression produced was not favourable. France was not yet ready, and both the ardent republicans and the ardent royalists realized that Bonaparte was their most dangerous enemy and prepared to destroy him.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

For preceding chapter, TAINE'S *Origines de la France contemporaine* is the capital work, though the twisting of the argument to fit the writer's negative thesis must be guarded against; see also MONNET, *Histoire de l'administration*, Paris, 1885; PÉROUSE, *Napoléon 1er et les lois Civiles*, Paris, 1866; D'HAUSSONVILLE, *L'Eglise romaine et le premier Empire*, Paris, 1870; DEBIDOUR, *L'Eglise et l'Etat en France*, Paris, 1898; WELSCHINGER, *La censure sous le premier Empire*, Paris, 1882; NERVO, *Finances françaises*, Paris, 1863. Among Memoirs those of PASQUIER, GAUDIN, THIBAUDEAU, MOLLIEN, and BOURRIENNE may be consulted. FOURNIER (see page 11) has a good study of Napoleonic legislation; FISHER, *Napoleonic Statesmanship, Germany*, Oxford, 1903, may be consulted for the application of the system in Germany.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DUC D'ENGHIEN AND TRAFALGAR

Conspiracies — The Bonaparte family — Moreau — Imperial Aspirations — The Duc d'Enghien — Proclamation of the Empire — War with England — The Trafalgar Campaign.

ALONGSIDE of the extraordinary building up of the Napoleonic legislative and administrative edifice, the consulate was one long and secret struggle against the agitation and plots of the ultra-Jacobins on the one hand and of the ultra-Royalists on the other. Not long after Marengo a desperate attempt on the First Consul's life was made. A barrel of gunpowder was loaded on a hand-cart that was placed in a convenient position at a spot in the *rue Ste. Nicaise* by which the First Consul's carriage must be driven on its way to the opera. That night Bonaparte was unpunctual, and the coachman, who is said to have been intoxicated, lashed his horses furiously through the intricate network of streets at the back of the Tuileries to make up for the lost time. The explosion took place just an

instant too late, and though many lives were lost and much damage was done, the First Consul went unscathed. At the opera there was a scene of the greatest excitement during which only two persons maintained a calm and dignified exterior, Napoleon and his sister Caroline. The personal friends of the First Consul, such men as Duroc and Junot, were quite unnerved, Hortense Beauharnais was crying, Joséphine was hysterical, the spectators were eagerly demonstrating their joy at the escape of the head of the State, and Caroline alone with her brother sat in the front of the box watching the scene with a cool gaze. Of all Napoleon's brothers and sisters she probably resembled him most in uniting passionate ambition to cool calculation and boundless courage. Of the brothers the strongest in character was Lucien, whose decisive action on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire has already been noted. Conspicuous during the early days of the Consulate, he soon quarrelled with his powerful brother on a matrimonial question and eventually separated himself from him and lost all political influence. The eldest, Joseph, was the most subservient and useful. Stronger in intellect than in character, he was always conspicuous as a subordinate, and was eventually rewarded

with two insecure thrones. Louis, a man of intelligence but uncertain disposition, married Napoleon's step-daughter Hortense, who inherited much of her mother's charm and temperament. What with matrimonial difficulties with Hortense and political ones with Napoleon, Louis found his career not an easy one. He was never an important figure, but a son of Hortense was destined to restore the Empire as Napoleon III. The youngest of the brothers, Jérome, was the least weighty, though even he was to become a king; his grandson, Prince Napoleon Victor, is at the present day the Bonapartist Pretender. Thus of the five sons of Charles Bonaparte one was to be an emperor and three, kings; his daughters rose almost equally high. Elisa married a Corsican who was later created Prince Baciocchi and was given an Italian principality; Pauline, the most beautiful member of a striking family, married first, General Leclerc, and after his death in the expedition of San Domingo, Prince Borghese. Caroline, the youngest, married Joachim Murat, and eventually became Queen of Naples; her ambition finally drove her to betray her brother in his greatest hour of need. Joséphine's son, Eugène, is the only member of the First Consul's family not yet mentioned.

At the commencement of the consulate he was a mere boy; before the end of the Empire he had made his mark and shown such qualities, political and military, that it will be no exaggeration to say that it would have proved fortunate for France had the imperial throne come to him as a consequence of the fall of his step-father.

But this enumeration of the Bonapartes and Beauharnais is a digression; it is now necessary to return to the struggle of the consular government for existence. Plot succeeded plot; the enemies of Bonaparte became more and more desperate as each month increased his power and brought him nearer to what was now his undisguised goal, the throne. The crisis culminated in the early weeks of 1804 when a number of sensational arrests startled Paris. Several Royalist conspirators, with the secret assistance of the British government, had made their way into the capital with the intention of making some attempt against the First Consul. They were mostly men of desperate fortunes who had taken part in the insurrectionary movements in Vendée and Brittany; their leaders were Cadoudal and the ex-republican general Pichegru. Cadoudal was only taken after a fierce resistance; Pichegru

was found strangled in his prison shortly after his capture. But the most important and sensational arrest of all was that of General Moreau, who appears to have had no real connection with the conspiracy. Moreau, the victor of Hohenlinden, was as beloved by the army of Germany as Bonaparte was by the army of Italy. Moreau, the staunch republican, was the hope of many who saw in Bonaparte the coming Cæsar. Moreau, who had always retreated from politics, might be used to pull down a fellow general who had forgotten his soldier's duty. He was accused of complicity in the royalist plot, arrested and tried. Although nothing substantial could be proved against him, he was driven into exile and left France for America. Cadoudal was less fortunate and he, together with several of his accomplices, was sentenced to death. But the matter did not end here.

The extremely dangerous conspiracy of Cadoudal, following as it had many others, and coinciding with the moment at which Bonaparte had at last decided to seize the crown, appears to have thrown him into a state of nervous excitement. Was he to reach the object of his ambition or were his enemies to pull him down at the last moment? He seems

to have thought, and Macchiavelli would have approved, that under such circumstances he could keep his enemies down only by a stroke of terror. He aimed a blow at the republicans by arresting Moreau, he dealt one to the Bourbons by virtually assassinating the Duc d'Enghien.

This young prince of the Condé branch of the House of Bourbon was near the French frontier staying in a country house in the duchy of Baden. He had held a command in the army with which the French *emigrés* had fought the Republic, and his presence on the border was held to signify that on the success of Cadoudal he was to enter France and take command of the royalist movement. On the 15th of March a party of gendarmes commanded by Savary, a confidential agent of Bonaparte, violated the frontier of Baden, and taking the duke from his bed placed him in a carriage and hurried him to Paris. He arrived there on the night of the 19th, was conveyed to the fort of Vincennes, tried by a subservient court-martial in the course of the same night, sentenced to death on no evidence, and shot at dawn. This crime, the most obvious blot on Napoleon's name, produced a wave of indignation that swept all Europe including France.

Not one of the First Consul's supporters approved the act, most of them regretted or repudiated it. Chateaubriand resigned from the diplomatic service; Talleyrand sententiously declared that the execution of the Duc d'Enghien was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. Yet as a stroke of terror, however unsuited to the political conditions of the nineteenth century, it was not altogether unsuccessful. From that time on France acknowledged her master without question, and the stain of blood of the 20th of March 1804, did not prevent the proclamation of the Empire on the 18th of May following.

In 1802 a plebiscite had converted Bonaparte's consulate for ten years into a consulate for life. In 1804 there was little more to do than to make the dignity hereditary and to change its title. That of king would not have been tolerated by France; even that of emperor, which Bonaparte chose, was associated with the continuance of France as a Republic, and for many months after the proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon, France still retained the political style she had assumed on the 1st of Vendémiaire of the year 1, the 22d of September 1792. The coronation of the new Emperor took place at the Cathedral of Notre

Dame on the 2d of December following his proclamation. The ceremony was invested with the greatest pomp, and the Pope was persuaded into travelling to Paris to perform it. It was many years since the annals of the Papacy had registered a similar event, and in the minds of all people of the Latin race it gave the new monarch a consecration that placed him on a not much lower level than that of the proudest Houses of Europe whose power reposed on the basis of divine right. In the following May (1805) Napoleon proceeded to Milan, the capital of what had hitherto been known as the Cisalpine Republic. There he proclaimed the kingdom of Italy, an ambitious and suggestive name for such a small State as Lombardy and her dependencies; he crowned himself with the Iron Crown of the Lombards, and announced that the viceroyalty would be entrusted to Prince Eugène, who would be his heir to the Italian throne. During these ceremonies the republic of Genoa sent a deputation asking for incorporation with France. This was, of course, an instigated act; it gave more obvious proof than any previous one that ambitious aggressiveness might be expected as the keynote of the policy of the Emperor Napoleon; it offended Austria's pride and before long drew

that Power into a new contest with France, the third since the days of the Republic.

We must now re-enter the atmosphere of war that constitutes the background of Napoleon's career. In 1805 began the first of the three great cycles of the wars of the Empire. But to understand the events of the continental war of 1805 we must first take up the relations of France and England at the point at which we left them.

Austria signed peace with France at Lunéville after Marengo, in 1801, leaving Great Britain alone at war. That Power having driven the remains of Bonaparte's army from Egypt, and having also captured Malta, now entered into negotiation. Peace was eventually concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March 1802. The negotiations were difficult, but the only essential question was really that of the Mediterranean and Malta. Great Britain finally agreed to withdraw from the island in favour of some neutral Power. But the position of Malta, midway between the western and eastern extremities of the Mediterranean, and the now unveiled ambition of Bonaparte to acquire a colonial empire, and to resume sooner or later his movement towards the east, made the British cabinet defer evacuation. French

troops occupied part of the kingdom of Naples with the port of Taranto, and the French government declined to remove them so long as the British remained at Malta. The peace between the two countries was in fact little more than a truce, as was well shown by a medal struck by Denon in which Bonaparte's head is covered with a helmet and surmounted by the threatening legend: *Armé pour la paix*, — armed for peace. After much diplomatic disputation, during which the First Consul was strengthening his hold on Italy and Switzerland and preparing plans for trans-oceanic extension, Great Britain broke off negotiations on the question of Malta, and withdrew her ambassador from Paris on the 12th of May 1803.

This renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain made Bonaparte adjourn his colonial ambitions; it influenced among other things his relations with America. The aggressive policy of the *Directoire* had led to a rupture between France and the United States in 1798; this had been patched up by Bonaparte in 1801. But a little later he set his eyes on Louisiana and would have probably attempted its occupation with the assent of its Spanish owners in the face of clearly expressed

American opposition, had not the inevitableness of war with England led him to reconsider his decision. The people of the United States viewed the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France with the utmost dislike. It would have given France the western bank of the Mississippi from the Gulf to the Canadian lakes, barring all possibility of expansion to the west. So it proved fortunate for the good relations of France and the United States that the former now plunged into war with Great Britain once more. By so doing she lost all power of action beyond the seas and was better prepared to abandon her new colonial scheme. A rapid negotiation resulted in the transfer of Louisiana to the United States for a sum of sixty million francs ($11,250,000).[1]

In 1803 the position of Bonaparte in regard to a war with Great Britain was very different from what it had been in 1798. Then the resources of France were limited, the ambition of the young general urged him to hazardous courses; now the resources of the country were vastly increased, and the First Consul was no longer ready to leave France and seek for glory

[1] Louisiana included not only what is now the State of that name, but the whole of the western half of the basin of the Mississippi.

at the further end of the Mediterranean. For every reason the opposite mode of attack to that of 1798 was chosen, and Bonaparte decided on the invasion of England. This great naval and military operation could not be carried out at a moment's notice, but necessitated preparations spreading over many months. From Dieppe to Antwerp the coast was armed with batteries covering numerous camps in which troops began to accumulate. Every port, great and small, was fortified, improved, and filled with pontoons and gunboats. Hundreds of gun vessels and numerous light cruisers were collected to engage the British ships that scoured the Channel.

But it was useless to venture troops in light transports to cross the Channel while the British fleet held command of the sea; nor did Napoleon seriously contemplate doing so. He planned a gigantic naval campaign that was to give him control of the Channel. His plan changed in details almost from day to day, but in broad outline, as it came nearest execution, it was as follows.

There were at that time several French squadrons of which the two largest were stationed at Brest and Toulon. Between these two ports, following the coastline of France

and of Spain her ally, were several others, such as Rochefort, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena, where smaller divisions were stationed. But the Brest fleet was closely blockaded by Lord Cornwallis, and that at Toulon was watched by Lord Nelson. At every point, as the fleets were distributed, the British were practically assured of success. To neutralize this advantage, to delude the British admirals, to concentrate the greatest possible force on the decisive point, Napoleon worked out a scheme of which we will now follow the unfolding. Admiral Villeneuve, commanding the Toulon fleet, in obedience to instructions, took advantage of a favouring slant of wind to make his escape from that port in the spring of 1805. He sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and thence nearly due west. Nelson was quickly on his track and followed out into the Atlantic. The British admiral soon learned that his adversary was sailing west, and concluding that his business was in the West Indian Islands, determined to cross the Atlantic in pursuit.

But Villeneuve's real objective was not the West Indies; his long journey of three thousand miles was only intended to deceive and distract the eye from the real point of danger. Had Nelson's instinct been as keen as Napo-

leon's plan was large, he would have sailed from Gibraltar not for the West Indies, but for the mouth of the Channel, for there was the vital point. As it was he sailed west, and having reached the West Indies discovered that Villeneuve, after a stay of a few days only, had put to sea again, this time steering east. Once more Nelson pursued, but once more he failed to see the bearing of Villeneuve's extraordinary movement and did not shape his course for the Channel, but sailed back towards the Mediterranean. The intention of Napoleon was that the fleet should make land at Ferrol, free the small squadron there, and thence sail to Rochefort and Brest. At that point he hoped that the superiority of his combined fleets would enable them to owerpower Cornwallis and sweep up the Channel. It would have taken a stronger man than Villeneuve to carry out this great plan successfully. He fought an indecisive action with a smaller English fleet under Calder off Ferrol, on the 22d of July, and then decided he could not reach Brest, eventually retiring to Cadiz.

Other events had meanwhile put an end to Napoleon's project of an invasion of England, but before relating those events, the fate of Villeneuve's fleet must be briefly told. The

Emperor was indignant at what he considered his admiral's pusillanimity. Villeneuve, to forestall his removal from command, determined to take his fleet out of Cadiz and fight at any cost. On the 21st of October 1805, he met Nelson off Cape Trafalgar, and was utterly defeated by the superior skill of his opponent. The Franco-Spanish fleet was nearly entirely destroyed, but England's greatest admiral paid for victory with his life.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept.,	1800.	British capture Malta.
Aug.,	1801.	British capture Egypt.
1 Oct.,	"	Peace preliminaries, France and Great Britain.
Jan.,	1802.	Bonaparte President of Cisalpine Republic.
27 May,	"	Treaty of Amiens.
1 Aug.,	"	Bonaparte consul for life.
12 May,	1803.	Renewal of war with England.
20 March,	1804.	Duc d'Enghien shot.
18 May,	"	Proclamation of Empire.
2 Dec.,	"	Coronation of Napoleon.
21 Oct.,	1805.	Trafalgar.

NOTE

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CHAPTER IX

AUSTERLITZ

Ulm — A Proclamation of Napoleon — Occupation of Vienna — Austerlitz — Peace of Pressburg.

THE threat of invasion had created the most profound alarm in England, and British diplomacy had exerted itself to the utmost to provoke a continental war that should draw Napoleon's great army away from its camps on the coasts of the Channel. In this it was successful, for in the autumn of 1805, Austria and Russia, having previously entered into a treaty with Great Britain, began moving their armies towards the French frontiers. War had long been foreseen. The growing strength of France, the brutally asserted ambition of the new made Emperor, the losses and humiliations suffered by Austria in two previous wars, all tended to bring about this result. Napoleon had long been preparing for it. He abandoned without hesitation his camps along the ocean and began transferring the army thence to the heart of Germany. The

march began on the 27th of August; it was of some five hundred miles; on the 14th of October Munich, the capital of Bavaria, was occupied; a week later the first Austrian army had been virtually destroyed.

General Mack, the Austrian commander, had invaded Bavaria in September and thence advanced towards the Rhine, eventually occupying a position at Ulm facing the Black Forest. He expected that the French would advance from some point between Basle and Mayence and appear in this direction. Napoleon did everything possible to lull Mack into security. He proceeded in person to Paris, handed over the command of the army to Murat, and ostentatiously sent him to Strasbourg. He moved large detachments of dragoons and light cavalry into the duchy of Baden and into the Black Forest, simulating a screen behind which the army was concentrating. Later, when it became necessary for him to leave for the front, public attention was again called to Strasbourg by the imperial baggage taking this route and by the Emperor's also following it. While these demonstrations were keeping Mack motionless at Ulm anxiously watching the débouchés of the Black Forest, the seven French army corps, starting from a base that stretched from Bou-

logne to Hanover, were sweeping to the northwest of Mack through Mayence, Coblentz, and Cassel, circling around his right wing, and finally sweeping down from the north on to the valley of the Danube in his rear. It was a repetition of the strategy of Marengo, and the Austrians were half beaten before a shot was fired.

The fighting that followed was desultory. Isolated Austrian divisions tried to force their way through and escape, but were in nearly every case overpowered, defeated, or captured. Mack himself, with twenty thousand men, surrendered at Ulm on the 20th of October. The events of the campaign were summed up with some exaggeration in one of Napoleon's bulletins. It will serve to illustrate his history and character to give the text of one of these documents; the one that follows is that which records the downfall of Mack.

Soldiers of the Grande Armée:

In fifteen days we have finished a campaign. Our intentions have been carried out: we have driven the troops of the House of Austria from Bavaria and reestablished our ally on his throne.

This army, that had so ostentatiously and imprudently placed itself on our borders, is now destroyed.

But what cares England for that! Her object is

gained: we are no longer at Boulogne and her subsidies will be neither diminished nor increased.

Of the hundred thousand men who made up this army, sixty thousand are prisoners: they will fill the places of our conscripts in the labours of the field.

Two hundred guns, the whole train, ninety colours, all their generals are ours. Only fifteen thousand men have escaped.

Soldiers! I had prepared you for a great battle; but, thanks to the bad manœuvres of the enemy, I have reached equal results without taking any risk; and, — unprecedented event in the history of nations, — this result has been gained at an expense of less than fifteen hundred men out of action.

Soldiers! this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your Emperor, to your patience in supporting all kinds of fatigue and privations, to your splendid valour.

But we cannot rest yet. You are impatient for a second campaign.

The Russian army, drawn by the gold of England from the furthest limits of the earth, must suffer the same fate.

In this contest the honour of the French infantry is more especially at stake; for the second time the question must be decided, as already once before in Switzerland and in Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or the second in Europe.

Among them are no generals from whom I have any glory to win. My whole anxiety shall be to obtain the victory with the least effusion of blood possible: my soldiers are my children.

NAPOLEON.

Whatever may be thought of Napoleon's rhetoric by the reader, there is one point that must be kept steadily in mind: that it produced the results he expected. It was designed to inspire the morale of his troops, and it succeeded in doing so. All ranks were full of confidence in the genius of their great captain, and the large proportion of veterans from the wars of the Republic steadied the dash of the troops with a leaven of solidity and skilled leadership. The victorious army with which Napoleon now found himself in Bavaria has been generally conceded to have been the finest he ever commanded.

He now had the following military problem to face. Some one hundred and fifty miles or more due east, down the valley of the Danube, lay Vienna. Between him and the capital, and to the northeast in Bohemia, were various Austrian and Russian corps, large in the aggregate but not yet concentrated. To the southeast the Archduke Charles was retiring towards the Austrian capital from Italy, followed by Marshal Masséna with a large army. A less bold general than Napoleon would probably have given his enemies enough time to concentrate in front of Vienna, but the Emperor waited not one day and urged

his columns rapidly down the valley of the Danube. There was no serious resistance offered, and on the 31st of October the French cavalry under Murat reached the Austrian capital. Only eleven days had passed since the capitulation of Ulm three hundred miles away.[1] From Vienna the French marched northwards towards Moravia, where the Emperor Francis and the Czar Alexander had now assembled a large army. Napoleon hoped for a decisive battle, and his opponents gratified his desire by advancing to meet him.

The position of Napoleon, in spite of his great success at Ulm, was in reality very critical. The internal affairs of France were disquieting chiefly owing to a grave financial crisis, but what was perhaps more important, the military situation was far from sound. The French army was now four hundred miles or more from its base and much weakened by detachments. The line of communications ran through southern Germany, of which the States professed amicable sentiments; but to the north Prussia was avowedly on the point of declaring war and had concentrated a large army under Marshal Mollendorf. It was evi-

[1] A large part of the French army was at Munich and beyond when Ulm capitulated.


AUSTERLITZ
To Olmutz
Plateau
of
Pratzen
LANNES
MURAT
Guard
Cav.
BERNADOTTE
Guard
Inf.
SOULT
OUDINOT
DAVOUT
To Brunn
Direction of Vienna
The arrows indicate the general direction of the Austro-Russian advance. The French corps are indicated by names. Napoleon was near Bernadotte and Soult.
BORMAY & CO., N.Y.

Austerlitz

dently the policy of Russia and Austria to keep Napoleon's army employed in Moravia without coming to battle until the action of Prussia could take effect on his line of communications. But the impetuosity of the young Czar and of his advisers threw counsels of prudence to the winds and led him into the very course Napoleon hoped he would adopt.

For several days the Emperor slowly retired before the advancing allies, having selected a position near Austerlitz from which he expected to derive great advantage. The French army took station there on the night of the 1st of December, Kutusoff with the two allied Emperors disposing his troops on the rising ground opposite. Napoleon's left was solidly established on a hill named the Santon that had been well intrenched. His centre was strongly placed on ground that was not likely to tempt the enemy to a decisive attack; but the right was far otherwise situated. It was drawn up on flat and unfavourable ground and appeared to the Russians weak in numbers and exposed. The command of this wing was given to the dogged Davoust, whose orders were to hold on to his position as long as possible, while at another point the Emperor was deciding the fortune of the day. Davoust's

wing was in reality far better placed than it appeared to be, and he had strong defensive positions on which to fall back protected by water and swampy ground. Having thus placed his right wing as a bait to the enemy, Napoleon crowded the corps of Soult, of Bernadotte, of Oudinot, and the Imperial Guard out of sight behind some buildings and rising ground in his centre; with these troops he proposed dealing the decisive stroke.

Kutusoff arrived in front of the French position on the 1st of December. He had an army of some eighty-five thousand men and estimated his enemy at about fifty thousand; in this he was wrong, for Napoleon had brought in several detachments by forced marches and had raised his numbers to about sixty-five thousand. The Russian general-in-chief decided to attack the weak French wing and thus to possess himself of the road to Vienna that lay behind it; he made his intention clear on the afternoon before the battle by moving troops from the strong plateau of Pratzen in his centre down towards the hollow occupied by Davoust. From the moment Napoleon observed these movements he looked on the coming battle as already won.

On the night before the battle occurred an

incident that shows with what feelings the first army of the Empire viewed its leader. Napoleon proceeded on foot to visit the outposts and observe the enemy. His short figure, grey coat, and little cocked hat, were recognised by some grenadiers, who raised shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* reminding him that the 2d of December was the anniversary of the coronation. From man to man the enthusiasm spread, and soon all the long lines of the bivouac were up and an improvised illumination of twisted straw whisps burst out; it astonished the Russian camps as much as it gratified the heart of Napoleon.

At the earliest dawn the two armies were in their positions for battle, and just as the first shots were fired the sun burst through the heavy winter mist. Soon the two lines were engaged, the Austro-Russians pressing hotly on the French right. Davoust disputed the ground fiercely, but was slowly forced back, a great part of the enemy descending from the heights at Pratzen and extending into the low land out beyond the French centre. At last Napoleon gave the signal, staff officers dashed off in every direction, and from behind the ridge that concealed them the dense columns of Bernadotte and Soult marched forward on

the Russian centre and climbed the heights; Oudinot with the grenadiers and part of the Imperial Guard followed in support. Kutusoff was unprepared for such an attack, his centre was strong by nature but was now denuded of troops, and the Pratzen was soon in the hands of the French. To regain this position was essential, for, with Napoleon there, the allies were completely cut in two. The only available reserve was the Russian Imperial Guard, and this was sent in. Fierce fighting followed, but the French were not to be dislodged, and the severed right of Kutusoff rolled back defeated. In the meanwhile Davoust was still hotly engaged with the other wing, but help was coming. From the heights of Pratzen long lines of French guns were now playing on the rear of the Russian left, while Davoust still kept up the fight in front. Thus cut off and surrounded there was nothing left but retreat. The flat ground, cut with streams and ponds, was bad for this purpose, and many of the fugitives who attempted to cross the frozen lake of Sastchan broke through the ice. Probably several thousand were thus drowned.[1]

The battle cost the allies a loss of thirty-five thousand men and two hundred guns, while the

[1] Recent investigation shows that this was not so.

French reserves were not even brought into action and their loss was probably not more than five thousand men. Two days later the Emperor Francis met Napoleon at the outposts, and agreed to an armistice as a preliminary of peace.

CHRONOLOGY

27 Aug.,	1805.	*Grande Armée* leaves Channel camps.
14 Oct.,	"	Munich occupied.
20 "	"	Surrender of Mack at Ulm.
31 "	"	Vienna occupied.
2 Dec.,	"	Austerlitz.
26 "	"	Peace of Pressburg.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL : GENERAL. — See page 11.

In the foregoing and the succeeding chapter the military operations of Napoleon are taken consecutively from Ulm to Friedland. Political matters are left over for general consideration with the treaty of Tilsit. For Ulm and Austerlitz, see SCHÖNHALS, *Der Krieg, '05*, Vienna, 1874; STUTTERHEIM, *Bataille d'Austerlitz*, Hamburg, 1805 (and numerous other editions).

CHAPTER X

JENA AND FRIEDLAND

War with Prussia — Jena — Murat's March to Lubeck — Eylau — Friedland.

TO present a clear impression it will be better to follow the first great cycle of wars to its conclusion, postponing till its termination a consideration of the political events and changes that accompanied it.

A peace between France and Austria quickly followed Austerlitz, and after the treaty, signed at Pressburg on the 26th of December, the French troops gradually evacuated Austrian territory. But instead of being brought back to the English Channel the corps of the *Grande Armée* remained for the most part quartered in the South German States that were on friendly terms with Napoleon. The reason of this was that the downfall of Austria had settled nothing; Russia was still threatening; war with Prussia had long appeared probable. Hanover, which Napoleon had seized immediately after his rupture with England, was dangled as a bait before King Frederick William's eyes, while the

Emperor pressed on him an anti-British commercial policy. Diplomatic bickering proceeded through the summer of 1806, and on the 1st of October the Prussian Ambassador at Paris presented a series of demands, including one for the withdrawal of the French troops from southern Germany, that brought matters to a crisis. The demands of Prussia were rejected by Napoleon, who was already in the midst of his troops.

Once more, as at Ulm, the Emperor repeated the strategic manœuvre of Marengo. To understand what took place a glance at the map is necessary. From the French frontier to the capital of Prussia ran perhaps the most important road in all Germany, one that was to figure conspicuously in the history of Napoleon; it led northeast from Mayence on the Rhine, through Erfurt and Leipzig to Berlin. Midway between the two latter places it crossed at right angles the river Elbe, which was defended by several large fortresses. This road described what was practically a straight line between Paris and Berlin and appeared to be the necessary scene of the campaign now about to open.

But the Prussian generals had not yet learned the methods of Napoleon. Their army, of

which the highest ranks were filled by veterans trained under the eye of the great Frederick, was confident in its machine-like precision, was inspired to martial ardour by the influence of the patriotic Queen Louisa and the Princes of the royal House. Young officers had whetted their swords on the stone steps of the French embassy in Berlin, and the whole army was animated by hatred of France and a blind confidence in its superiority. But the aged Duke of Brunswick, who was in command, fell into error. The Prussian divisions were marched beyond the Elbe and thence slowly advanced in a great semicircle stretching out on either side of the Mayence road. On the 5th of October headquarters were at Erfurt, and the one hundred and ten thousand men of the Prussian army presented a front of about ninety miles between Cassel and Rudolstadt, watching the Thuringian forest for a first glimpse of the enemy.

Meanwhile what had Napoleon been doing? Aiming, as always, at dealing a decisive blow, he rapidly moved the corps that were protecting the French frontier, not along the Mayence-Berlin line, but to the eastward through Wurtemberg and Bavaria, where they joined the troops already stationed close to the Austrian

border. The army, numbering about one hundred and ninety thousand men, was strongly concentrated about Bamberg, and thence marched north and slightly east towards the corner of Bavaria, Saxony, and Bohemia. On the 5th of October the front of the French army, covering not more than thirty-five miles, was between Coburg and Hof, and Napoleon, who already shrewdly suspected the approximate position of the Prussians, declared that if he could march unimpeded a few days more, he would be in Berlin first.

The French pressed on by long days' marches, and a week later the outposts of the two armies were in touch not far from Saalfeld; the French extreme left had come into contact with the extreme left of the Prussians; the French were rapidly marching north, the Prussians slowly south-west. Napoleon's object was now to swing about towards his left so as to get across the great road in the rear of the Duke of Brunswick. This manœuvre was successfully carried out, the French corps getting into a line roughly indicated by Saalfeld, Jena, and Naumburg, the main strength constantly tending northwards and towards the Elbe.

When the Duke of Brunswick discovered that the French army had completely turned

his left flank and was rapidly moving towards his line of communications, he issued orders for a general movement eastwards in hopes of being able to retreat towards the line of the Elbe through Jena and Naumburg; but he was just a few hours too late and was compelled to fight with his enemy between him and his line of retreat. On the 14th of October were fought two battles within a few miles, at Jena and at Auerstadt. At Auerstadt Davoust with inferior numbers held his position all day and prevented the passage of the King of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick. At Jena with superior numbers Napoleon utterly crushed Hohenlohe. The Prussian infantry fought well until beaten, then the French cavalry rode them down with ease. The pursuit of the defeated army by Murat was of an extraordinary character; he all but literally galloped from Jena to Lubeck, on the Baltic Sea, in three weeks. With the corps of Lannes, Soult, and Bernadotte, together with a large division of cavalry, he swept up the remains of the Prussian army, and captured all the fortresses he passed. Blucher with twenty thousand men was the last to hold out, surrendering, after Murat had stormed Lubeck, on the 7th of November. In the meanwhile

Napoleon with the other half of the army had pressed on to Berlin, which he occupied on the 27th of October.

This was the most decisive and brilliant in its results of all the campaigns of Napoleon; but the uncertainty of war, the fickleness of fortune, were demonstrated by the course of that which was immediately to follow.

Russia was now as anxious to support Prussia against France as she had been to support Austria. But once more the allies had gone in singly and paid the consequences. By the time that Napoleon had destroyed the army of Prussia and occupied her capital with the greater part of her territory, the Russian corps were barely across the frontier. Napoleon decided not to await them but to march, even to Poland if necessary, and there dispose of these last enemies.

During two months following Jena, French columns were marching steadily north and east from prosperous and rich central Germany towards the desolate plains of eastern Prussia and Poland. Napoleon, so as to utilize the political sentiments of the Poles now in hopes of recovering their lost independence, determined to base himself on the line of the Vistula and to place his headquarters at Warsaw.

The Russian commander, Bennigsen, anxious to support the Prussians, moved into the coast provinces, covering Königsberg and operating towards Dantzig. These two fortresses with a small body of troops now represented all that remained of the Prussian power.

On the 25th of December a partial engagement between the two armies took place at Pultusk in which the losses were heavy and the results indecisive. Then Napoleon and Bennigsen both went into winter quarters until early in February 1807, when the latter determined to make an attempt to crush Bernadotte's corps before it could be assisted by the others. In this he failed; Napoleon, rapidly concentrating, hoped in turn to deal a heavy blow at his antagonist. But the success of great military operations often depends on the most trifling details. A staff officer conveying dispatches to Marshal Bernadotte fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and Bennigsen thus became informed of Napoleon's plans. He promptly moved his army to safer positions and finally stood his ground and offered battle near the little village of Eylau. There on the 8th of February was fought one of the most bloody battles of the Empire. A raging snow storm impeded the first movements of the French;

Marshal Augereau's corps lost its direction, advanced to the attack diagonally, and was surrounded and annihilated by the Russians. A great gap was opened in the French line at Eylau, and Bennigsen sent forward his infantry to pierce it. Napoleon and his staff appeared in the greatest danger, but a few battalions of the Guard held their ground with grim desperation, and the Emperor, calm and unmoved, declined to change his position. It was necessary to relieve the pressure on the French centre at any cost and thus gain time to bring fresh troops up, so Murat was ordered to collect all the available cavalry and advance on the Russian centre. Seventy squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers, lancers and chasseurs, about ten thousand men, then followed that most brilliant of cavalry leaders through the whirls of snow straight for the Russian line. This remarkable charge of cavalry was carried a distance of nearly three thousand yards before it was spent; it swept everything in its front, pierced completely through the Russian centre, and gave Napoleon the relief he so urgently needed. From then on to dusk the battle was fought with dogged obstinacy on both sides, the French making but little progress. At night each army and each commander was beaten, thirty

thousand dead men, four thousand dead horses lay between them.

Napoleon and Bennigsen both made preparations for retreat, but the former guessed his opponent's intentions in time, countermanded his first orders, occupied the Russian positions next morning, and claimed Eylau as a victory. But the French army and all Europe realized that the victory was purely technical, and that Bennigsen had come very near defeating the invincible conqueror. Was the spell broken? All through Germany, in Austria, and in the remotest parts of Italy, the opponents of Napoleon drew breath and declared his fall was near. He, meanwhile, retired to winter quarters once more, and called up from every corner of the Empire fresh contingents of men to stop the enormous gaps made in his ranks; one of Napoleon's favourite theories was that numbers constituted the essential factor of success.

It was not till June that the armies could be once more got into motion in a country where the spring comes so late as in Prussian Poland. The new campaign opened badly for the French, as Bennigsen held his ground successfully in a partial engagement at Heilsberg. Manœuvring followed, and at last an opportunity arose of

which Napoleon took full advantage. Bennigsen marched down the right bank of the Alle towards Königsberg, which one half of the French army, under Murat, was threatening. At Friedland he sent a detachment to the further bank to occupy that town. A French corps, that of Lannes, deployed against the town and engaged the Russians. Bennigsen sent over more troops in support, and seeing no sign of French reinforcements came to the hasty conclusion that he had only Lannes' corps to deal with. He accordingly decided to cross the river in strength and crush this isolated opponent. But behind Lannes, in the wooded semicircle of hills that nearly surround Friedland, the Emperor, Oudinot, Ney, Victor, Mortier, and the Guard were hurrying on. Napoleon watched the Russian movements until he judged that Bennigsen had gone too far to withdraw, and then the whole army advanced to Lannes' support. The Russians were outnumbered nearly two to one and were in a wretched position to fight, massed in a contracted space where the converging fire of the French artillery could not fail to cause havoc, and with a river behind them. Bennigsen was utterly defeated with heavy loss, and retreated with his shattered army to the Russian fron-

tier. Napoleon pursued and a few days later reached the little river Niemen, boundary of Prussia and Russia. At this point he received overtures for peace from the Czar Alexander, which he accepted, and it was agreed that the two Emperors should meet in a raft moored in midstream close to the town of Tilsit. This famous interview, which will be dealt with in the following chapter, marks the close of the first great cycle of the wars of the Empire, that which was marked by nearly unclouded success.

CHRONOLOGY

26	Dec.,	1805.	Treaty of Pressburg.
	Feb.,	1806.	Invasion of Naples by Masséna.
	March,	"	Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples.
	July,	"	British victory at Maida.
12	"	"	Confederation of the Rhine formed.
1	Oct.,	"	War between Prussia and France.
14	"	"	Jena and Auerstadt.
27	"	"	Napoleon occupies Berlin.
7	Nov.	"	Murat storms Lubeck.
8	Feb.,	1807.	Eylau.
10	June,	"	Heilsberg.
14	"	"	Friedland.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

The invasion of Naples is not dealt with, though it will be alluded to later; see also HELFERT, *Königin Karolina*, Vienna, 1878.

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CHAPTER XI

NAPOLEONIC POLICY

1806–1808

Napoleon's Ambition — Fall of the Germanic Empire — War and Finance — Tilsit — Commercial War on England — Copenhagen — Junot occupies Lisbon — Continental Policy — Spanish Intrigue — Occupation of Madrid — Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain.

IT is now time to consider the questions of policy that underlay the wars we have just followed, and that soon drove Napoleon to new and less fortunate enterprises. And first the personal element, the man, must engage attention. His successes, his ambitions, his plans, were immoderate; they were the result of an insensate craving to satisfy the selfish appetites of a gigantic intellect. The good of others was with Napoleon nothing more than a means for attaining some personal end, and France was rather the instrument than the object of his achievements.

To Cromwell and to Washington, even in a way to Cæsar, their country had been a sufficient world of action; but Bonaparte's imagi-

nation ever soared to fresh fields of conquest The Corsican lieutenant of artillery had made France his, and now stretched his hand over Europe; — had he made Europe his, nothing can be more certain than that he would thence have risen to the conquest of Asia or America. He was the embodiment of man struggling to better himself as conceived by Utilitarian or Darwinian philosophers, and the field of ambition in which he strove for existence was only bounded by planetary space. Nor was his aggressiveness veiled, it was the man himself, and came out in all his acts. In his bulletins and familiar soldier's talk he used the most offensive language towards his opponents, sparing not even a woman such as Queen Louisa of Prussia. In his diplomatic encounters he showed no greater generosity. When his opponent was down he took from him everything he could, and even when possible, more than was bargained for. Thus it was after the treaty of Pressburg that followed Austerlitz. By the terms of peace Napoleon extorted every cession of territory and of money he could; yet he took more in the months that followed. Having by the terms of the treaty increased the South German States, especially Bavaria, at the expense of Austria, he subsequently proceeded

to form a south and west German body which he called the Confederation of the Rhine and took under his Protectorate. Bavaria and Wurtemberg which he now raised to the rank of kingdoms, with Westphalia later, were the principal among the numerous German States that either through necessity or ambition joined the new Confederation. But these States had been component parts of the Germanic body or Germanic Holy Roman Empire of which the head was the Emperor Francis of Hapsburg-Lorraine. The Empire had long been a weak and tottering institution, this thrust of Napoleon overthrew it; for the Emperor Francis thereupon issued a declaration announcing the dissolution of the Germanic Empire and his assumption of the style of Francis first hereditary Emperor of Austria.

There was another feature of Napoleon's system of politics that became strongly emphasized immediately after Austerlitz: this was that he intended war to be self-supporting. Heretofore in European politics war had been an abnormal condition entailing abnormal expenditure on the country waging it, with this consequence, that on a peace, armaments were reduced. With Napoleon all this was changed. After Austerlitz the French battalions were

not reduced by one man; the army was to its master what the tool is to the craftsman, and he would not admit of its efficiency being diminished.

At the same time it appeared in every way contrary to Napoleon's interests that the abnormal charge for maintaining this great army should be borne by France. He consequently entered on the policy of quartering on his enemies if possible, otherwise on his allies, large bodies of troops which they were called on to maintain and in many cases to pay. For seven years, 1806–13, the greater part of Germany thus served as pasture ground, and so evil and burdensome was the system that even the placid people of that prosperous country were nearly driven into open rebellion.

When the victory of Friedland forced his last great continental antagonist to confess defeat, Napoleon touched the summit of his power. The days of the struggling consulate appeared long past. Already after Austerlitz a great change had come over him physically. He was no longer the lean, intriguing Corsican, struggling to reach the front rank, but had filled out and assumed a better satisfied corporal aspect. He had now established his equality with the greatest sovereigns of Europe.

Eighteen months later, at Tilsit, equality no longer satisfied him, and he decided to divide the hegemony of the Continent with the Czar, providing that sovereign would consent to follow his policy against Great Britain. France and Russia could clearly dictate terms, for Prussia was reduced to a secondary rank, while Austria alone retained a claim to military power. It was on this basis that Napoleon framed his policy at Tilsit. He was prepared to be friendly with Russia. Of Alexander he claimed no territory, save the little island of Corfu; all he asked was co-operation in his struggle against England. He took pains to charm the Czar, and succeeded, for his fascination could be as great as his invective was brutal. Alexander agreed to all that Napoleon asked of him, was content to see peace made at the expense of Prussia, and was repaid by gaining a free hand to take Finland from Sweden and various provinces from Turkey. The Czar begged hard for his ex-ally, King Frederick William, but Napoleon was bent on crushing the Prussian monarchy under his heel. By the terms of peace Prussia was not only despoiled of much territory, but was also charged with an enormous war indemnity, pending payment of which French troops were

to occupy Berlin and her most fruitful provinces. So loose were the terms of the treaty that Prussia remained saddled with the French occupation until after the great catastrophe of November — December 1812.

But the point of greatest interest in the agreement arrived at by the two Emperors was that which concerned Great Britain. Alexander, glad to pay for Austerlitz and Friedland at so little direct cost, fascinated by the cajoleries of the great captain, agreed to turn against his ancient ally. This part of the negotiations was intended to be kept secret for the present, but the British Cabinet secured information and determined to forestall a projected move of the two great continental Powers. Instead of accepting a proposal for the mediation of Russia with a view to a general peace, the government of King George sent an expedition to Copenhagen to seize the Danish fleet.

This event (September 1807) rendered prospects of a peace with Great Britain even more remote, it ruined Napoleon's naval projects, and it prompted him to a counterstroke at England. Nearly every country of the Continent except Sweden and Turkey was now closed to British trade. But in Portugal her

commerce found free outlet, and Napoleon determined, as an offset to Copenhagen, to close the Portuguese ports to Great Britain. To effect this, military action became necessary, and a small army under General Junot was marched through Spain and occupied Lisbon at the end of November 1807. The Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil.

This incursion into Portugal, though it appeared merely a counterstroke for the British seizure of the Danish fleet, was in reality an integral part of a vast scheme which Napoleon's mind had long been maturing. The war of 1805 had drawn him from the Channel; Trafalgar and Copenhagen had deprived him of the naval strength he required, and the invasion of England had faded into the background of possibilities. But though invasion was no longer possible, the commercial attack was; if Napoleon could no longer march an army to London, he might yet hope to starve and ruin her. His first step towards effecting this was when the conquest of Prussia gave him the power to stretch his hand over the north-western seaports. In November 1806 he issued the famous Decree of Berlin, whereby it was ordered that no port in the French Empire or its dependencies should receive any

ship coming from Great Britain or any of her colonies, that Great Britain herself was in a state of blockade, and that all British goods were seizable wherever found. To this the British reply was an Order in Council practically forbidding neutral vessels to trade except through British ports, and later proclaiming all French ports blockaded. Napoleon answered this by declaring all neutral vessels carrying British papers denationalized and seizable. This last decree was in November 1807. The whole force of Napoleon's intellect was now turned towards making this extraordinary economic policy effective. He had not only to devise means whereby English cottons and colonial products should not be smuggled through his extensive cordons of custom house officers, but he had to devise means of bringing the whole of the Continent into his policy, for it was only on the largest scale that it could be effective. Having secured the Czar's promise of co-operation, having a strong hold on the coasts of the Baltic and North Seas, his attention was now more closely directed to the south. Italy was his as far as the Strait of Messina, for the treaty of Pressburg had added Venetia to the kingdom of Italy; the Papal dominions were virtually under French control;

the Bourbons had been driven from Naples, where Joseph Bonaparte was installed king in 1806. The treaty of Tilsit had given Corfu to France, and now, in the winter of 1807–08, Napoleon was revolving plans whereby, acting from that island and in concert with Russia, he might arrange to partition Turkey and thence launch a Franco-Russian expedition through Persia towards India. These schemes were inordinately vast, and their execution never passed the initial stages; but leaving the eastern for the western basin of the Mediterranean there was another detail of the Napoleonic plans that required attention but appeared to offer little or no difficulty.

Junot's march to Lisbon in the autumn of 1807 has already been noticed. Portugal had fallen without resistance and the capital had not fired a shot to stop the paltry force that captured it. Spain appeared as rotten, as effete, as Portugal. The king, Charles IV., was perhaps the most inept of all Bourbon sovereigns, and to make matters worse the Queen and the favourite Godoy were little better than the King. In 1795 Spain had abandoned the struggle against the French Republic and ever since had dragged by her side in an unconvinced and ineffective alliance. But the people

and even the minister tired of French dictation, and in 1806, shortly before Jena, Godoy showed clear indications that he only awaited a favourable opportunity to turn against Napoleon. The Spaniard chose his time badly; the Corsican played his game more deliberately. He wanted the full use of the Spanish naval resources against England, he viewed with contempt the Bourbon occupant of the throne, he did not contemplate as possible a serious resistance from Spain to the conqueror of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Without showing his hand very clearly, without perhaps quite deciding what his precise policy should be, he pushed on supporting columns behind Junot's army of Portugal, and gradually established a considerable force in the northern provinces of Spain.

In the early months of 1808 Napoleon showed his hand more clearly; a large French army was now moving towards Madrid, and Murat was given supreme command. This steadily increasing pressure applied by Napoleon proved too much for the Bourbons, dislodged them from their throne. There were recriminations between Charles IV., his son Ferdinand, and his minister Godoy. Popular discontent broke out. Charles IV. resigned. A mob nearly mas-

sacred Godoy who was barely saved by the French troops. Murat, who had quietly installed himself at Madrid, declined to recognise Ferdinand as king, and Charles repented his hasty abdication. Father and son proceeded to Bayonne to lay their case before Napoleon, and he by menace and cajolery obtained from them a renunciation of their rights in his favour. Spain was now apparently his, and he appointed to its throne his brother Joseph, giving in turn that of Naples to Murat.

It was on the 5th of May that the renunciation of his crown by Charles IV. gave Napoleon Spain with a stroke of the pen, but the people of Madrid had demonstrated that they were no willing parties to the shameful transaction of their king three days earlier. A street insurrection broke out which Murat subdued with much trouble and punished severely. It was the precursor of a national rising continued for five years and that ended in success. France had hitherto conquered by means of a national army; she was now to be met with the same arm she had so triumphantly used and abused.

French troops were now advancing in every direction, but a provisional government organised resistance, and within a few weeks the imperial arms received the most decisive check

they had yet met with. South of Madrid the French general Dupont allowed his communications to be cut, and failing to force a passage was compelled to surrender with twenty thousand men at Baylen (July 19). A few weeks later a similar disaster occurred in Portugal. A British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, landed close to Lisbon, fought and defeated Junot's army (Vimiero, August 21). A capitulation was signed at Cintra a few days later, whereby the French evacuated Portugal.

These unexpected reverses roused Napoleon. His army in Spain was made up mostly of new levies; he now ordered several corps of the *Grande Armée* to leave their cantonments in Germany for the peninsula. Other corps were formed in France and hurried to the frontier, and Napoleon determined to take command in person. He joined his troops in November; they were then concentrated between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, faced by several Spanish armies for the most part poorly drilled, insufficiently equipped, and miserably led. A few rapid strokes to the right and left shattered resistance, and Napoleon marched irresistibly on Madrid, which he entered on the 4th of December.

This first success was illusive. There were several peculiarities that rendered campaigning in Spain a far more difficult task than in Italy or Germany. The country was poor and troops had to be accompanied by long convoys; the peasantry, fanaticized by the priests, took up arms, cut off detached parties, and isolated the French columns; the mountain ranges of the peninsula ran generally east and west, that is across the line of invasion, making movements slow and arduous, and affording continuous openings for rapid flank attacks up the valleys. While Napoleon was marching south on Madrid, a British army under Sir John Moore was moving east from Lisbon and nearly succeeded in striking the French line of communications in the neighbourhood of Valladolid. No sooner did Napoleon realize the presence of this new enemy than he turned all his available force towards the British, and taking command pushed forward to attack Sir John Moore. It was now winter and the mountain passes were covered with snow, but the French pressed on rapidly, and the British general, heavily outnumbered, hastily retreated. He eventually reached Corunna after severe losses and hardships, and there succeeded in embarking his army but lost his life in the fighting.

Napoleon had not pursued the British as far as Corunna; midway important dispatches had reached him from Paris. Handing over the command to Marshal Soult he took a few personal attendants, and galloping as fast as saddle and post horses could carry him, unexpectedly reached his capital on the 23d of January 1809.

CHRONOLOGY

7 July,	1807.	Treaty of Tilsit.
Sept.,	"	Capture of Danish fleet at Copenhagen.
30 Nov.,	"	Junot occupies Lisbon.
2 May,	1808.	Madrid riot.
5 "	"	Bayonne. Charles IV. resigns his crown.
19 July,	"	Surrender of Dupont at Baylen.
21 Aug.,	"	Junot defeated at Vimiero.
Sept.,	"	Interview of Erfurt.
Nov.,	"	Napoleon joins army in Spain.
4 Dec.,	"	Occupies Madrid.
23 Jan.,	1809.	Napoleon returns to Paris.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

For Tilsit and the relations of France and Russia there is no authority comparable to VANDAL'S *Napoléon et Alexandre*, Paris, 1896. For the Continental blockade see MAHAN, *Influence of Sea Power*, London, 1892. For

Spain, OMAN, *Peninsular War*, London, 1902–03 (two volumes only, to 1809); or the classic but not altogether reliable NAPIER, *Peninsular War*.

ROSE is good to consult on France and Great Britain after Tilsit, and FISHER on Germany.

The war in Spain will not be followed after this chapter, as Napoleon took no further personal part in it; only such brief allusions to it will be made as will suffice to keep the reader abreast with the general progress of affairs.

CHAPTER XII

WAGRAM

Austrian Jealousy — French Discontent — Napoleon leaves Spain — War with Austria — Aspern and Essling — Dispossession of the Pope — Wagram — Peace.

THERE were two causes that brought Napoleon suddenly back from Spain to Paris, one general and widely known, the other of a more intimate and obscure character. The first of these was connected with the relations of France with the great Powers of north-eastern Europe; to understand it we must go back a little and pick up the thread of policy spun by Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807.

With Prussia reduced to impotence and largely occupied by French troops, there were now as military factors but two Powers in the north-east, Russia and Austria. The friendly advances of Napoleon to the former indicated beyond question that his policy in that quarter would turn on the balancing of these two Powers one against the other. And further, his friendship with Russia was held at Vienna to

imply hostility to Austria. The inference was obvious and told more deeply owing to the repeated humiliations Austria had met with, though Napoleon would doubtless have been pleased to remain at peace with her. From the time when Eylau opened anew the possibility of shaking off the Napoleonic yoke, the Cabinet of Vienna made great efforts to reorganize its army and resources.

But the Emperor's relations with Alexander, though outwardly friendly, had already developed slight points of friction, and in the summer of 1808 an interview between the two was arranged for the discussion of their interests. It took place at Erfurt. Here amid much pomp, surrounded by the princes of Germany and of the French Empire, they privately debated the questions of Poland, of Prussia, of Great Britain, and in short the whole political field from St. Petersburg to Cadiz and from Norway to India. The nature of these conferences was not generally known, and it was only a few of the best placed and most astute observers, such as Talleyrand, who detected the fundamental incompatibility of views between Napoleon and Alexander that must sooner or later break down their alliance. The general opinion was that France and Russia were in

perfect accord, and that jointly they could control the whole of continental Europe. In reality the Czar chafed at the pressure of the French Empire eastwards in Prussia, in Poland, in the Balkan peninsula.

The conference at Erfurt alarmed Austria. Her statesmen were not sure that Napoleon had not given Russia a free hand against Sweden and Turkey as a price for her abstention from interfering against his carrying out some design against Austria. Was it his intention to reduce the Emperor Francis to the position of King Frederick William, or perhaps even to steal his throne, as he had that of Charles IV.? There was little present ground for fear, yet Austria pressed her armaments forward. Napoleon declared to Count Metternich, Austrian ambassador at Paris, that if Austria armed she could never afford to disarm without fighting and that war must therefore follow, and he disclaimed, probably sincerely, all hostile intention. Yet the dangerous process continued during the autumn and winter months of 1808. By the beginning of 1809 Austria had gone so far that war was inevitable and it became clear that sooner or later Napoleon must leave Spain and return to Germany. It does not appear probable, however, that he would have

abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore quite so precipitately as he did, had there not been another matter of importance that required his presence in Paris without delay.

In 1799 Bonaparte's advent to power had been eagerly supported by reasonable men of many shades of political opinion. His early steps as a ruler tended to confirm the hopes of those who looked to him to provide stability; and even if he aimed openly at personal power, yet through him was introduced such sound administration, finance, and justice as France had never known. Many, therefore, viewed his personal rule so far as a blessing. But the development of Napoleon's policy after the proclamation of the Empire, after Austerlitz, after Jena, and especially after Tilsit, frightened those who dared think for themselves and whose insight was not obscured by apparent prosperity, large salaries and unaccustomed titles. Talleyrand after long directing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had held back strongly from the Tilsit policy, and had been transferred to the non-political functions of High Chamberlain. Fouché, the ex-Terrorist and Jacobin, head of the secret police, thought that Napoleon was going too far, saw in the Spanish war the possibility of a personal or military disaster for

the Emperor, and ever on the lookout for political evolutions, viewed with complacency an eventual vacancy of the throne and the possible promotion of his friend, the dashing, popular, liberal-minded, and liberal-handed Joachim Murat, King of Naples. Nothing much was actually done, yet a political demonstration of the greatest significance occurred. For many years Talleyrand and Fouché had been estranged and barely on speaking terms. One night, while Napoleon was toiling through the snow-clad passes of revolted Spain after Sir John Moore, these two important political personages made their entrance at a fashionable reception arm in arm, and ostentatiously promenaded their alliance before the astonished guests It was a little thing, and yet it was a great one; for Talleyrand and Fouché were the two most delicate political weathercocks in France, and if they both veered together it was safe to conclude there was something in the wind.

So Napoleon thought, as he spurred and galloped back to Paris. He publicly disgraced Talleyrand; he privately admonished Fouché, but continued to employ him. But though on the surface this was the close of the incident, there can be little doubt when the course of events is noted, that Napoleon now had

brought into stronger prominence before him than ever the perplexing question of the imperial succession. He was now the most powerful sovereign of Europe; he had already established his fame as the greatest legislator and conqueror of history; yet two of his subjects could venture to suggest publicly that they, and not he, might eventually decide to whom his magnificent empire should revert. Joséphine could not give him an heir; he had no faith in the power of any of his brothers to retain his throne. Yet he could not live for ever, more especially if continually exposing his life to the dangers of the battle-field.

It was in no pleasant mood that Napoleon now faced the fast-approaching war with Austria, — a war he did not seek, from which he could gain little, and that interfered with the completion of the conquest of Spain. It came at the last somewhat unexpectedly. On the tenth day of April 1809, the Archduke Charles crossed the Bavarian frontier announcing in his proclamations that Austria was championing the cause of European liberty and calling on all Germans to rise against their oppressors. It was making the courageous stand of the people of Spain a text for all the nations of Europe. For a few days the

Archduke held a great strategic advantage, and had he pressed forward among the scattered French corps, would probably have won considerable successes. Napoleon hurried on from Paris and by a series of rapid manœuvres which he always considered the most brilliant he ever carried out, concentrated his corps, forced the passage of the Isar, and brought the Archduke to a general engagement at Eckmühl. The interest of these operations depends on an examination too minute and lengthy to be followed out here; all that it will be possible to say is that at Eckmühl the Archduke Charles was severely defeated and Napoleon found himself, as after Ulm, on the highroad to Vienna.

On the 10th of May occurred a slight incident of which the interest is of a character rarely to be found in the life of Napoleon. The French had arrived in front of Vienna, and although the Archduke Charles with the great mass of the Austrian army was on the further bank of the Danube, there was an attempt at resistance. The invaders brought artillery into position and opened fire on the city. Napoleon was now informed that the young Archduchess Maria Louisa had not been able to leave the palace owing to illness;

he immediately gave orders to have the guns trained in another direction. He probably little guessed that the princess for whom he showed this consideration would in less than twelve months be Empress of the French.

The resistance of Vienna was not serious, and the French army quickly occupied it. While Napoleon was maturing a plan for crossing to the north side of the Danube, whence the Archduke Charles was watching his movements with a large army, he issued a decree annexing Rome to the Empire (May 17). The army was now moved a few miles east of Vienna, bridges were constructed, and on the 21st the leading brigades began to deploy on the further bank between the villages of Aspern and Essling. At this point desperate fighting took place during the 21st and 22d. The Archduke Charles attacked in force; the French numbers on the northern bank gradually increased until on the second day a rise of the Danube broke down the bridges. Then it became a question of whether the French could hold their ground. While engineers worked desperately to re-establish communications, Lannes and Masséna held the Austrians at bay with dogged obstinacy, fought on till night, and thus enabled the troops to retreat in safety.


Wagram
July 6
Margrafneusiedl
Leopoldsdorf
Florisdorf
May 21
May 23
Enzensdorf
Essling
Aspern
1st Crossing
ISLAND
OF
LOBAU
2nd Crossing
VIENNA
DANUBE
Austrian Positions.
BORMAY & CO., N.Y.

Wagram

But Napoleon had lost twenty-five thousand men, including Marshal Lannes who was mortally wounded at the close of the day; and whatever excuses there might be to offer, he had been defeated by the Archduke Charles.

The French army had now retreated from the northern bank into the large island of Lobau, and the marshals whom Napoleon consulted were all of opinion that the retreat should be continued to Vienna, or at all events to the southern bank. Napoleon's decision admirably illustrates a cardinal principle of strategy. It is nearly invariably the rule that of two armies one is attacking, the other defending; one has the offensive, the other the defensive. So long as that relation holds the army on the offensive has the move; that is, it may within certain limits choose a line of operations which its opponent is compelled to devise methods to defend. The offensive in the hands of a competent general is an immense military advantage to be retained at any cost, and for this reason Napoleon decided to keep his army in the island of Lobau rather than seek safety on the southern bank of the Danube. For in that position he still threatened Aspern and Essling which the Archduke could not abandon; but had he fallen back, then the offensive

would have passed to the enemy and he would have been obliged to reply to whatever move the Archduke chose to make.

Napoleon therefore remained cooped up with his army in the island of Lobau while the Austrians daily intrenched themselves along his front. The check was not unlike that at Eylau, and all Europe was eagerly on the watch for several weeks to see what the next move would be. The opponents of Napoleon plucked up courage, the more so as Sir Arthur Wellesley was once more operating in Portugal and had defeated Soult at Oporto. Germany appeared on the point of rising; the dispossessed Pope fulminated a degree of excommunication against his spoilers and had to be removed from Rome as a prisoner; a British fleet and army occupied the island of Ischia in the bay of Naples and threatened Joachim Murat in his capital.

Once more, as at Austerlitz, as at Friedland, Napoleon cleared a threatening situation by a great military stroke. At the north-west corner of the island of Lobau where his bridges had been established opposite the heavily fortified Austrian lines at Aspern and Essling, he placed his largest guns and opened a fierce bombardment. He wanted the Austrians to believe that he intended forcing their position

by a frontal attack. In the meanwhile secret preparations were made for another move. On the night of the 4th of July bridges were rapidly thrown over the Danube from the lower or south-eastern end of the island, and in the early hours of the 5th, the army had got a footing on the northern bank in the Marchfeld, thus turning the Archduke's position at Essling. The Austrians changed front, and during that day there was considerable fighting between the two armies. On the 6th was fought the memorable battle of Wagram, in which about two hundred and fifty thousand men were engaged.

The Austrians having abandoned their Essling-Aspern position had now fallen back a few miles to the west. Napoleon faced them and made dispositions not dissimilar to those that had given him such a complete victory at Austerlitz. The Archduke's right was extended towards the Danube nearly opposite Vienna, and it was clearly to his interest not to be driven back at this point. There was a further incitement to strengthen this wing, because, if the opposite wing of the French could be made to give away, Napoleon's line of retreat through the island of Lobau would be compromised. The Emperor, divining his opponent's thoughts

and relying on his own numerical superiority, decided to encourage the Archduke to attack this part of his line, but placed Masséna, the most resolute and resourceful of all the marshals, in command. In the meantime the French right under Davoust strongly attacked the Austrian left. The Archduke Charles met with some measure of success at first; though pressed by Davoust on his left, his centre held its ground and his right was slowly driving back Masséna. As success began to appear possible on this part of the field the Austrian supports were gradually pushed out from the centre towards the right, until at last Napoleon judged the moment had come for the decisive movement. A battery of one hundred and twenty guns was suddenly massed within short range of the Austrian centre. Bernadotte and Macdonald were pushed forward and the Archduke found his line too weak to resist. His right wing was in the greatest danger of being cut off and separated, and there was no alternative but to order a retreat along the whole line. He drew off his army, defeated, but far from routed. Some fifty thousand men were killed and wounded, the losses being fairly equally divided, but though beaten the Austrians left behind them practically no prisoners.

Shortly afterwards an armistice was concluded, and for the fourth time Austria accepted defeat at the hands of Napoleon. This was recorded in the treaty of Schönbrunn whereby she lost with other territory, Trieste and Illyria, thus becoming an inland power. But, however humbled and weakened for the moment, an unexpected event a few months later gave the House of Hapsburg renewed importance in the politics of Europe. That event must be discussed in the next chapter.

CHRONOLOGY

22 April,	1809.	Eckmühl.
13 May,	"	Vienna occupied.
17 "	"	Decree annexing Rome to the Empire.
22 "	"	Napoleon defeated at Aspern.
6 July,	"	Wagram.
14 Oct.,	"	Treaty of Schönbrunn.

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF RUSSIA

Dynastic Question — Napoleon marries Maria Louisa — Jealousy of Russia — Causes for War — Preparations — Campaign of Russia — Borodino — Moscow — The Retreat.

HAVING concluded the treaty of Schönbrunn with Austria, Napoleon left Vienna for France, but he returned in a far different mood to that in which he had returned from Tilsit in 1807. Then an unclouded series of successes lay behind him, and before him arose great schemes that were to lead to the glorious day when Great Britain should be at his feet; but now his preoccupations were on a smaller scale, for the security of his own throne shared his thoughts with the overthrow of his hated enemy.

There were many reasons for the Emperor's dissatisfaction. The defeat of Austria had proved a harder task than ever before; at Essling the Archduke Charles had claimed a victory, at Wagram he had withdrawn his

The French Empire after Wagram

army from the field virtually intact. In Spain, too, a British general was proving more than a match for the best marshals of the Empire, while from one end of the Peninsula to the other insurrection blazed, and King Joseph could barely maintain himself at Madrid. Greatest of all his anxieties was the dynastic question: whose was to be the reversion of the imperial throne? The idea had long been working in his head; the question had now become an acute one; perhaps an incident that occurred during his stay at Vienna drove him finally and reluctantly to an act that he had first contemplated on his return from Egypt in 1799. While the peace negotiations were progressing a German student named Staps approached the Emperor as he was inspecting the guards in the court of the palace of Schönbrunn. His movements were suspicious; he was arrested and on him was found a knife that could leave no doubt as to his intentions. Brought before Napoleon he avowed, with perfect composure, his intention of killing him as an enemy of the human race; and on the Emperor's asking him what he would do if he were released, he replied phlegmatically that he would take the earliest opportunity of assassinating him. This courageous

student was necessarily shot, but he had evoked before the Emperor the spectre of revenge that underlay German opinion, and Napoleon was profoundly affected by the incident.

On his return to France his resolve was fixed; he had decided that there must be a direct heir to the Empire, and he promptly announced her fate to Joséphine. After a painful scene she consented to all that was asked of her, and a divorce was decided on. The Pope refusing his consent, a somewhat irregular form was gone through by the complaisance of a committee of cardinals, but had Napoleon pronounced the decree of his own will and authority it is not likely that any one would have dared question its efficacy.

In the meanwhile it was necessary to find a suitable consort for the Emperor and the alliance between France and Russia immediately suggested the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Czar. Informal overtures were made at St. Petersburg; they met with doubtful answers; it appeared possible that an eventual *no* would be the result, and this was an affront Napoleon could not bear to face. Just at this delicate moment Austrian diplomacy, now under the wary guidance of Count

Metternich, succeeded in suggesting the Archduchess Maria Louisa, who in point of age was far more suitable than the young Russian princess. Metternich, whom the Emperor had liked as ambassador, promptly seized the opportunity, placed it beyond doubt that a favourable reply would be given to any proposal made, and secured this enormous politico-matrimonial prize for his master's daughter.

The rapid conduct of the preliminaries, the pomp and magnificence of the ceremonies, the effusions of the French and Austrian courts, the gratification of Napoleon with his Hapsburg bride, the amicable married life that ensued, — all these are matters of which the details can find no space here. It is the grim reverse of the medal that must be dwelt on, the political aspects of the marriage, the so-called reasons of State that made the bringing of one child into existence the cause for the destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives!

Metternich had come into power at the moment when Austria had touched her lowest point. He was determined to restore her fortunes, and to do that he saw clearly that she must not again bear the brunt of war, but, leaving that to others, quietly prepare to throw in her sword when next the scale balanced

and her intervention might be decisive. He followed up the French marriage closely, anxious to profit, clearly perceiving that France must lean either on Russia or on Austria, and already convinced that the Czar and Napoleon were fast drifting apart.

Two new and grave causes of disagreement had arisen between France and Russia as a consequence of the war of 1809. One was the sudden manner in which Napoleon had dropped the proposal for marrying the Grand Duchess Anna, the other was of an even more serious character. At the peace of 1807, partly to reward the Poles who had long served France, partly to obtain a political support in the north-east, Napoleon had formed of Prussian Poland the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the rule of his ally, the King of Saxony. This was virtually reconstituting Polish independence and caused great uneasiness to the Czar. When the war of 1809 broke out, Napoleon called on Alexander as his ally to place an army in the field. This the Czar did but in an inefficient way that did nothing to help Napoleon's operations. The Poles of the Grand Duchy however, ably led by Poniatowski, made a strong diversion in Galicia, and Napoleon duly rewarded them with a large slice of Austrian Poland when

peace was signed after Wagram. Nothing could have been more calculated to alarm and alienate the Czar, who was now declaredly offended at the course of French policy. The year 1810 was not old before it was common report that a war between the two great empires must surely ensue, and it appears that from that date both Napoleon and Alexander began quietly to make preparations for the gigantic struggle all felt was coming.

But in its essential aspect this great war arose from Napoleon's policy of the continental blockade. For a brief moment it looked as though that policy might meet with success. In 1810 British funds fell to 65, commercial ruin appeared imminent, bread was at famine prices, the Tory Cabinet was falling to pieces. Wellington's generalship probably saved his country from a humiliating peace. Driven from Spain by Masséna he fell back on the lines of Torres Vedras in front of Lisbon and there successfully stopped the French advance to the sea. His foresight and strategy had turned the scale in the Spanish war, for from this moment the Anglo-Spanish position grew steadily stronger, and it may be said with little exaggeration that the lines of Torres Vedras mark one of the great turning-points

in Napoleonic history. For it was essentially the commercial necessities of the war against Great Britain that led to the rupture between France and Russia in 1812. Even in northern Germany, — notwithstanding armies of custom-house officers, repressive and inquisitive laws, wholesale burnings and destroyings, — British goods still found a market, though at exorbitant rates. The Baltic trade was still carried on under the neutral flag, and Russia, in defiance of the continued representations of the French ambassador, did not defend herself very strenuously against the importation of British luxuries. The court party at St. Petersburg constantly opposed the French policy, and Alexander was easily convinced that he must arm and prepare to struggle against Napoleon's dictation.

In the spring of 1811 both empires were openly preparing for war, yet in Paris all appeared prosperous. Never had Napoleon enjoyed the splendour of reigning as he did at this period, and his last wish was gratified when, on the 20th of March 1811, the Empress Maria Louisa gave birth to a son whom he named King of Rome. The title of this ill-fated child, taken from what was now the second city of the Empire, was reminiscent of the King of the Romans, the appointed succes-

sor to the crown of the Germanic Roman Empire that Napoleon had destroyed.

In the early part of 1812 came the long-expected crisis in the relations of France and Russia. Napoleon summoned Alexander to carry out his obligations and exclude British commerce; elusive answers were returned, and the troops received marching orders. Napoleon had often declared that an invasion of Russia was a foolhardy undertaking, and that he would never, as Charles XII. had, lead an army to destruction in the steppes. He had always disliked the enterprise, and it was only the alternative of seeing the continental blockade policy fail that drove him into it. His preparations were of the most elaborate nature; the army he assembled was gigantic. In 1811 the movement of these masses from France, Germany, and Italy towards Poland and Russia had begun. Every little detail of organization and especially of transport received the Emperor's personal attention. Austria was summoned to affirm her alliance by placing an army in the field, and sent thirty thousand men to the frontier under Schwarzenberg; this body formed Napoleon's extreme right. Unfortunate Prussia was compelled, at the point of the sword, also to furnish a body of troops which, together with a French

corps under the command of Marshal Macdonald, was to operate along the Baltic and form the extreme left. In the centre came the vast hosts that Napoleon in person was to lead. The old corps of the *Grande Armée*, under such leaders as Davoust, Ney, Oudinot, St. Cyr, Bessières, Junot, Victor; the massed cavalry, chasseurs, lancers, dragoons, and cuirassiers under the King of Naples; the Westphalians under King Jèrome; the Italians under Prince Eugène; the Poles under Poniatowski; the Saxons, the Bavarians, the magnificent divisions of the Old and Young Guard, with its veteran bodies of grenadiers and voltigeurs and its superb horse artillery and cavalry, — all made up a central army of more than three hundred thousand men. Including the flanking armies and the supports that followed the main columns, it is calculated that over five hundred thousand men marched into Russia that summer.

As had been the case in 1807 it was well on in June before active operations became possible. Napoleon and Maria Louisa made a short stay at Dresden, capital of their ally, the King of Saxony; there they met the Emperor and Empress of Austria, with many of the Princes of Germany. Thence the Emperor proceeded to join his army whose columns

were already converging on the Niemen. The French army crossed that river, nearly one thousand miles from the frontiers of France, on the 24th of June 1812. Napoleon hoped to be opposed, to crush the Russian generals with his superior numbers, and to conclude a prompt peace without advancing far; but in all this he was disappointed. The advance of the French was opposed only by Cossacks or light cavalry, the Russians showed no sign of effective resistance. On the 28th Napoleon reached Wilna, and so disinclined was he to plunge further into the half-desert country beyond that he stayed there three weeks hoping for some arrangement. But Alexander gave no sign; he had long foreseen the situation that now faced him, and both he and his advisers believed that Napoleon could be defeated. More than two hundred thousand Russians were in the field, but the Czar had decided not to rely on his troops alone, but also on the nature of his country. From the Niemen to Moscow was a distance of some seven hundred miles through thinly peopled steppes in which supplies could only be obtained during the summer months. Moscow was nearly two thousand miles from Paris, and between them lay hostile Europe; was it possible that Napoleon could maintain

himself there? Such was the Czar's reasoned attitude, and the Russian armies were given orders not to engage, but to fall back before the French advance, until a favourable opportunity should arise.

Finding the occupation of Wilna fruitless, Napoleon advanced into the interior of Russia, and after an action with the enemy's rear guard occupied Smolensk on the 18th of August. His line was now extremely extended; his transport arrangements had broken down; the army was much disorganized. Yet, against the feeling of all the marshals, he decided that the war must be brought to a conclusion by a decisive move and ordered the advance to Moscow.

The Czar now departed from his policy of retreat, for it was impossible and impolitic to resist the clamour of the Russian army to fight; it was decided to make a stand before Moscow and Kutusoff selected a strong position barring the road at Borodino on the Moskva. Here on the 7th of September the two armies met, the French numbering rather more, the Russians rather less than one hundred and twenty thousand men. The fighting was of a desperate character and might have ended in a decisive victory for Napoleon had he consented

to employ the Guard; but he probably already viewed his position so far from France with secret anxiety and would not risk impairing the efficiency of that splendid body. As it was, a bare victory was won at the frightful cost of not less than thirty thousand men to each side, and Kutusoff retreated during the night, leaving Moscow at the mercy of the French.

Napoleon entered the ancient capital of Russia on the 14th of September and there awaited once more proposals for peace from Alexander. But they came not, and Moscow itself was burned down by incendiaries. It was difficult to feed the army from day to day, and the Cossacks made foraging difficult. The total of the *Grande Armée* after its losses in detachments and in action was barely ninety thousand men. The King of Naples was hard pressed to maintain his line of outposts against Kutusoff, and suffered one severe reverse. Autumn was now nearly spent and to delay longer was madness; on the 18th of October Napoleon began his retreat. He attempted to follow a road to the south of that by which he had advanced, so as to pass through country not yet wasted by war. But Kutusoff barred the way, and for some days there was heavy fighting and marching. It appears probable that Napoleon

could have forced a passage, but he dared not draw too largely on his reserves of ammunition and abandoned the road through Kalouga to return to that by which he had advanced, past the ghastly fields of Borodino, where the remains of thousands of their unburied comrades greeted the retreating troops. In the first week of November, when midway to Smolensk, the *Grande Armeé* was suddenly struck by the first wave of the Russian winter. The roads became frozen sheets of ice and in a week nearly all the horses perished. The cavalry was dismounted and could no longer patrol and ward off the Cossacks; many of the guns had to be abandoned, and there was no artillery to fight a big battle; the convoy was in large part unhorsed, and the army's supplies had to be abandoned. Food had been scanty enough from the first, but now the soldiers had little else than what they could find in the desolate villages they had already plundered in their advance. The marauders were cut down and captured by the Cossacks, and the army began to melt at a frightful rate. There was nothing to do now but to press forward, giving Kutusoff no time to catch up the fugitives before they reached Smolensk. At that point were large magazines, and there Napoleon hoped he would be

able to restore order and perhaps take winter quarters.

But the disintegration and demoralization of the starving army made such alarming progress that Napoleon was only able to stay a few hours at Smolensk. The first column of the fugitives to reach the town threw themselves on the magazines, and, before the last passed out, it had been completely pillaged and gutted. Just beyond Smolensk Kutusoff succeeded in throwing his leading division across the road, cutting off the French rear guard under Ney. The marshal succeeded in holding his ground all day, crossed the Dnieper on the ice during the night, made a long detour, and finally rejoined the army a few days later; but his corps had dwindled away to less than a hundred men. The army was now reduced to some fifteen thousand men; it presented an appalling spectacle of misery and appeared doomed. At its head marched Napoleon clad in furs and supporting himself with a stick, his face covered with a beard, his expression set but curiously placid. Behind him marched a new formed corps in which the rank and file were captains or lieutenants, and officers of the highest rank acted as majors and captains. Then on the road came a few harnessed wag-

ons with the Emperor's papers and war chest, and behind them a long column of men in which only here and there was there any semblance of alignment or discipline. Towards the end came the stragglers, unarmed, limping, half frozen, some wandering away with ravenous looks, others dropping by the roadside. Thus marched the army in several divisions from Smolensk westwards.

Between Smolensk and the river Berezina, a few days' march distant, was the most critical point of the retreat. To the north of Smolensk, Oudinot and Victor had been operating to cover the line of communications against a Russian army under Wittgenstein. They were now retreating before him to join Napoleon, with some eighteen thousand men in fair fighting condition. So here were two French armies converging on the Berezina, one from the east the other from the north-east, each with a superior Russian force in hot pursuit. But there was a third Russian army marching from a totally different direction, the south; that army under the command of Tchitchagof was on the further side of the Berezina and reached its southern bank just in time to oppose the passage of the French. To make matters worse for Napoleon the

wave of cold was now spent, a thaw had set in, the ice was broken up, and the rivers were impassable.

To steal a passage across the Berezina between the three converging Russian armies was now the only means of escape, and Napoleon solved the problem on familiar lines. He demonstrated ostentatiously at the point where he did not mean to cross, and thus persuaded Tchitchagof to draw off his troops from the point he had decided on. Victor's and Oudinot's corps were drawn up so as to hold off Wittgenstein and Kutusoff, and the long train of fugitives began to cross the bridges. The passage closed in disaster. Wittgenstein drove in the French rear guard long before the crowd of fugitives had finished crossing; many of the stampeded mob were crowded into the river; the Russian artillery found them an easy target and, most horrible of all, the French rear guard corps whose efficiency made them too precious to lose, received orders to force their way through to the bridge by firing on their disbanded and unarmed comrades. Last of all the bridges were broken down amid the despairing shrieks of the wretched beings who saw in them their only avenue to safety. The tragic passage of the Berezina cost the French army about eigh-

teen thousand lives, roughly one half of its strength.

No sooner had the remnant of the army crossed than a second and more severe cold wave overtook it. The Russian pursuit, save that of the Cossacks, was now fairly distanced, but Nature proved an even more terrible destroyer. The few remaining thousands struggled on, but hunger and cold killed the greater part. Every morning fewer men arose from the snowy bivouacs than had lain down the night before. Advancing supports fared no better than the exhausted men who had marched the whole weary way from Moscow. Two regiments of light horse of the Neapolitan Royal Guard, freshly arrived from the south, were nearly entirely destroyed in two nights without even seeing the enemy.

At Gumbinnen near the frontier Napoleon decided to leave the army for Paris, where his presence was urgently required. He handed over the command to the King of Naples, and wrote the famous Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the *Grande Armée*, in which he acknowledged such parts of the catastrophe that had overtaken him as it was useless to deny. But in what light did that great calamity, that direct and awful warning of Nature as many thought it, appear to him

on whose shoulders was its responsibility? He closed the Bulletin with the words: "The Emperor has never been in better health"! The awful destruction, and death, and sorrow, the loss of so many brave lives, all counted but as an incident in the personal career of a soldier of fortune!

On the 6th of December the fugitives reached Wilna, still numbering twenty thousand men.[1] When Marshal Ney, the bravest of the brave, musket in hand, brought the rear guard in to Königsberg some days later, he counted less than one thousand men under arms.

[1] The discrepancy in figures is only apparent. As the army retreated it picked up some detachments left in garrison, and met others advancing from the base.

CHRONOLOGY

2 April,	1810.	Marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa.
July,	"	Wellington retreats on lines of Torres Vedras.
20 March,	1811.	Birth of the King of Rome.
24 June,	1812.	French army invades Russia.
7 Sept.,	"	Borodino.
14 "	"	Moscow occupied.

18 Oct.,	1812.	Retreat begun.
26–29 Nov.,	"	Passage of the Berezina.
5 Dec.,	"	Napoleon leaves army for Paris.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY AND ITALY

1813

Effects of the Russian Catastrophe — Lutzen and Bautzen — Austrian Intervention — Dresden — Leipzig — Murat and Italy.

THE great catastrophe of Russia had a twofold effect, material and moral. It destroyed the veteran army that had for so long imposed its master's will on the Continent, it broke the spell of invincibility that had so often paralyzed Napoleon's enemies. Schwarzenberg, who had done little or nothing, concluded a military convention with the Russian general and withdrew his troops. The Prussians serving under Macdonald deserted him and, before many weeks had passed, the Prussian government plucked up enough courage to approve this course officially, signed a treaty of alliance with Russia (Kalisch, February 27) and declared war. The King of Naples soon abandoned his trust as commander-in-chief to return to his capital, and Prince Eugène, who assumed command, then gradually withdrew the

small army he had collected from the Vistula to the Oder, and then from the Oder to the Elbe; his numbers were quite insufficient to meet the Russians and Prussians in the field.

Meanwhile Napoleon in Paris was making gigantic efforts to retrieve his impaired fortunes. New levies were raised amounting for the whole year 1813 to over a million men. Women, children and old men did the work of the fields, while every able-bodied man and boy was seized by the conscription, passed through the barrack-yard, armed, uniformed, and marched on the road to Germany.

By the month of April Napoleon once more had a large army across the Rhine rapidly advancing to join that of Prince Eugène. The Emperor took command in person and pushed on towards Leipzig. He effected his junction with the prince and was preparing to march on Berlin when he was attacked in flank by the Russians and Prussians under Wittgenstein and Blucher at Lutzen (May 2). Here a great battle was fought and the French conscripts astonished their generals and brought victory back to the imperial standards. But Lutzen was a hard-fought field barely won, and Napoleon's lack of cavalry prevented his impeding the retreat of the allies.



Campaign of Germany, 1813

Three weeks later another battle was fought, with much the same results at Bautzen. In the pursuit that followed into Silesia Napoleon once more sadly missed an efficient force of cavalry and on the 4th of June he agreed to an armistice that gave him Saxony and the line of the Elbe. He hoped by this means to gain time to bring up his strength in men and horses, but as events turned out, the suspension of hostilities proved more to the advantage of the allies. During this armistice came the news of Wellington's decisive victory at Vittoria which drove the French from Spain, and Austria notified France that she was prepared to offer her mediation with a view to peace.

As soon as Metternich had realized the magnitude of the disaster that had overtaken the French army in Russia, he determined to prepare to take advantage of it, but advanced with prudence. The Austrian army was rapidly increased and placed on a war footing, and after many hesitations due to the timidity of the Emperor Francis, Austria finally put forward her conditions. These were broadly that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw should be abolished; that Prussia should regain her boundaries of 1805; that the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved, and that Austria should

regain Trieste and Dalmatia. There followed interviews between Napoleon and Metternich, extensions of the armistice, a peace Congress at Prague, but the Emperor never meant to accept peace, he was only negotiating to gain time. The upshot was that Austria, on her mediation failing, joined the allied Powers.

On the 10th of August hostilities were resumed, and Napoleon now had to face an Austrian army of two hundred thousand men besides those of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. For Sweden had now joined the allies; Marshal Bernadotte had been elected Crown Prince three years before and now led her army, while another Frenchman, General Moreau, had left the United States and joined the staff of the Czar Alexander. Even Murat, sick of war and anxious for his throne, had been engaged in negotiations with Austria, while the French army was utterly dispirited and longed for peace. The marshals were weary and entreated the Emperor to accept reasonable conditions, the conscripts mutilated themselves by thousands so as to be sent home. Yet Napoleon's relentless energy drove his army to victory once more. At Dresden, on the 27th of August, the Austrians under Schwarzenberg were heavily defeated, largely owing to the King of Naples'

brilliant leadership of the French right. Then followed a series of inconclusive manœuvres and partial engagements in which the allies were constantly successful against the detached French corps. The weather was inclement, the country exhausted, and the French army was reduced to some two hundred thousand men, while that of the allies had gradually increased to more than double that figure. Germany was now partly in arms, and as success appeared more hopeful, defection spread from one State to another. North, south, and east of the Elbe between Dresden and Magdeburg three great allied armies nearly surrounded that of Napoleon, avoiding battle with him, but engaging his marshals when he was absent. Finally, on Bavaria joining the allies, Schwarzenberg moved from Bohemia westwards and threatened to strike at the Mayence-Leipzig road in Napoleon's rear. The Emperor now divided his army; one half marched northwards under his own orders for a stroke at Blucher or Bernadotte; the other under the King of Naples was left to contain Schwarzenberg. Napoleon failed in his attempt to bring the Prusso-Russians, or Swedes, to an engagement, and fell back towards Leipzig; at the same time the King of Naples retired towards

the same point, pressed hard by Schwarzenberg's superior numbers.

All the armies were now converging from south, east, and north on Leipzig, one hundred and fifty thousand French, three hundred thousand allies, and on the 16th and 18th of October a decisive battle was fought there. The French, placed in a semicircle, fought on the defensive, but were slowly and surely driven back. A dramatic incident marked the second day's fighting, when a corps of Saxon troops left their position in the French lines and went over to the enemy. On the night of the 19th Napoleon, though hard pressed and driven back, still held positions covering the town, but he was virtually defeated and had not enough ammunition in hand to continue the struggle. Orders for a retreat were therefore issued. But to leave Leipzig by the road to Mayence a bridge over the Elster had to be crossed. This was insufficient for the passage of the army, and Napoleon, bent as ever on the offensive, had neglected to make provision for a retreat. On the morning of the 19th the last French corps were caught in the trap, and the bridge was blown up when thirty thousand men or more were still on the further bank. Probably Napoleon's total losses at Leipzig did not fall

far short of sixty thousand men, and a few weeks later the army he led back across the Rhine only numbered about seventy thousand.

An incident of this retreat must now be mentioned that will lead to a digression on the affairs of Italy hitherto somewhat neglected. A few days after leaving Leipzig Joachim Murat suddenly left headquarters and, travelling post-haste, returned to Naples, where he arrived in the first week of November. Murat, like nearly every one of Napoleon's generals, was heartily sick of war, and now considered the Emperor irretrievably defeated. He hoped for a prompt peace, but was anxious, whatever happened, to maintain his own position as King of Naples. If fighting were to continue this could only be done, so he thought, either by treating with the allies or in another way, one that opens up a large and interesting question of policy.

By various consecutive steps, by the creation of the kingdom of Italy, by the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, by the absorption of the States of the Church, Napoleon had brought all the peninsula of Italy under his rule. For the first time since the days of Rome, Italians from north and from south fought under the same flag, obeyed similar

laws, were governed by the same system; and this too was the work of a man of Italian race. The designation he had chosen for his Lombard provinces, the declarations he had made during the campaign of 1796, the title he had given his son, were all indications of a possible creation of an Italian nationality. Now that Germany and Spain were lost, now that victorious Austria was on the point of invading her lost provinces south of the Alps, the question arose: how were they to be defended? Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, had been sent to assume command of such troops as could be collected. But his army was small, there was no public spirit behind him, and the King of Naples persistently declined to move his troops to assist the Prince. Murat wanted to do one of two things: either to obtain a guarantee of his throne from Austria and Great Britain, or to obtain from Napoleon a declaration creating Italy one, and giving him the command of her combined and now national resources. In the latter case he made sure that, joining his troops to those of the Viceroy and supported by the nationalist sentiment of the people, he could successfully resist any Austrian invasion. Appealing both to Metternich and to Napoleon,

he found the former willing, the latter unwilling to treat. The dream of Italian unity faded and Murat turned traitor to his old colours by signing a treaty of alliance with Austria on the 11th of January 1814. At that date the Austrians had already occupied Venetia to the south of the Alps, while to the north they had crossed the Rhine and were marching on Paris.

CHRONOLOGY

2 May,	1813.	Lutzen.
21 "	"	Bautzen.
4 June,	"	Armistice.
10 Aug.,	"	
21 June,	"	Wellington successful at Vittoria.
26 Aug.,	"	Dresden.
16–18 Oct.	"	Leipzig.

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CHAPTER XV

THE CAMPAIGN OF FRANCE

Napoleon's last Defence — St. Dizier — Brienne — La Rothière — Montmirail — Laon — Chatillon — Fall of Paris — Abdication — The Final Scene at Fontainebleau.

DRIVEN from Russia in 1812, from Germany in 1813, Napoleon was now, in 1814, preparing to defend France. Yet peace had always been within his reach, and even after so many disasters, when the allies were mustering half a million of men on the frontiers of exhausted France, she might still have retained the natural frontiers won by the Republic, — the Alps and the Rhine. During the last few months negotiations proceeded, at Frankfort, at Châlons; but beneath the diplomatic superficialities and wranglings was the unmistakable fact that Napoleon was always thinking of victory rather than of peace; he aimed at regaining the whole of his position and would not accept a diminished portion; he was the man of success and could not acknowledge defeat.

Campaign of France, 1814

His strategy, usually so sound, was weakened by the extravagant possibilities of victory his ardent imagination evoked. He forgot that soldiers were not machines always equally responsive to their driver's impulsion, and believed that by military means such as his genius could devise he could plant the French eagles once more in Berlin and on the Vistula. To retain his hold on Germany he had left one hundred and fifty thousand men in her fortresses from Dresden to Hamburg and Dantzig; these were now swallowed up and useless, while in France there were not enough soldiers to guard the Rhine. The remnants of the army that had retreated from Leipzig had been distributed along the frontier, but typhus broke out among the troops and caused immense losses. When the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, some two hundred thousand strong, crossed the Rhine at the beginning of 1814, they met with no resistance and slowly advanced into a country where there was apparently no army to oppose them.

To understand the extraordinary military events that followed, a glance at the accompanying map is necessary. Paris was the objective of the allies, and there were three converging routes by which they might ad-

vance. The first of these ran south-east from the Rhine through Namur and Laon; the second, starting from points on the Rhine between Mayence and Basle, followed roads converging about Vitry and Châlons, and thence took the valley of the Marne to the capital; the third was parallel to the second and to the south of it, following the valley of the Seine. As the campaign opened, the great force of the allies under the supreme command of Schwarzenberg, accompanied by the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia had reached the Marne and Seine unopposed; Blucher with seventy thousand Prussians and Russians was on the northern road, Schwarzenberg with one hundred and fifty thousand Austrians on the southern.

Napoleon had now collected about fifty thousand men, mostly raw recruits, at Châlons, and marched rapidly up the Marne valley, striking Blucher's advance at St. Dizier on the 27th of January. Fierce fighting followed, and Blucher, unable to hold his ground, retreated, abandoning the line of the Marne and marching south towards Schwarzenberg. Napoleon followed hard, overtook and surprised the Prussians at Brienne on the 29th, and there once more drove

them off the field. And here it may be as well to note the peculiar advantage Napoleon had in this campaign. He was fighting on his own ground. The name of Brienne has once before appeared in this history, for here it was that Napoleon had passed most of his schoolboy days; how little could he foresee then that he would one day surprise and nearly capture a Prussian commander-in-chief in the old chateau where he had investigated the initial mysteries of mathematics and literature!

But the Austrians were now at hand. On the day following his defeat at Brienne, Blucher effected his junction with Schwarzenberg. Napoleon determined to make an attempt to bar their advance. He selected a strong position at La Rothière, and there fought a desperate defensive battle against immensely superior numbers on the 1st of February. Making up for his lack of infantry and cavalry by employing and risking the loss of immense batteries, he made a gallant defence, and at nightfall was still maintaining the fight. But the French army had lost too severely and was too exhausted to renew the engagement, and in the night Napoleon retreated down the valley of the Seine, eventually taking position at Nogent. He was now extremely dejected,

and it may be that for a few days at this time his instructions to Caulaincourt for negotiating a peace were sincere. But the aspect of affairs soon changed.

Their victory at La Rothière made Blucher and Schwarzenberg lose sight of the extraordinary and indomitable resource of their enemy. The original scheme was resumed and Blucher returned to the valley of the Marne, leaving Schwarzenberg to follow that of the Seine. From Nogent Napoleon eagerly watched their movements. With a detached corps he demonstrated in Schwarzenberg's front and delayed his advance; then, timing his march with marvellous precision, he suddenly moved north towards the valley of the Marne. Blucher was advancing westwards along the road that follows that valley, there being about three days' march between his front and rear divisions. On the 10th of February Napoleon struck this long column at its centre, destroyed that, and turning right and left in the course of the next two days completely shattered the Prussian army, the principal engagements being fought at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps. Blucher beat a disordered retreat, and Napoleon was so elated at his brilliant success that he confidently declared that one more such vic-

tory would carry the French arms to central Germany.

But while this fighting was proceeding in the valley of the Marne, Schwarzenberg had pushed on up the valley of the Seine, and was now getting threateningly near Paris. The Emperor could not pursue Blucher, but fell back nearer the capital to watch the Austrian movements, and decided to try against Schwarzenberg the same strategy that had succeeded so well against Blucher. He rapidly transferred his army from the valley of the Marne to the valley of the Seine once more, struck the Austrian line of advance in flank, and severely handled their columns in a series of engagements of which those at Nangis and Montereau only need be mentioned (February 17 to 22). On the 23d of February Napoleon had advanced as far as Troyes, and Schwarzenberg was falling back in full retreat.

These wonderfully brilliant results, this appearance of success, proved elusive. The reinforcements sent from Paris to the army barely sufficed to fill the gaps caused by casualties, disease, and the wholesale desertions of the conscripts. There was a dearth, too, of muskets, and the withdrawal of troops from the southern army under Soult had enabled Wellington to

get a foothold north of the Pyrenees. While Napoleon, though successful, saw his strength decrease, the defeated allies were being daily reinforced. A large number of fresh troops had now joined Blucher, while other corps had begun operations in the direction of Laon, and, after much hesitation and debate, the assembled monarchs, statesmen, and generals of the allies decided that the march on Paris must be resumed. Blucher once more advanced down the valley of the Marne, and this time reached Meaux before Napoleon could arrest his movement. No sooner, however, had Blucher realized that the Emperor was once more nearing his flank than he hastily crossed to the further bank of the Marne (March 3), and retreated towards the north. Napoleon pursued, and manœuvred to surround the Prussians, but was unsuccessful, partly owing to the advance of fresh allied corps down the Namur-Laon-Paris road. On the 7th a severe action was fought at Craonne with little result. Blucher, however, retreated, and on the 9th at Laon once more offered battle, and this time with success. Napoleon was severely defeated and retreated to Rheims. Still hoping for success, however, and learning that Schwarzenberg was again on the march for Paris, he left Rheims and

marched hurriedly southwards to attack the Austrians once more. On the 20th of March the French advance guard came into contact with an Austrian column at Arcis-sur-Aube. Soon the whole of Napoleon's little army was in action but the Emperor discovered, when it was too late to disengage himself, that it was not an isolated Austrian corps but the whole of Schwarzenberg's army that faced him. The odds were too great, and though Napoleon rode through the fiercest fire, apparently courting death, he could not avert a crushing defeat. Beaten by both Prussians and Austrians, his army shattered, all hope of success now seemed lost; but Napoleon played one last desperate card. Instead of retreating towards Paris, he issued orders for the army to march north-east, towards the Rhine. His object was to base himself on the frontier fortresses, to sweep aside the allied forces blockading them, and to operate against Schwarzenberg's and Blucher's lines of communications. It was a defensible move from a strictly military point of view, but was feeble politically. For there was now a Bourbon movement forming, and Napoleon had driven France to such a pass that peace would have appeared a cheap blessing to nearly all men at any cost. At Paris was a weak

government, the Empress, the King of Rome, Joseph Bonaparte, with few troops, little hope, and no ability. An occupation of the city would mean the proclamation of the Bourbons and the downfall of Napoleon.

Detaching a large force of cavalry to mask his movements, Schwarzenberg risked his line of communications, pushed straight on for Paris, effected his junction with Blucher in the neighbourhood of Meaux, and on the 29th of March arrived under the walls of the capital. One day earlier Napoleon at Doulevent realized that his manœuvre had not drawn his opponents from their objective, and that Paris was in imminent danger; he decided to start for the capital. He travelled post-haste, taking a southerly route by the Seine valley, leaving the army to follow him. On the evening of the 30th he reached Fontainebleau with a few attendants, where he received reports that heavy fighting had been going on before Paris, and that it had capitulated. He continued his journey, and, a few miles further on, met the troops that had just left the city by the terms of capitulation. General Belliard urged him to give up all thought of proceeding, and he turned back to Fontainebleau, where he took up his quarters in the Palace.

The game had been played out to the bitter end, and Napoleon had lost. He could still muster fifty thousand men at Fontainebleau, and for a day or two he threatened to continue the struggle, but France was fast turning from him. A Provisional Government, of which the chief member was Talleyrand, had proclaimed the restoration of the Bourbons, and even the marshals were anxious to put an end to the frightful eighteen months' drama that had cost a million lives and that had shaken their allegiance to their old comrade and Emperor. The hard facts of the situation were too great for even Napoleon to conquer, and on the 4th of April he signed a formal abdication. A week later he concluded a personal treaty with the allies whereby he was granted the sovereignty of the little island of Elba off the coast of Tuscany, the title of Emperor, and an annual revenue of two million francs, payable by the French government. While these negotiations were proceeding the new King, Louis XVIII., had made his entry into Paris surrounded by a group of marshals all wearing the white cockade of the Bourbons. On the 20th of April Napoleon's travelling carriage was ready for his conveyance as soon as one last ceremony should have been duly accomplished. A few

hundred veterans, the remains of the Old Guard, were drawn up in the courtyard of the palace for the last parade, for the last farewell. Then, at last, emotion broke down the indomitable courage, the pitiless intellect of the great captain. When in front of that splendid setting of presented bayonets and sombre faces, grim under the tall bearskins, he saw the tattered tricolour, — the flag of Lodi, of Marengo, of Austerlitz, — lowered to him for the last time, he was suddenly overpowered, and seizing the glorious symbol he buried his head in its folds and sobbed. That dramatic scene portended much, for it was not only the Emperor Napoleon whom the Bourbons were displacing, but also Napoleon the child of the Revolution; their white standard had displaced not only the flag of the Empire but that of the Republic.

CHRONOLOGY

27 Jan.,	1814.	St. Dizier.
29 "	"	Brienne.
1 Feb.,	"	La Rothière.
10 "	"	Champaubert.
13 "	"	Montmirail.
17 "	"	Nangis.
7 March,	"	Craonne.
9 "	"	Laon.

13 March,	1814.	Wellington enters Bordeaux.
20 "	"	Arcis-sur-Aube.
30 "	"	Paris capitulates.
4 April,	"	Abdication of Napoleon.
11 "	"	Treaty of Fontainebleau.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

In the preceding chapter several matters are treated shortly: the campaign of Prince Eugène in Italy, for which see authorities quoted in last chapter; the operations of Wellington from Vittoria to Toulouse, for which see NAPIER or forthcoming volumes of OMAN; the Bourbon intrigues for which see the *Memoirs* of DE VITROLLES or PASQUIER, and the negotiations of the allies and Napoleon, for which see FOURNIER, *Der Congress von Chatillon*, Vienna, 1900, and among *Memoirs*, CASTLEREAGH'S dispatches. For the Campaign of France see FAIN, *Manuscrit de 1814*, Paris, 1823; HOUSSAYE, *1814*, Paris, 1888 (WEIL covers the same ground in more detailed fashion). For Maria Louisa and Napoleon at Fontainebleau, see WELSCHINGER, *Le roi de Rome*, Paris, 1897.

CHAPTER XVI

ELBA

Return of the Bourbons — Congress of Vienna — French Dissatisfaction — Napoleon leaves Elba — His progress to Paris — Changed Situation — Attitude of the Powers — Champ de Mai.

THE return of the Bourbons, which few men thought possible a month before it happened, changed the whole aspect of the events that had brought it about. It was now clearly perceived that the triumph of the allies meant more than the fall of Napoleon, and that the autocratic system challenged by the Revolution, modified by the Empire, was to be reasserted. The Powers were now intent on readjusting the territorial divisions of Europe on such a footing as the old order of things and their recent successes appeared to make suitable; but it was soon found, not unnaturally, that it would be a difficult matter to settle satisfactorily the numerous points at issue. It was therefore decided to call a congress of the great Powers at which every outstanding European question

should be determined; this congress eventually assembled at Vienna, its first meeting taking place on the 20th of September.

Of the different questions discussed by the Powers two appeared likely to lead to difficulties. The first of these concerned the parcelling out of north-eastern Germany, especially Saxony and Poland. This question created such antagonism that Austria, opposing Russia and Prussia, finally entered into a secret treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain; there seemed, in fact, a strong prospect of a new European war. The question of Naples also gave rise to much difficulty. Murat's course of action during the campaign of 1814 on the Po had been nearly as unsatisfactory to the allies as to Napoleon, and now the two restored Bourbon kings,—of France and of Spain, — were making every effort to get their kinsman Ferdinand reinstated at Naples. Murat prepared for war, hoped to take advantage of the apparently approaching conflict between Austria and Russia, and towards the end of February 1815 chose the bold course of directly challenging the recognition of France.

Meanwhile what had become of Napoleon? The island of Elba in which he was cooped up

was far too small to hold so great a man. This had been generally felt immediately after the signing of the treaty that sent him there, and proposals had been put forward by Bourbon partisans for his removal to the Azores and even more distant points. It is not credible that Napoleon would have ever become reconciled to his diminutive domain; it is not credible that even without provocation he would have abstained from once more taking part in that great game of politics that every instinct prompted him to, yet he did receive direct provocations that partly excuse the course he eventually adopted. He had heavy expenses to meet in Elba, for no sooner there than he began to improve roads and ports, to develop mines, to infuse such animation in the island as it had never known; he had a thousand veterans in his service whom he had been allowed to keep for his personal protection, and these had to be maintained; yet he could get no payment of the revenue secured to him by the treaty of Fontainebleau. There was even a worse grievance than this: his wife and his son were denied him.

Maria Louisa had left Paris with the King of Rome at the approach of the allies. She had

retired to Blois and had thought of joining Napoleon at Fontainebleau. But she hesitated, and presently Metternich persuaded her into various steps that gradually drew her under her father's influence. Keeping her away from Fontainebleau, Metternich eventually persuaded her to Vienna. He placed as special diplomatic representative near her a dashing, amiable, and skilful negotiator, General Count Neipperg, who was destined never to leave her and eventually to marry her. In the first few weeks after the abdication of the Emperor correspondence passed between him and the Empress, and she showed some sign of attempting to join him at Elba, as he desired. Later, as Metternich's hold tightened, the correspondence was intercepted and at last dropped.

As Napoleon brooded over his disasters, his mistakes, and his wrongs, he was silently but intently watching the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna on the one hand, the state of public opinion in France on the other. In France the all-important factor was the army, as it had been for twenty years past. The peace had set free thousands of seasoned soldiers who returned from every part of Europe to find their old flag hauled down, and a new

government in power little inclined to give them employment or help. It was inevitable that Louis XVIII. should reduce the strength of the army, it was equally inevitable that such a step should lead to discontent.

Thousands of officers were placed on half pay (in 1816 they numbered over sixteen thousand), which meant a trifling allowance rising from forty-four francs a year for lieutenants. Among these old soldiers the feeling against the Bourbons was doubly bitter, and not a few openly declared their hope that one whom from his favourite flower they called *le Père la Violette* would soon come to their rescue. There was another active section of the population, militant ex-Jacobins, politicians, republicans, also actively opposed to the Bourbons and pushing eagerly towards a change of government. Probably the great mass of the people was content to be at peace once more and was, if not loyal to the new monarch, at all events opposed to change; yet it is the active section and not the great mass that generally effects a revolution.

Towards the close of February, then, it was confidently expected in high political quarters that a war was about to break out in north-eastern Europe, and Napoleon judged that

France was ripe to revolt against the Bourbons; he determined to risk all and turn that revolt to his profit. On the 25th of February he embarked his handful of soldiers in several small vessels, set sail, happily escaped the observation of the British cruisers, and on the 1st of March disembarked at Cannes. Turning away from the royalist towns of the coast of Provence, Napoleon at once marched north at the head of his little column, into the mountains, towards Savoy. On the 5th, nearing Grenoble, the result of his adventure was settled. Troops had been sent to arrest him and were discovered in position barring the road. Napoleon took with him forty grenadiers, their muskets reversed, and advanced on foot. When near to the opposing line, he threw open his long grey coat, showing his well-known uniform and the red ribbon of the Legion of Honour. When the soldiers saw once more that little stout man with the square head and piercing eye, their companion, their leader, who had planted the glorious flag that was carried behind him in every capital of Europe, they could resist no longer. Some one in the ranks shouted *Vive l'Empereur*, the line broke out into vehement cheers and the soldiers crowded about Napoleon tearing

the hated white cockades from their shakos. That scene was repeated with variations at every point at which the Emperor met his old soldiers between Grenoble and Paris. Colonel Labédoyère, his former aide-de-camp, ordered the drums of his regiment to be broken open and drew from that receptacle where they had been sacredly treasured the old flag and the tri-colour cockades. At Lyons a large army under Macdonald's orders melted away at the first distant glimpse of the magician attired in the grey coat and little cocked hat. Louis XVIII. in despair entrusted the Guard to Ney, and that marshal declared he would cage the usurper; but long before Napoleon arrived the contagion had outstripped him, and Ney and the Guard were his long before they met him. The Emperor accomplished the last stages of his journey in a carriage, attended by nothing more than half a dozen Polish lancers. Louis XVIII. fled from Paris on the 20th of March, and a few hours later Napoleon entered the capital unescorted and as secure as though he had never left it; his arrival at the palace of the Tuileries occasioned a remarkable scene. It will serve to explain the peculiar quality of that demonstration if the experience of one of the eye-witnesses be

recalled. General Thiébault, who had fought through all the wars of the Republic and Empire, had never been a zealous Bonapartist, rather the reverse; he had accepted the returned Bourbons, and carried out his duty in opposing Napoleon's return. Deserted by his troops he had quietly returned to his house in Paris with the firm intention of taking no further active share in the events of the day. But the arrival, the personality of Napoleon was in the air; Thiébault was restless and decided after dining that he would go out and indulge in a short walk. At first he resolutely turned his steps in the opposite direction to the Tuileries, but presently the irresistible magnet began to draw; soon he found himself one of a great throng of old soldiers and citizens hurrying to the palace gates. Presently a travelling carriage drove up in the midst of a hurricane of cheers, a wild dash was made for it, and from the midst of the turmoil Napoleon appeared, was hoisted in strong arms from one step to another up to his old apartments on the first floor of the Tuileries; and Thiébault was one of the crowd and cheering as wildly as the others! That night a volunteer guard of general officers did sentry duty at the Emperor's door, but within

a day or two everything had fallen back into the old imperial routine.

Superficially all was the same; in reality Napoleon's position was vastly changed. Even about his person many familiar faces were missing. Berthier, who as chief-of-staff had never left his side since 1796, did not choose to join him now, and Soult was appointed to that arduous post. Prince Eugène who had taken up his residence in the dominions of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, showed no desire to return to Paris. Joséphine the wife, the friend of early and of late days, whom he frequently visited since the divorce and still preferred to all others, had died at the Malmaison shortly after the abdication, and the old home of consular days was deserted. Talleyrand was in Vienna upholding the Bourbon interests, and there helped to define the position of Napoleon in a proclamation that was less to the credit of the Powers than a confession of the genius of their opponent; the assembled monarchs and diplomatists of Europe solemnly proclaimed that Napoleon was an outlaw, "outside the pale of social and civil relations and liable to public vengeance." It was, in plain words, an incitement to assassination, and showed that the struggle was to be of a

new character, that negotiation was out of the question, and that war must be to the death. Napoleon on his side declared, with more or less sincerity, that he was anxious for peace, that he intended to abide by the treaties that had closed the war of 1814, and that his return to the throne was merely an incident of internal policy that concerned the French people and himself; at the same time he lost not an hour in preparing for hostilities.

But the greatest change in the position of Napoleon was that in his relation to French liberalism. Before his landing at Cannes a republican revolution was thought to be imminent by many, and if he had profited by the agitation and converted it to his own uses, he was none the less bound to base his position on popular support and to reckon with the leaders of the liberal party. He was repeating Brumaire, but with a weaker case. How far the internal necessities of his position carried him may be judged from the fact that one of his earliest measures (March 24) was to remove the restrictions on the press; this was followed by the selection of two pronounced liberals, Carnot and Constant, as ministers, and by the announcement that the constitution would be amended in a popular direction. On the 22d

of April the constitutional changes were announced; the most important was that the legislative body or lower House was to be elected by the direct vote of the people.

In the meanwhile matters looked daily more like war, and the stability of the remarkable evolution of French political institutions marked by the return of Napoleon was felt to be really dependent on the event of the approaching military operations.

If there was one sovereign whom Napoleon might hope to detach from the European alliance, it was his father-in-law the Emperor of Austria, but, as it happened, his were the first troops engaged. Murat had closed his wranglings with the Powers by a stroke of despair, and immediately after Napoleon's departure from Elba had ordered his army into northern Italy. He was opposed by Austria. After a short campaign he was completely defeated at Tolentino, his army disbanded, and the Austrians occupied Naples, proclaiming Ferdinand. Murat escaped to the south of France, where he arrived just as Napoleon was on the point of leaving Paris to assume command of the French army for the last time.

On the 1st of June there was held a great ceremony known, in defiance of all chronological

considerations, as the *Champ de Mai*. Detachments from every corps of the army paraded and received new flags, and Napoleon solemnly pronounced an oath to maintain the new constitution. Attired in a theatrical and unbecoming costume he delivered a speech in which he appealed strongly to national and liberal sentiment and declared that as Emperor, as Consul, and as soldier, his every act had been dictated by his devotion to France. But these Napoleonic apologetics were not of vital importance; an Anglo-Prussian army under Wellington and Blucher was assembled close to Brussels, a large Austrian army under Schwarzenberg was nearing the Rhine, all Russia and Germany were alive with columns marching towards the French frontier, — here was the all-important problem to be solved: Could Napoleon reassert his military superiority? Were the French soldiers and generals the equals of those of a few years before? Were the soldiers and generals of the allies no better than their predecessors?

CHRONOLOGY

20 Sept.,	1814.	Congress of Vienna.
3 Jan.,	1815.	Treaty of Alliance, Austria, France, and Great Britain.
25 Feb.,	"	Napoleon leaves Elba.
1 March,	"	Disembarks at Cannes.
20 "	"	Arrives at Paris.
3 May,	"	Murat defeated at Tolentino.
1 June,	"	Champ de Mai.

NOTE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL: GENERAL. — See page 11.

For the Congress of Vienna, see PALLAIN'S *Correspondance de Talleyrand*, Paris, 1881; also METTERNICH'S *Memoirs*, and D'ANGEBERG, *Congrés de Vienne*, Paris, 1847. For Italian affairs, HELFERT and WEIL as already referred to. For the journey to Elba and subsequent events, see TRUCHSESS VON WALDBURG, *Bonaparte's Reise von Fontainebleau*, Berlin, 1815; HOUSSAYE, *1815*, Paris, 1898; GRUYER, *Napoleon, King of Elba*, London, 1906.

CHAPTER XVII

WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA

Plan of Campaign — Ligny — March on Brussels — Waterloo — Second Abdication — St. Helena — Death of Napoleon.

IT is curious to find Napoleon confronted in his last campaign by precisely the same military problem as in his first, applying the same solution, but meeting with a different result. In 1796, as now, his opponents were superior in numbers, occupied an extended line and belonged to two armies operating from two different bases; in 1815, as before, he decided to strike in full force at the point of junction of his opponents and to throw them back in diverging directions on their respective bases. The French army numbering about one hundred and twenty thousand men was rapidly concentrated during the first week in June, and on the 11th the Emperor left Paris to take command. On the 14th he was at Beaumont on the frontier, in the midst of his troops, and within a few days' march of Brussels.

So rapid was the French advance that the Prussians and English got little warning of the approaching storm. Blucher, in command of the former, was operating on the line of the Sambre and Meuse through Liège and Namur, and his different corps were distributed in the neighbourhood of the last-named city and Charleroi. The British under the Duke of Wellington had their base at Antwerp and their line of communications ran from that city to Brussels, and thence some twenty-five miles south where the troops were quartered to the west of the Prussians in the neighbourhood of Quatre Bras, Genappe, Nivelles and further to the west. A road running east and west through Quatre Bras and Ligny served to connect the Prussian right with the British left. It was at this point that Napoleon aimed.

On the 15th the armies were in contact, the French driving back such opposition as they met with and occupying Charleroi. Blucher succeeded, however, in concentrating the greater part of his troops in the course of the night, and determined to hold his ground at St. Amand and Ligny the next day. The British were more completely surprised than the Prussians, yet the small force occupying Quatre



Position at nightfall, June 17, 1815

Bras was left there and received such supports as could be pushed forward. On the 16th Napoleon advanced to the attack of the Prussians, detaching a corps under Ney to operate against the British. A fierce struggle took place for the possession of the villages of St. Amand and Ligny that were at last carried by the French; Blucher, although he had lost heavily, retired slowly towards Gembloux in fairly good order. During the course of the same day Ney had been engaged with the British at Quatre Bras, but had not gained any ground. Yet on the whole the operations of the 16th had been very favourable to Napoleon: he had defeated the Prussians, inspirited his soldiers, and broken through the line of contact between the two allied armies. That night Napoleon formed a corps of some thirty thousand men which he placed under Grouchy, ordering him to follow Blucher's retreat. The Prussian general might withdraw along the line of the Sambre and Meuse; this was the obvious course for him to follow and the one Napoleon hoped he would take. But he might play a bolder game and leaving his line of operations move north and attempt to join hands with Wellington in the neighbourhood of Brussels; bolder yet, he might retreat ex-centrically and threaten the

French line of communications. During the early hours of the 17th Napoleon waited to get information; but Blucher moved fast, Grouchy slowly; the French light cavalry was at fault and could get no certain news. At last, hearing that the British still held Quatre Bras, Napoleon put the whole army in movement towards that point.

Wellington had no intention of holding Quatre Bras now that the Prussians had been forced to retreat, and he had only a rear guard in position when Napoleon arrived on the scene. The Duke got into communication with the Prussians, and believed that Blucher's intention was to move north and to effect a junction in front of Brussels if possible. He therefore decided to fall back some miles from Quatre Bras to a strong position at Mont Saint Jean, where he hoped for support. On the morning of the 17th he had not yet decided whether he would risk a battle at that point or not; that, as he explained to one of Blucher's staff officers, entirely depended on whether Blucher could undertake to support him with one of his corps.

All through the afternoon of the 17th of June Napoleon pushed on with cavalry and horse artillery after the British rear guard from

Quatre Bras northwards towards Brussels. In the evening he had reached the farm of La Belle Alliance and thence saw a mile in front the whole of Wellington's army evidently prepared to give battle. The Emperor now stopped, and as the evening passed into night long columns of soldiers came up and were bivouacked right and left of the road between Genappe and La Belle Alliance. On that same night Grouchy, marching with painful hesitation and slowness, had only reached Gembloux. He had now, however, ascertained that the Prussians had retreated towards Wavre, and proposed marching in that direction the following morning. Blucher had, indeed, acted with the boldness, decision, and promptitude of a good soldier, and on the night of the 17th he had his whole army concentrated near Wavre. Thence he dispatched a staff officer to inform Wellington that not one corps, but three, under his personal command, would march to the assistance of the British early in the morning. This message reached the Duke about two o'clock in the morning of the 18th, and he determined in consequence to hold his ground.

On the 18th of June was fought the battle of Waterloo, so called from a village some way from the scene of action, the last and most

disastrous field of the greatest soldier known to history. Napoleon had some seventy thousand men actually present, Wellington rather less. Blucher, who came up late, engaged his troops gradually, and probably, at the last, had not more than thirty thousand in the fighting. Wellington's army was of mixed composition, and many of his corps, newly recruited in Holland, were of very poor quality; he relied chiefly on his excellent British and German infantry. He had disposed his line according to his favourite method some fifty or one hundred yards back from the summit of a slope that the French would have to top in their advance. His infantry was in part further protected by a transversal sunken lane that acted as a sort of natural ditch. Wellington's position stretched out east and west of the Brussels road. On his right the manor house and enclosures of Hougoumont formed a strong natural bastion. In the centre the farm of la Haye Sainte formed another advanced position. The British left was more open, but a move in that direction led over ground heavy and in part impassable for horses, while it might also result in exposing the French to a flank attack from the Prussians. Napoleon, contrary to the opinion of all those of his generals who had fought the

British in Spain, decided not to manœuvre but to attack frontally. In this it is hard to believe that he was right, for the French troops manœuvred more rapidly than any in Europe, while the British were equally pre-eminent for their unflinching steadiness under attack and their deadly musketry.

Heavy rain since the preceding day had turned the roads into quagmires; guns and transport wagons could be moved only with the greatest difficulty. Napoleon could not get his army ready for action, and the morning hours slowly passed. During that time Grouchy was marching steadily towards Wavre, while Blucher was struggling hard to get his columns on towards Mont Saint Jean but made hardly any progress in the muddy lanes of the valley of the Dyle. At last at 12 o'clock the Emperor opened the battle by sending the King of Westphalia to the attack of Hougoumont. This was only a demonstration, though fierce fighting took place at this point throughout the day. The real attack was to be made at the centre, where Napoleon intended to force the British line and establish himself at the cross-roads of Mont Saint Jean. Heavy columns of infantry, twenty thousand men in all, marched forward to the attack, faced the

fire of the British artillery, breasted the slope, topped it, and then received the volleys of the British infantry. There was a fierce struggle; Picton led forward his brigade with the bayonet and was killed; the British cavalry charged and finally the French rolled back from the slope beaten, while the horsemen wrought havoc among them.

The British cavalry went too far in pursuit, and was now assailed and routed by the French cavalry; the Emperor supported the first by fresh squadrons, and a great mass of horse soon climbed the slope from which the French infantry had been so disastrously driven. The British infantry was now thrown into squares, alternating on two lines in chess-board pattern, and the cavalry charged in among them, but with no success. A new and more determined effort was made. Ney led the attack. Every available horseman was thrown in. Long lines surged upwards, steel-breasted cuirassiers, tall horse grenadiers in bearskins, carabineers with gilded armour and enormous curved helmets, Polish lancers with fluttering pennons, dragoons, hussars. The British gunners from the crest line ploughed great holes in their ranks, then at the last moment ran back to the infantry squares for protection. But though the French

cavalry easily overran the guns and swallowed the squares of red-coated soldiers in their midst, they could make little impression on the coolly levelled bayonets, while a destructive fire mowed them down in hundreds. Three times was the charge renewed, but after the fourth failure it was no longer possible to hope that the Emperor's cavalry would turn the fortunes of the day. A great part of it lay dead and mangled along the front of the British position.

The battle had not been long in progress when Napoleon observed a dark column of soldiers winding along a road some miles away to the east. Before long it became clear that some Prussian movement was to be expected from that direction, and the French right was thrown back and reinforced. The Prussians attacked as soon as they could be brought into action fighting in a line that may be roughly described as at right angles with the British left and parallel with the Brussels-Quatre Bras road. This they were beginning to threaten to the rear of the French right while the great cavalry charges against Wellington's centre were progressing. Napoleon, however, was still hopeful of forcing the British line before the Prussian attack had developed sufficient force. He also hoped that Grouchy might come up

on his right, and sent orders for that marshal to march in the direction of the main army. But Grouchy, obeying his original orders in a strict sense, was following the Prussian rear guard which kept him engaged during the whole day in the neighbourhood of Wavre.

The Emperor now ordered Ney to resume the attack and to carry la Haye Sainte at any cost. Ney led his men in person, and after a fierce struggle drove the defenders from the farm. He had now obtained a foothold in the British centre, and getting some guns in position at short range opened a deadly fire. Several of the English brigades were now nearly shattered, some German and Dutch troops gave way, and a stream of fugitives set in from the field towards Brussels. But Wellington and his splendid infantry remained firm, gaps were filled as best they could be, and Ney could get no response to his pressing call for some fresh troops to drive home the attack. Napoleon had in truth at that moment no troops to spare; all the reserves had been used save a few regiments of the infantry of the Guard, and the Prussians had just carried the village of Planchenoit within striking distance of his line of retreat. The position was fast getting desperate for the Emperor. Two regiments of the Guard, however,

drove the Prussians out of Planchenoit, and taking advantage of this respite Napoleon aimed one last blow at Wellington's centre. Some four thousand infantry of the Guard were massed into column and Ney advanced at their head over the ground where he had led the cavalry earlier in the day. The exhausted combatants to the right and left, from la Haye Sainte to Hougoumont, paused and watched the slow advance of that magnificent infantry, the last remnant of veterans of the great armies of the Republic and the Empire. From along the crest the English gunners poured down grape and cannister. The commander of the infantry of the Guard, Count Friant, fell dead; Ney's horse was shot down, but the marshal jumped to his feet, drew his sword, and marched on through the smoke dauntlessly. Once more the crest was won, once more the British infantry behind it poured in their withering musketry. The Old Guard deployed its melting lines as best it could, and for five or ten minutes struggled to hold its ground. But the fire was too deadly, the French began to recede, and soon their broken lines were flowing backwards. At this moment the Duke of Wellington rode forward to the crest, his figure could be seen for some way along the British line; he raised his hat

high in the air and waved it towards the enemy. At this victorious signal the British regiments advanced along the whole line, fifes and drums, bugles and bagpipes urging the men forward. The French army was beaten. The sight of the Old Guard rolling back in confusion, of fresh columns of Prussians closing in on the right, told the defeated French that all was lost. On the high road by la Belle Alliance a few squares of grenadiers still held their ground and gave Napoleon shelter; but all attempts to stay the panic that had now seized the whole army was hopeless. The pursuit was taken up by the Prussians, and it was not till three days later and many miles within the French frontiers that the army could be restored to some semblance of order.

Napoleon had appealed to the supreme political test and failed, and he now apparently entertained no hope of being able to recover his position. He arrived in the capital on the night of the 20th, and on the following day the Chamber, on the motion of Lafayette, declared itself in permanent session and directed the ministers to report to it. In effect this was a withdrawal of authority from the hands of Napoleon, and he accepted it in that sense. On the following day he abdicated for

the second time in favour of his son. A week later the allies were nearing Paris, and the provisional government, led by Fouché, was intriguing with the Bourbons. There was nothing Napoleon could now do but to try to leave France. He proceeded to Rochefort, whence he expected to be able to find ship for the United States. But a British cruiser blockaded the port, and Napoleon finding no other course possible finally went on board H. M. S. *Bellerophon*, Captain Maitland, and threw himself on the generosity of Great Britain.

The arrival of the *Bellerophon* and her illustrious passenger at Portsmouth created great excitement in England. It is easy to see at this distance of time that Napoleon's career was run, and that a magnanimous treatment would not have been dangerous. But the feeling of those days was violent. Never had Great Britain been so threatened and alarmed as she had been when the army of Austerlitz was encamped along the shores of the Channel. The generation that had struggled with and defeated Napoleon could not forgive him, and General Bonaparte, as the British Government childishly insisted on addressing him, was sent to the island of St. Helena, in the South Atlantic, as a State prisoner.

Of his six years' residence in that island there is but little that can be said here with advantage. Controversy has raged about the trivial matters over which the illustrious prisoner and his gaoler, Sir Hudson Lowe, disputed. Englishmen have written to prove that Napoleon was insulted and shabbily treated, Frenchmen to prove that he spent his whole time lying and intriguing against Sir Hudson Lowe. It is altogether fortunate that these matters are of minor importance, and that they need not be discussed in a work of these dimensions. It is a self-evident proposition that under the most favourable circumstances the coupling of Napoleon with a British military officer not remarkable for tact or urbanity on a barren rock in mid Atlantic could hardly lead to agreeable results. For those who have noted the peculiarities of Napoleon's character it will appear natural that his constant occupation at St. Helena was to dictate to some of his companions in exile statements of a biassed and misleading character as to his history. He was busy elaborating the Napoleonic legend, creating an artificial atmosphere of fact from which he hoped would emerge in some future time an empire for his son. Towards the little King of Rome his thoughts frequently turned, and

when in 1820 it became clear that an illness he had felt before at intervals was now becoming dangerously acute, he dictated long instructions for the future guidance of his son. The last sentence of his will was of an extraordinary character. Was it hallucination, or was it astute calculation, that made him write: "My wish is to be buried on the banks of the Seine in the midst of the French people whom I so dearly loved"?

He died on the 5th of May 1821, of cancer in the stomach, and was buried under a weeping willow near Longwood, where he had spent six weary years of exile. British soldiers accompanied him to his rest with reversed arms, and fired a parting salute over his grave. Twenty years later, as if the violent contrasts of his life had not yet been exhausted, his body was ceremoniously transferred to Paris and buried in the Invalides with every circumstance of military pomp and national mourning and under the auspices of a Bourbon King.

CHRONOLOGY

16 June, 1815.	Ligny.
18 " "	Waterloo.
22 " "	Napoleon abdicates.
5 May, 1821.	Death of Napoleon.

NOTE

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For Waterloo see also: KELLY, *The Battle of Wavre*, London, 1906, and various articles in German reviews by PFLUGCK-HARTTUNG and LETTOW-VORBECK.

APPENDIX A

BONAPARTE FAMILY


Charles Bonaparte — Letizia Ramolino
— Joseph, King of Spain, d. 1844, — (no male descendants).
— Napoleon, d. 1821.
Maria Louisa — Duke of Reichstadt, d. 1832.
— Lucien, d. 1840, (barred from imperial succession).
— Louis, King of Holland, d. 1846.
Hortense Beauharnais — Napoleon Charles, d. 1807.
— Napoleon Louis, d. 1831.
— Louis Napoleon, Emperor, d. 1873.
Eugénie Montijo — Napoleon Louis, d. 1879
— Jerome, K. of Westphalia, d. 1860.
Catherine of Wurtemberg — Napoleon Joseph, d. 1891.
Clotilde of Savoy — Victor Napoleon
— Louis Napoleon
— Elisa
Prince Baciocchi
— Pauline
Prince Borghese
— Caroline
Joachim Murat, King of Naples, d. 1815. — Murat family.

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